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Abstract
Electricity networks are undergoing a transformation brought on by new
technologies, market pressures and environmental concerns. This includes
a shift from large centralised generators to small-scale distributed generat-
ors. The dramatic cost reductions in rooftop solar PV and battery storage
means that prosumers (houses and other entities that can both produce and
consume electricity) will have a large role to play in future networks.
How can networks be managed going forward so that they run as effi-
ciently as possible in this new prosumer paradigm? Our vision is to treat
prosumers as active participants by developing a mechanism that incentiv-
ises them to help balance power and support the network. The whole process
is automated to produce a near-optimal outcome and to reduce the need for
human involvement.
The first step is to design an autonomous energy management system
(EMS) that can optimise the local costs of each prosumer in response to
network electricity prices. In particular, we investigate different optimisation
strategies for an EMS in an uncertain household environment. We find
that the uncertainty associated with weather, network pricing and occupant
behaviour can be effectively handled using online optimisation techniques
using a forward receding horizon.
The next step is to coordinate the actions of many EMSs spread out
across the network, in order to minimise the overall cost of supplying elec-
tricity. We propose a distributed algorithm that can efficiently coordinate
a network with thousands of prosumers without violating their privacy. We
experiment with a range of power flow models of varying degrees of ac-
curacy in order to test their convergence rate, computational burden and
solution quality on a suburb-sized microgrid. We find that the higher accur-
acy model, although non-convex, converges in a timely manner and produces
near-optimal solutions. We also develop simple but effective techniques for
dealing with residential shiftable loads which require discrete decisions.
The final part of the problem we explore is prosumer manipulation of
the coordination mechanism. The receding horizon nature of our algorithm
is great for managing uncertainty, but it opens up unique opportunities
for prosumers to manipulate the actions of others. We formalise this form
of receding horizon manipulation and investigate the benefits manipulative
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agents can obtain. We find that indeed strategic agents can harm the system,
but only if they are large enough and have information about the behaviour
of other agents. For the rare cases where this is possible, we develop simple
privacy-preserving identifiers that monitor agents and distinguish manipu-
lation from uncertainty.
Together, these components create a complete solution for the distrib-
uted coordination and optimisation of network-aware electricity prosumers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electricity networks are undergoing a huge transformation due to the emer-
gence of new technologies, market pressures and environmental concerns.
The most significant trend is the transition from large centralised to small
distributed forms of generation. The adoption of rooftop solar is shifting
the ownership and control of generation away from large companies and
into the hands of consumers. Such prosumers (houses and other entities
that can both produce and consume electricity) have the opportunity to
meet significant portions of their own energy needs and to sell excess power.
Distributed generation both positively and negatively affects electricity
networks. It can reduce losses and allow for leaner, cheaper network designs;
however, the weather dependent nature of distributed generation like solar
photovoltaics (PV) means that supply does not always align with demand.
In addition to this, uncontrolled or uncoordinated distributed generation
can create voltage, peak power flow and ramping problems for networks.
Solar PV is already causing problems in some networks, and it will only
get worse with time. For example, in some areas of the Australian network,
the amount of rooftop PV has reached the point where utilities have to limit
or reject new proposals if the impacts are assessed to be adverse [AEMO,
2012, CAT Projects and ARENA, 2015]. The only other option utilities
currently have, network augmentation, is cost-prohibitive.
Other types of distributed energy technologies (DETs), including battery
storage, electric vehicles (EVs) and smart appliances, pose similar oppor-
tunities but also similar risks to the network as PV [Ramchurn et al., 2012,
Kok et al., 2009].
This thesis explores a new way forward for prosumers and utilities, where
they work together to operate the network as efficiently and safely as pos-
sible. It addresses the question:
How can DETs be operated so that the benefits to prosumers are
maximised whilst also supporting the network?
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In answering this question, we will enable networks to embrace higher
levels of DETs, most importantly rooftop PV and EVs. This will allow net-
works to operate more efficiently, with lower emissions and at lower cost.
Prosumers will benefit through lower network costs, greater flexibility, re-
wards for actively supporting the network, and better utilisation of their
DET assets.
We identify three parts that are necessary for a technical solution to the
above problem, which form the motivation for the work in this thesis:
1. having autonomous controllers for DETs that can minimise prosumer
energy costs in an uncertain environment;
2. coordinating the actions of multiple prosumer controllers to reduce
system-wide costs and satisfy network constraints; and
3. aligning the motivations of self-interested prosumers with what is fa-
vourable for the wider network.
When combined, these parts deliver a technical solution for the distrib-
uted coordination and optimisation of network-aware electricity prosumers.
Home Energy Management
The first part of this thesis recognises the need to automatically control
DETs so that the amount of human interaction is minimised. Prosumers do
not want to invest time in manually controlling their devices, and even if
they did, they would likely make poor decisions. Instead, what we propose
is an automated energy management system (EMS) that acts on behalf of
the prosumer to optimise their energy needs and costs, in a way that is
transparent and does not encroach on their freedom.
We focus on the development of an EMS for household prosumers (see
figure 1.1), although the same the techniques could be applied to commercial,
industrial or other types of prosumers. Houses are the most numerous (and
interesting) type of network participant, accounting for around 25% of the
total electricity consumption in countries like Australia [Vivid Economics,
2013].
The EMS communicates with devices present in the house and with the
network. The house occupants provide simple, high-level preferences and
constraints to the EMS, which then schedules the operation of the devices
in a way that minimises energy costs.
What makes this especially challenging is the presence of uncertainty,
which comes from a variety of sources including the weather, occupant be-
haviour and dynamic electricity prices. The EMS can make poor decisions
if it does not take this uncertainty into account. For example, it is typically
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Figure 1.1: An EMS controls household DETs including batteries, EVs, space
heating/cooling and smart appliances.
beneficial to align consumption within the house with the solar PV output,
which is not possible without a good prediction of solar production.
We design an EMS that can make sensible decisions in the face of uncer-
tainty, using ideas from model predictive control (MPC), receding horizon
control [Morari and Lee, 1999] and online stochastic optimisation [Van Hen-
tenryck and Bent, 2006]. The EMS schedules the operation of devices over
a forward horizon, using stochastic models for the uncertainty. This is cru-
cial because the operation of state-based household devices (e.g., battery
charge) needs to be planned out over multiple time steps. The EMS also
operates online, updating its stochastic models and schedule as it progresses,
enabling it to recover from poor earlier decisions and to take advantage of
new opportunities.
We develop models for the devices and stochastic models for the uncer-
tain aspects of the problem. Two different online algorithms are developed
that use mixed-integer programming, and are compared to more reactive
forms of control in an uncertain home environment—something that is miss-
ing from the existing literature.
We learn that for household devices and uncertainty, a simple approach
based on a receding horizon and an expectation of the future produces solu-
tions that are close to what can be obtained by an oracle. The approach
can quickly compute solutions, making it suitable for real-time use. We also
learn that more complicated techniques such as 2-stage stochastic program-
ming provide only very small additional returns, and impose a much higher
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computational burden.
These results show that, in practice, the uncertainty present in houses
can be managed with computationally efficient methods and that the case
for automating energy management is strong. The EMS can make local
control decisions on behalf of occupants, providing the building blocks for
the wide-scale control of DETs.
Network-Aware Coordination
The next step is to expand beyond a single prosumer by considering how
multiple EMSs impact the network. When prosumers are left to optimise
their own costs in an uncoordinated manner, the combination of their de-
cisions can create undesirable new peaks in supply and demand [Ramchurn
et al., 2011]. This effect, known as herding, has the potential to cause price
volatility, and large voltage, ramping and line limit problems [Farhoodnea
et al., 2013, de Hoog et al., 2013, Cain et al., 2010, Roozbehani et al., 2012].
To illustrate this problem, consider a network where prosumers own EVs
and are subject to peak/off-peak pricing. If the off-peak period starts at 10
pm, then many of the EVs will be scheduled to begin charging at 10 pm,
which could create a large spike in demand. On the other hand, spikes in
supply can be produced in sunny conditions by PV systems when the overall
demand for electricity is low. We cannot consider agents in isolation if we
want to ensure the safe operation of the network and the efficient utilisation
of available assets.
This motivates the next step where we take a network of prosumers with
EMSs and look at the larger problem of jointly optimising prosumer and
network costs. We take a network-aware approach, which means that we
explicitly model the flow of power on the network to correctly account for
the network’s behaviour and limitations. Conventional networks already
perform a similar task for large generating units, minimising dispatch costs
whilst obeying transmission network constraints. When this is extended to
allow prosumer participation, a significantly different approach is required.
Firstly, the scale of the problem is much larger than the conventional
dispatch problem. Instead of coordinating a few hundred generating units,
now many thousands or even millions of participants need to be considered
(see figure 1.2). Secondly, the distributed nature of the problem means that
localised distribution network constraints become significant, where before
they could be ignored. Finally, prosumers have a more diverse range of
behaviours and sensitivities which need to be considered.
We propose the use of distributed optimisation algorithms to handle this
huge increase in problem size. Distributed algorithms also enable greater
privacy for prosumers as their preferences and device behaviour are kept
local. The algorithm we use, the alternating direction method of multipliers
5Figure 1.2: A small sample of the many thousands of connected prosumers and
distributed generators that need to be coordinated to balance the network.
(ADMM) [Boyd et al., 2011], works by locally exchanging price and power
consumption/production information between prosumer EMSs and neigh-
bouring network components. The algorithm negotiates a set of dynamic
nodal prices and power allocations for the network and its participants. The
prices accurately represent the marginal cost of supplying power to that part
of the network, and are used to charge/pay prosumers for their actions. As
power allocations for each prosumer are negotiated ahead of time, it pre-
vents the herding effect exhibited by other pricing methods that have no
two-way negotiation.
The handling of network and prosumer non-convexity in distributed al-
gorithms is a significant unresolved problem that we tackle. Tractable dis-
tributed algorithms do not provide any guarantees of optimality when the
underlying problem is non-convex. Unfortunately, the equations that model
the physical flow of power on the network are non-convex, and the opera-
tion of certain household devices requires discrete decisions to be made. We
investigate how such non-convexities can be managed in a tractable manner
without sacrificing the quality of solutions.
What we find in our experiments is that the non-convex network models
can be used directly with little to no loss in solution quality and perform-
ance. We identify and compare a number of approaches that can be used to
handle the discrete decisions required to model shiftable smart appliances in
houses. We also investigate how pricing structures can be used to incentiv-
ise prosumers to meet their commitments in the presence of uncertainty.
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The end result is to show that a distributed approach to optimising and
coordinating EMSs is not only possible, but highly effective.
Receding Horizon Manipulation
The final contribution is to ensure that the incentives offered to prosumers
are aligned with the social objective of minimising the total system costs.
Our distributed algorithm minimises the social objective, but only if agents
act truthfully. By lying about their costs and constraints, prosumers can
reduce their own costs, at the detriment of others prosumers and the so-
cial objective. We want to reduce the ability of agents to perform such
manipulation and its impact on the system.
Existing electricity markets are already vulnerable to manipulation, with
generating units adjusting their bidding strategies to maximise their ad-
vantage. Beyond this, the receding horizon nature of our algorithm creates
unique opportunities for manipulation. The receding horizon is great for
dealing with uncertainty, but the added flexibility also allows more oppor-
tunity for agents to manipulate others.
To illustrate this form of manipulation, take two neighbours, Alice and
Bob, who both want to charge their EVs at 9 pm (see figure 1.3). The social
solution is for them to both charge at 9 pm. Alice realises that if it were
just her charging at 9 pm then the price will be lower. She artificially and
temporarily raises the price at 9 pm by claiming to require more power than
she actually needs. To avoid the price Bob charges at 8 pm. After Bob has
finished charging, Alice can start telling the truth, allowing the price at 9
pm to reduce to a value lower than in the social solution.
Figure 1.3: Two homes competiting to charge their electric vehicles.
It is difficult to correctly identify that Alice actually manipulated Bob, as
we do not have access to her private information, and she could pretend that
she was uncertain about her consumption requirements. There is a conflict
between allowing agents to recover from uncertainty while also preventing
manipulation.
We investigate receding horizon manipulation in detail. We develop a
greedy agent that uses bilevel optimisation [Migdalas et al., 1998] to calculate
strategies for manipulating other agents. This is used in experiments to
investigate how much a manipulative agent can achieve and how much it
7harms the system. We then develop non-invasive techniques which can be
used to detect this form of manipulation. If successfully identified, agents
can be fined or be subject to further auditing processes.
We find that it is possible for large agents or a large coalition of agents
to gain an advantage and harm the overall social objective. We manage to
successfully apply our identifiers to the actions of these agents, and distin-
guish their actions as being manipulative as opposed to just being honestly
uncertain. It does not completely eliminate manipulation, but it acts as a
strong deterrent, and makes it more difficult to calculate beneficial manip-
ulative strategies. Our framework allows new identifiers to be added over
time if agents develop new strategies.
Summary
To summarise, the key research question we tackle is how to operate distrib-
uted energy technologies in a way that maximises the benefits to prosumers
whilst also supporting the network. We address this question in three
parts that come together to form a complete solution: the development
of autonomous home EMSs that can operate in an uncertain environment;
the coordination of these EMSs across the network to reduce system-wide
costs while satisfying network constraints; and the development of identifiers
that deter strategic agents from manipulating the system.
We contribute to knowledge in each of these areas:
• We show how online stochastic optimisation based on a receding hori-
zon can be used to efficiently control devices within a house, and that
it produces solutions that compare favourably with a perfect inform-
ation case. It was found to have significant advantages over reactive
forms of control.
• We establish the suitability of different power flow models in a distrib-
uted optimisation setting and, how the non-convex power flow equa-
tions can be used directly to produce near-optimal results. Similarly,
we show how discrete shiftable house loads in practice can be included
in the distributed algorithm, and still achieve near-optimal results.
• We determine in the worst case how much strategic agents have to
gain and how much they can harm the performance of the system.
We formalise receding horizon manipulation in this power exchange
setting, and develop and demonstrate identifiers that can distinguish
strategic agents from uncertain agents.
Updating our power systems is crucial for the future of our environment
and the productivity of our societies. The development of renewable energy
and cheap battery storage, and the rapid electrification of the world requires
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new flexible and efficient solutions. Our work develops a key component of
the solution, by enabling prosumers to participate actively in the balancing
and management of the network.
Thesis Outline
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a non-technical introduction to power systems, look-
ing at topics such as energy markets, generation and power transmis-
sion/distribution. It also dedicates sections to describing the different
types of DETs and the different approaches that have been used to
incentivise and coordinate them.
Chapter 3 introduces the residential energy management problem and de-
velops online stochastic optimisation techniques for scheduling DETs
in the presence of uncertainty. These algorithms are compared with
reactive controllers and a clairvoyant controller on a household test
case.
Chapter 4 extends this to the wider problem of how to coordinate EMSs
over the network. A distributed algorithm is developed to perform the
coordination and is experimented with on a test microgrid for different
power flow models and methods for handling discrete decisions.
Chapter 5 investigates the potential for manipulation of the receding ho-
rizon mechanism. It formalises receding horizon manipulation, exper-
iments with a greedy strategic agent and develops identifiers to detect
this type of manipulation.
Chapter 6 concludes our findings and combined approach, and discusses
future developments.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides background material that sets the context and motiv-
ation for our problem. First we introduce power systems and what changes
distributed energy technologies (DETs) are causing. Then we introduce the
different types of DETs and the types of methods that have been proposed
for controlling/coordinating them. In later chapters we develop our dis-
tributed algorithm with these DETs in mind, and perform more detailed
comparisons to existing approaches.
Where relevant, later chapters include more topic-specific background
material. Chapter 3 has a section on stochastic programming, chapter 4
contains sections on power flows and distributed optimisation, and chapter
5 has a section on mechanism design.
2.1 Power Systems
Electric power systems (also known as grids or networks) have been used for
over a century to supply energy to our industries and homes, playing a cent-
ral role in enabling the technological and quality-of-life improvements over
this time. This section provides an overview of conventional power systems
and discusses the pressures they are experiencing from new technologies and
environmental concerns.
To help explain power systems, we refer to the National Electricity Mar-
ket (NEM) in Australia. The NEM network spans the east coast of Australia,
supplying some 19 million residents [AEMO, 2015a]. Many parallels can be
drawn between the NEM and other deregulated electricity markets such as
those in the USA.
Power systems consist of three main components: generators, consumers
and the network of conductors that transport power between the two. The
network is further divided into the transmission and distribution networks
(see figure 2.1). Conventional power systems are operated by central au-
thorities which manage the dispatch of generation and control of network
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components.
Generation Transmission Distribution Consumers
Figure 2.1: The main components of a power system.
2.1.1 Markets
In deregulated power systems, markets play a key role in facilitating the sup-
ply of electricity and coordinating operational decisions. These centralised
markets focus on coordinating the dispatch of large generation units and
managing the transmission network. In chapter 4 we construct a market of
our own, but one that coordinates prosumers and other network participants
in a decentralised way on the distribution network.
Wholesale energy supply markets ensure that there is always enough bulk
supply dispatched to meet forecast demand. Frequency regulation markets
recruit generators to balance any wholesale market supply and demand pre-
diction errors in real time.
The NEM is made up of one wholesale energy supply market (the spot
market) and 8 frequency control markets. Generators bid into the market
the amount of power they can supply for a particular price. The NEM
dispatch engine clears the market every 5 minutes by selecting the lowest
cost bids to match the forecast demand. The spot price is a 30 minute
average of these dispatch prices, and it is the price at which all dispatched
generators get paid.
Retailers buy electricity at the spot market price and onsell it to con-
sumers. The retail tariffs offered to consumers vary between regions and
depend on the type of customer (e.g., residential, commercial or industrial).
Residential tariffs are typically either constant or time-of-use (TOU) where
they change for different times of the day. Section 2.3.3 will discuss other
more dynamic forms of pricing.
Retail tariffs recover wholesale market costs for the retailer, but also
other costs to do with providing and maintaining the network. In the NEM
at least, transmission and distribution costs overwhelm the wholesale market
costs as shown in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Breakdown of NEM residential electricity bill costs in 2014 [AER, 2014].
2.1.2 Generation
Generators get their energy from either renewable (hydro, wind and solar)
or non-renewable (coal, gas, oil and nuclear) sources. In most countries the
majority of electricity still comes from non-renewable sources. Table 2.1
shows how coal supplies around 75% of the NEM electricity.
Table 2.1: NEM capacity and production by generator type for 2014/15 financial
year [AER, 2015]. Only includes registered generators (no rooftop PV).
Type Capacity (%) Production (%)
Black Coal 39.2 50.8
Brown Coal 14.3 25.7
Gas 20.1 11.6
Hydro 16.5 6.6
Wind 6.6 4.8
Other 3.2 0.5
Generators are dispatched so that supply always matches demand on the
network. The network itself cannot store electricity, so any mismatch will
cause fluctuations in frequency and voltage, which can ultimately damage
equipment or trigger a blackout. This dispatch problem is becoming more
challenging as networks transition away from large centralised forms of gen-
eration to small distributed generators, which is our primary motivation for
using DETs to help balance supply and demand.
The physical limitations and running costs of different generator types
influences what role they play in the network. Coal power stations have
relatively low fuel costs, but their starting and stopping procedures can be
lengthy and expensive. Gas turbines on the other hand can start, stop and
change their output quickly, but have high fuel costs. Renewables, such
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as wind and solar, have effectively zero marginal running costs, but their
availability is weather dependent.
As such, coal power stations provide a steady base-load supply and gas
turbines are typically peaking plants that get dispatched during peak load
or high ramping rate conditions. The near-zero running costs of renew-
ables means that they get dispatched whenever they are available. These
behaviours are observed in table 2.1 when the normalised amount of energy
each generator type could provide (capacity) is compared to the normalised
amount of energy it actually produced (production). For example, although
gas has 20.1% of the total capacity, it is only used to supply 11.6% of the
actual load.
In most networks the vast majority of electricity comes from a relatively
small number of very large power plants. For example, the NEM has less
than 400 registered generating units, with the 100 largest having around
80% of the total network capacity [AEMO, 2015b] (see figure 2.3). These
100 generating units are from around 40 individual power plants, which is a
tiny number when compared to the near 9 million metered consumers that
the NEM serves.
Figure 2.3: The Yallourn W brown coal power station alone supplies around 8% of
the NEM’s electricity (“Yallourn Power Station” by CSIRO, CC BY 3.0).
Large generators often have to be situated far from where the energy
is needed for public safety reasons and/or the need to be collocated with a
geographical feature (e.g., a coal mine, water source or hydro dam). The
transmission network serves the role of transporting high volumes of electri-
city from the generators to where it is needed.
Solar, wind and other renewables are expected to replace non-renewable
generation in the coming decades, both for environmental and economic reas-
ons. For example, studies estimate that since 2013 wind has been cheaper
than new build coal power in Australia [Bloomberg New Energy Finance,
2013]. A report from the same year estimated that PV would be the cheapest
form of generation within the next 25 years [Syed, 2013]. The reductions PV
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costs have outdone expectations, with recent studies estimating that utility-
scale PV is already competitive with conventional generation in countries
such as the US [Lazard, 2015].
These cost comparisons are for generators in the wholesale market, but
renewables like PV are able to compete in the retail market by being installed
in homes behind the meter. As shown previously in figure 2.2, the wholesale
prices contribute only around 20% of the total retail costs in the NEM. This
makes PV much more competitive installed in homes than it would otherwise
be in the wholesale market, primarily because it bypasses the expensive
network altogether by supplying power directly where it is needed. Such
behind-the-meter PV makes up the majority of the installed PV, which was
around 2.5% of the total electricity consumed in the NEM in 2014 [Johnston
et al., 2015].
2.1.3 Transmission
Transmission networks provide high volume transport of electricity between
generators and load centres (e.g., cities). Figure 2.4 shows the transmission
network for the NEM which spans the whole Australian east coast con-
necting generators, cities and regional towns. This thesis focuses on what
happens further downstream on the distribution network, as this is where
DETs will have most impact; however, the same techniques can be applied
to manage the transmission network.
Structurally, transmission networks are meshed (contain cycles) and are
often designed and operated to be N−1 reliable, which requires that the fail-
ure of any one line, generator or network component will not bring the whole
system down. Most networks are 3-phase alternating current (AC) with a
small number of high voltage direct current (DC) links where economically
viable.
Transmission networks operate at high voltages (typically in range 100kV
to 500kV in the NEM) and are much more heavily instrumented, mon-
itored and managed than distribution networks because of their more critical
nature. The operators of transmission networks are concerned with issues
of voltage regulation, managing congestion and stability.
2.1.4 Distribution
Distribution networks take power from the transmission network and distrib-
ute it out to all the loads in the local area. They are typically structurally
radial, but some networks, especially in cities, can be meshed. In chapter 4
we develop a technique for coordinating DETs over a distribution network.
Substations (see figure 2.5) connect the transmission and distribution
networks together by lowering the high transmission voltages to medium
voltages (11kV in much of the NEM), which can more safely be transported
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Figure 2.4: NEM transmission lines and generators (image adapted with permission
from AER [2014]).
through built-up areas. These medium voltage lines, called feeders, connect
to distribution transformers close to consumers. Distribution transformers
bring the voltage down to the final voltage for consumption (400V three
phase or 230V single phase for residential customers in the NEM).
Meters are used to record how much power enters the distribution net-
work from the transmission network and how much leaves the network at the
point of customer connection. AC power is split up into two components,
real power which does actual work, and reactive power which oscillates back
and forth between active electrical components (see appendix A for more
details). Residential customers are typically only billed for real power con-
sumption, while larger customers are also billed for their peak consumption
of real and reactive power.
As shown in figure 2.2, distribution network investment and maintenance
accounts for nearly half of all retail electricity costs. This is because distri-
bution networks are designed so that all conductors and transformers can
meet peak load requirements. These events might only occur for a handful
of hours in a year, with the extra capacity (and investment) going under-
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Figure 2.5: The layout of a distribution network. Distribution transformers have 4
conductor outputs, one for each phase and a neutral. Customers connect to either
a single phase or to three phases.
utilised for the rest of the time. The techniques we develop in this thesis
for the intelligent control of DETs can reduce these peaks and hence greatly
reduce distribution network costs.
2.1.5 Microgrids
Microgrids are an emerging technology which hold particular promise in
developing nations. Microgrids are small-scale networks (ranging in size from
a small community all the way up to an entire city) that can disconnect from
and operate independently of the rest of the network [Glover et al., 2011].
Microgrids provide a number of advantages including better resilience to
faults on the network, and more organic and gradual electrification of remote
or rural areas.
Like more conventional centralised networks, microgrids need to ensure
that power is balanced, frequency is maintained and the network is safely
operated. These events take place on a smaller scale, which means that
there is more uncertainty and less room for error. In chapter 4 we test our
distributed algorithm on a community-scale microgrid.
2.1.6 Consumption
In the NEM, the residential, commercial and manufacturing sectors each
consume around 25% of all electricity, with the remaining quarter shared
between public utilities, mining, agriculture and transport [Vivid Economics,
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2013]. In this thesis we focus on residential customers; however, the same
techniques we develop could be applied to participants in the other sectors.
This focus is because residential customers:
• in aggregate have a large share of the overall consumption;
• are the most numerous;
• are the early adopters of many DETs such as PV, EVs and battery
storage; and
• are widely dispersed throughout the network.
Figure 2.6 shows the consumption pattern for one house over a single
day. The load profile has large peaks caused by the operation of different
appliances. The power profile tends to smooth out as the loads of many
houses are combined, but there are still events which are correlated between
homes (e.g., working schedules, air conditioner usage and PV production).
The aggregate profile tends to exhibit peaks in the morning and evening as
residents leave for and return from work. By scheduling the operation of
DETs (e.g., a smart dishwasher), the load profile of both a single house and
the aggregate of many houses can be shaped. Chapter 3 investigates in detail
how to optimise the operation of DETs within a single house (prosumer).
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Figure 2.6: Loads in a house over a day (data from [Kolter and Johnson, 2011]).
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2.2 Distributed Energy Technologies
DETs are any generators or controllable loads that are of a small enough
scale that they can be connected directly to the distribution system or be-
hind the meters of customers. The rapid development of such technologies
is challenging the conventional notion of how networks are designed and
operated.
As discussed previously, DETs are shifting generation away from large
centralised power stations and are enabling individuals or communities to
have more control over their own energy requirements. For example, DETs
enable the formation of community owned microgrids, which can either op-
erate stand-alone or trade energy with the wider network.
This thesis will often refer to consumers (houses or any agents) that have
control and ownership over a set of DETs as prosumers. This captures the
idea that they can both consume and produce energy, and that they are
more involved in managing their own energy requirements.
The following sections describe some of the DETs that are available to
houses, and which we will be working with in later chapters. We discuss
their behaviour and what they can be used for. They range from batteries
that can be charged or discharged on command, to less controllable solar
PV generators.
2.2.1 Generators
Distributed generation ranges from the renewable-sourced solar PV and
wind generators which have limited controllability to the dispatchable fuel-
based micro gas turbine, diesel and fuel-cell generators. Solar PV is safe,
low maintenance, unobtrusive and affordable, making it ideal for residen-
tial use. The other distributed generators are let down in one or more of
these areas, which means that they are typically only viable in larger-scale
grid-connected applications.
PV systems connect to an inverter, which converts DC power from the
panels to AC power at the grid frequency. At the inverter the output real
power can be controlled between zero and a maximum for the current sun-
light intensity. Some inverters can also be configured to supply or sink
reactive power. For most inverters these controls are not utilised, instead
they are configured to output real power at maximum availability, at a fixed
power factor (which fixes a ratio between real and reactive power).
2.2.2 Storage
With dramatic cost reductions in recent years, battery storage is starting to
be a viable investment for residential customers. Storage enables prosumers
to better utilise their rooftop PV systems by storing any excess generation
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for later use. If they are exposed to time-varying pricing, storage also enables
them to take advantage of the cheapest prices.
Like PV, batteries connect to an inverter, but this inverter can also con-
sume real power to charge the battery. The maximum charge and discharge
rates are a function of the battery state of charge and physical limits. Bat-
teries deteriorate with use based on the number of charge/discharge cycles
they undergo, the rate and depth at which this occurs, and the ambient tem-
perature. These factors should be taken into consideration when controlling
the battery, as the savings from a particular use might be outweighed by
the resulting reduction in battery life.
The batteries in EVs can also be used for storage, but this use is com-
plicated by the EVs’ interaction with household occupants. EV batteries are
only available when they are at home plugged in and their state of charge
changes through driving. In addition to this, occupants expect a certain
level of charge at different times of the day so that they have enough range
to complete trips. Together these factors limit how EV batteries can be
operated.
2.2.3 Controllable Loads
Not all conventional household loads can be controlled as they must be avail-
able on-demand for use by occupants. Such loads include lighting, cooking
and entertainment. They can be made more energy efficient (e.g., lights that
sense when an occupant enters a room) but for the most part they have no
useful actions for control.
Loads that are controllable include dish washers, washing machines and
water heating. These are typically more complicated than other DETs, as
the occupants have expectations about their operation which add additional
constraints and costs associated with particular decisions. Below we describe
some of these technologies:
Smart Appliances— Smart appliances are regular appliances which have a
communication and control interface built into them [van den Briel et al.,
2013]. Relevant appliances include dish washers, washing machines and
clothes dryers. When operating such a device, an occupant will typically be
asked a completion deadline. The smart appliance can then be scheduled
within this limit to take advantage of the cheapest electricity. Depending
on the type of appliance it might be possible to delay the start time, pause
and resume it part way through, or run it at different power settings.
Appliances such as clothes dryers and dish washers are ideal candidates
as they can be energy intensive and occupants are often flexible with their
use. Unfortunately, smart appliances are not always available, as they first
require a occupant to issue a run request. Therefore, while smart appliances
can play an important part, on their own they will not be enough to balance
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a network that is supplied by high levels of renewable generation.
Space Heating/Cooling— Heating and cooling of houses is an energy intens-
ive load. Occupants desire temperatures to be within comfortable bounds at
certain times of the day. These bounds allow for some power consumption
flexibility. Greater flexibility is available when the house has high levels of
thermal mass or insulation.
In addition to this, occupants may allow the temperature to move outside
the comfortable zone for short periods if it means that they will make a
reasonable saving on their electricity bills. In cases where the house does
not have much flexibility, control of space heating and cooling will only be
beneficial if the electricity prices are dynamic and volatile.
Water Heating— Water heating is a flexible operation which needs to ensure
that at all times enough hot water is stored to meet the requirements of
occupants. In many networks water heaters are already controlled so that
they take advantage of off-peak prices. This control can also take place when
prices are dynamic or where excess solar generation is available during the
day.
Pool Pumps— Swimming pools are relatively common in countries such
as Australia. Water needs to be pumped through the pool’s filtration or
heating system. Typically a minimum volume of water needs to be pumped
through the system each day, which is often a flexible operation.
2.3 DET Coordination
The prosumer and DET coordination we develop in chapter 4 has similar
goals to demand response (DR) and demand-side management (DSM). DR
and DSM are general terms used for schemes that influence or coordinate
customer consumption on the demand side of the network. They are often
interpreted as focussing just on loads when many of the techniques can also
interact with prosumers, distributed generation, batteries and other grid
connected DETs. Another point of confusion is that in microgrid settings,
the distinction between the demand side and the supply side of the network
is less apparent. For these reasons, we favour the use of prosumer or DET
coordination when referring to our work.
The strength of our approach lies in its network modelling, consumer
focus, near optimality, scalability, robustness to uncertainty, automation and
resilience to manipulation. Other approaches have the advantage of being
significantly less complex, but they do not achieve the long-term vision of
managing high levels of DETs in a network supplied primarily by renewable
resources. In later chapters we will compare our approach in more detail as
it is explained and experimented with.
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As an introduction, this section categorises and explains some of the
existing techniques for controlling DETs (DR, DSM or otherwise) that fulfil
a role analogous to conventional generator dispatch. Techniques that use
DETs in a frequency regulation capacity are not considered, although in
general they can be designed to work alongside DET dispatch.
2.3.1 Conventional Pricing
Utilities have used several different pricing schemes to influence the con-
sumption and production behaviour of customers on the demand side of
the network. The goal is either to shift consumption away from particular
times or reduce peaks. Peak/off-peak metering has been used for more than
50 years in Australia [UOW, 2014], to shift some of the daytime loads to
the night. Originally this involved separate peak and off-peak meters with
separate wiring to designated peak or off-peak loads. Hot water heating is
commonly used as an off-peak load, with the utilities using ripple control to
remotely switch the system on during off-peak hours.
With modern smart meters the need for separate wiring is removed,
thereby allowing all loads to take advantage of cheaper off-peak prices. They
also enable more pricing intervals and a distinction between weekdays and
weekends. The general name for such pricing structures is time-of-use (TOU)
pricing. The idea is for these prices to reflect the wholesale market prices
for a typical day, but to do so in a way that is transparent and not overly
complicated for customers. The prices and time intervals are locked in when
customers sign up for an electricity contract, or only infrequently updated
by the retailer (e.g., annually).
More recent pricing developments have been in reply to the popular
uptake of solar PV. PV first became financially viable because of government
rebates and legislation that mandated retailers buy any excess PV generation
from customers. The price that customers get paid at is called a feed-
in tariff (FIT). In many markets the FITs were originally set at several
times the average retail price of electricity, creating an asymmetry between
consumption and production in order to encourage adoption.
FITs have reduced over time as PV technology has become cheaper.
Subsequently, in many markets retailers are now free to set their own FIT
prices. This has often resulted in the FIT being set much lower than the
average retail price. This encourages houses to self consume their excess
solar generation instead of exporting it back to the network.
These existing schemes encourage behavioural changes in customers, so
that over time their consumption habits better align with the costs of gen-
erating and supplying electricity. What they cannot do is react to dynamic
changes in the wholesale market and the distribution of electricity. The net-
work will become increasingly more dynamic as more renewable generators
come online, and as more solar PV and electric vehicles are adopted by cus-
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tomers. Advances in DETs, communications and automated systems make
it possible to design schemes that can handle more dynamic networks, with
minimal disruption to customer behaviour.
2.3.2 Direct Load Control
In direct load control (DLC) schemes customers allow utilities or other third
parties to take control of some of their devices, with customers paid some
form of ongoing or per-use compensation as part of the agreement. DLC
makes most sense for use with large industrial loads that can be reliably
predicted. An example of this is aluminium smelters in Australia, which in
extreme network situations can be shed by the network operator.
Optimisation techniques have been applied to assist networks with mak-
ing DLC decisions when they have a portfolio of large industrial loads that
can be controlled. For example, Pedrasa et al. [2009] use binary particle
swarm optimisation to assist a utility in deciding when DLC should be per-
formed, and which participant should be selected. The participants can
have different load shedding costs and constraints in their contracts with
the utility.
DLC has also been proposed for residential customers. Guo et al. [2008]
consider DLC where the set point temperatures of household air conditioners
are directly controlled by the utility. They use adaptive genetic algorithms to
decide on the optimal set point allocation for each house, whilst considering
temperature comfort bounds. Each house can override the utility signal, but
by doing so they forfeit any incentives.
The problem with DLC is often scalability and privacy concerns, as data
from each participant needs to be communicated to a central body which
then solves a large problem centrally. DLC is more suitable for a network
that only rarely needs to intervene, for example, just to reduce summers
peaks. We focus on delivering a solution that on a daily basis seamlessly
controls household devices to balance renewable generation.
2.3.3 Dynamic Pricing
As we have discussed, TOU pricing is fixed months or years in advance
so cannot react to dynamic events. Dynamic pricing, also known as real-
time pricing (RTP), allows for a continuously changing price signal, where
the price is known at most only a short time in advance. Dynamic pricing
comes the closest to exposing customers to the actual wholesale market, but
the signal may be modified to reduce volatility and to incorporate network
costs.
Dynamic pricing has the potential to achieve more efficient solutions for
the network and unlike DLC does not require the utility to model and control
every individual participant. On the negative side it exposes customers
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to more complexity, and can be more difficult to predict the response of
customers.
The utility has the task of setting a dynamic price based on what the
current market and network conditions are, and based on how it expects
participants to respond to the price. If this is is not done carefully it can
result in unanticipated herding behaviour as explained by Reddy and Veloso
[2012]. Customers exposed to a dynamic price have to decide what their best
response is. This can either be the occupants themselves being conscious of
the price and manually changing their behaviour or, as we propose, having
an automated home energy management system make decisions on behalf
of the occupants.
The dynamic prices can also have a spatial dependence. For example,
locational marginal prices represent the cost of serving electricity to a par-
ticular part of the network at a particular time. The advantage of this is
that they can account for network losses and network congestion.
2.3.4 Coordination
Several methods that are not based on prices have been proposed to avoid
the herding problems that naive pricing methods can experience [van den
Briel et al., 2013, Shinwari et al., 2012]. A probability distribution which
represents an “ideal” load curve is used to randomly select the start time
of loads. Although this avoids having to select dynamic prices, the problem
of how to choose an ideal load curve that obtains an optimal solution in
expectation remains. At times this may be just as challenging as selecting
sensible dynamic prices.
Ramchurn et al. [2011] and Reddy and Veloso [2012] reduce herding
behaviour by providing agents with adaptive controllers. Using slow time
constants to reduce the responsiveness of controllers and adding randomness
to some decisions allows for a reduction in herding behaviour, but with
a possible increase in the solution costs. Caron and Kesidis [2010] also
use stochastic polices in order to reduce peaks in a cooperative game for
scheduling loads, and investigate how the quality of solutions changes when
sharing different amounts of private information.
A greater degree of coordination between participants is required to pre-
vent the herding-type problems and to ensure quality solutions. Two-way
communication between participants and the network (or amongst parti-
cipants) can be used to provide feedback. For houses such communication
will typically be performed by energy management systems on behalf of
occupants. As with DLC, privacy and scalability can also be major issues.
Auctions, aggregators and distributed optimisation have been proposed
to overcome these challenges. In auctions, participants submit bids to either
consume or produce electricity, which are then centrally cleared by the mar-
ket. The bids themselves can range from simple price and power pairs, to
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utility functions that represent the demand curve of the participant, and
they may be submitted iteratively [Ygge and Akkermans, 1996, Vytelingum
et al., 2010, Chapman and Verbic, 2015] or all at once [Kok et al., 2009]. One
of the challenges of these auction-based approaches is to develop appropriate
bidding strategies for participants.
Virtual power plants and aggregators have been proposed as a means of
enabling small distributed prosumers to participate in the wholesale market.
Participants join an aggregator which can sell services to the wholesale mar-
ket on behalf of the collective [Chalkiadakis et al., 2011]. The aggregator has
to decide how to reward or incentivise its participants so that they achieve
the desired outcome [Akasiadis and Chalkiadakis, 2013]. There remains a
coordination problem, but at least it is smaller than the original and easier
to integrate with existing electricity markets.
The coordination problem can be viewed as a distributed optimisation
problem. Distributed optimisation algorithms provide a structured method
of solving the problem with well-defined participant subproblems and a clear
interface for communications [Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010, Gatsis and Gian-
nakis, 2012, Kraning et al., 2014]. Care must be taken to ensure the problem
converges and that agents cannot cause significant harm to the system by
providing misleading information.
Some of the approaches discussed take into consideration or model the
network, but for the most part the network is overlooked. Modelling the
power flows is necessary in order to accurately account for losses and net-
work constraints such as voltage and current limits. We adopt a distributed
optimisation approach that explicitly models the network in chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
Home Energy Management
3.1 Introduction
For many residential electricity customers, DETs, including PV, EVs, bat-
tery storage and smart appliances, are now within financial reach. We de-
velop a residential energy management system (EMS) for such a residential
prosumer that minimises electricity costs by automatically operating local
DETs (which we simply call devices). This provides value to prosumers
that are exposed to time-varying pricing or who want to self consume solar
generation, and is a building block for the coordination of network-aware
prosumers that we develop in chapter 4.
The EMS must consider both occupant comfort and energy costs, for
example, when controlling space heating/cooling. These two objectives are
often conflicting, so we provide a means for occupants to indicate how they
value comfort against cost savings. This combined objective is then used by
the EMS when optimising the device operation.
One approach is for the EMS to have simple reactive device control
policies, but due to the state-based nature of many devices this is often too
short-sighted. Instead, what we propose is for the EMS to schedule the
actions of devices over a forward time horizon, to better account for the
implications of an action. This raises its own problems, because while the
EMS might have a good idea of the current state of the system, there are
many external influences which it cannot know exactly in advance including
electricity prices, the weather and occupant behaviour.
To overcome this the EMS develops stochastic models of the uncertain
external processes and takes these models into account when optimising
its actions. The EMS can learn and tune these models over time as it
collects more data. The EMS also makes use of an online algorithm to
reduce the impact of uncertainty. We use a receding horizon, like in model
predictive control, where the EMS only acts on decisions for one time step
before the horizon shifts forward and a new optimisation is conducted. This
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ensures that the algorithm always takes into account the most up-to-date
information before making a decision.
We investigate the benefits of online optimisation for an EMS that is ex-
posed to dynamic pricing in an uncertain environment, making two primary
contributions: one conceptual and one algorithmic.
At the conceptual level, we present a compositional architecture for EMS
optimisation, where each device can be modelled independently in terms of
a collection of functions that encapsulate its behaviour. These devices are
then assembled into a model of a home, from which optimisation problems
for the EMS can derive.
At the algorithmic level, we present a comprehensive study of the value
of EMS optimisation when future prices, occupant behaviour and environ-
mental conditions are uncertain. The formulation uses models representative
of physical devices and stochastic models trained on real weather and net-
work demand data. These device and stochastic models are used in two
online optimisation algorithms which are compared to simple controllers
that use reactive policies.
The experimental results not only show the value of stochastic informa-
tion, but also that online optimisation provides solutions that are close to the
clairvoyant solutions which have perfect knowledge of the future. The on-
line stochastic algorithms using mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
technology are fast and produce significantly better solutions than the re-
active controllers. Also of interest is the comparison between the two online
stochastic algorithms, and an experiment that investigates the optimal re-
ceding horizon size.
In section 3.2 we provide background material on stochastic program-
ming which is a basis for one of the EMS optimisation strategies we employ.
We then formalise a deterministic version of the residential EMS problem
and develop device models for our experiments in sections 3.3–3.4. This is
followed by the stochastic version of the problem, our online optimisation
strategies and the stochastic models used in our experiments in sections
3.5–3.7. We provide a experimental comparison between our different EMS
techniques in section 3.8, followed by a discussion of the related work in
section 3.9 and finally our conclusion in section 3.10.
3.2 Stochastic Programming
Stochastic programming is a framework for modelling optimisation problems
that have uncertain parameters [Shapiro et al., 2009]. In these problems
some decisions need to be made before the values of the uncertain parameters
are known. By taking into consideration the probability distributions of
these parameters, stochastic programming aims to make decisions that are
feasible for all possible scenarios, whilst also minimising the cost function (in
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expectation). It fits naturally with scheduling problems where uncertainty
is revealed over time [Van Hentenryck and Bent, 2006].
One of the online algorithms we develop for the EMS uses stochastic
programming. Accounting for the stochastic nature of the problem can
reduce the likelihood of making decisions that will later be regretted, and
can open up new opportunities that would otherwise not have been possible.
In stochastic programming the problem is split up into two or more
stages which represent consecutive time periods. Each stage has a set of
decision variables which must be settled before the problem can progress
to the next stage. The values of uncertain parameters are revealed between
each stage. The simplest formulation to describe, and the one that we utilise
in the EMS, is 2-stage stochastic programming.
In a 2-stage stochastic problem the variables are split up into two stages,
where all uncertainty is assumed to be revealed after the first stage. Let the
vectors x and y be the first and second stage variables respectively. Let the
vector s represent a particular realisation of the stochastic parameters, also
called a scenario. The set of all possible scenarios is S, only one of which
will come true.
For a problem with cost function f(x, y, s) and constraint g(x, y, s) ≤ 0,
the 2-stage stochastic problem is formulated as:
min
x
E[q(x, s)] (3.1)
q(x, s) := min
y
f(x, y, s) (3.2)
s.t. g(x, y, s) ≤ 0 (3.3)
where E[·] is the expectation over all scenarios S and q(x, s) is the minimum
cost achievable for a given scenario s and first-stage decision x.
The problem can be transformed into an equivalent deterministic form
when the set of all possible scenarios S is finite. This effectively involves
solving |S| versions of the problem with common first-stage variables x. Each
scenario s has its own copy of the second-stage variables ys. The constraint
is applied once to each scenario and the objective function of each scenario
is weighted by the probability of the scenario occurring ps. This equivalent
deterministic formulation is:
min
x,ys∀s∈S
∑
s∈S
psf(x, ys, s) (3.4)
s.t. g(x, ys, s) ≤ 0 ∀s ∈ S (3.5)
Standard deterministic solvers (e.g., an LP solver if f and g are linear in x
and y) can be used to solve the problem in this form.
If the number of scenarios is infinite (e.g., when there uncertain para-
meters are continuous random variables) or just very large, then a sample
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average approximation (SAA) can be used to form an approximate but tract-
able version of the problem. This involves sampling a finite number of scen-
arios, say m scenarios, from the joint distribution, and giving them an equal
weighting: ps =
1
m .
3.3 Deterministic EMS Problem
This section introduces the problem and formalises a deterministic version
of it. The objective of the EMS is to minimise the cost of electricity and
maximise occupant comfort through the control of household devices. To
make the problem more concrete we have to make some assumptions, the
first of which relates to the objectives.
Multi-objective problems can be interpreted and solved in a number of
different ways [Collette and Siarry, 2013, Ehrgott and Gandibleux, 2000].
Our approach is to apply a linear scalarisation to the objectives, combining
them into a single objective. This assumes that occupant discomfort can
be weighted so that it is directly comparable to a monetary cost. Taking
thermal comfort as an example, this assumes that it is possible for occupants
to associate a price they are willing to pay to keep the temperature in
their house within a certain range. To make this simple for occupants, we
expect the EMS interface to present a “slider” which occupants can adjust
between maximum comfort on one end and maximum frugality on the other.
Behind the scenes this is interpreted as varying the weighting between the
two objectives. Occupants can move the slider about until it matches their
expectation through experience.
The next design choice we make is to discretise time, in effect taking
a quasi-steady-state approximation of the control problem. This is appro-
priate because we are focused on the longer time scale device actions that
require planning in advance. Faster transients and power system frequency
control are better handled by myopic fast acting controllers, for example,
dynamic-demand devices [Angeli and Kountouriotis, 2012] which can work
alongside the EMS. As long as time discretised into sufficiently small steps,
the results will be close to what would be achievable with a fully continuous
control signal.
For this discretisation, the index t represents the t-th time step, ∆τt is
the duration of the t-th time step in seconds and τt is the time at the end of
the t-th time step in seconds, where τt > τt−1 and ∆τt = τt−τt−1 (see figure
3.1). This somewhat complicated formulation allows us to have variable step
sizes over the forward scheduling horizon which, as we will discuss later, will
allow us to focus computational resources where they are most needed.
3.3. DETERMINISTIC EMS PROBLEM 29
1 2 T
τ0 τ1 timeτ2 τTτT-1
Figure 3.1: The timings over a forward horizon with T time steps. The time steps
(represented by the index t) range from 1 to T . The times τ are used to mark the
times at which the steps begin and end, as the steps might have varying lengths.
3.3.1 Devices
At a high level, a device has a vector of variables xt ∈ RM and a vec-
tor of parameters1 rt ∈ RL for each time step t. The variables repres-
ent device actions or states and the parameters represent external factors
which impact the operation of the device (e.g., occupant usage requests
or ambient temperatures). Devices have an operation cost function f :
RM × RL 7→ R and a power function h : RM × RL 7→ R which take these
vectors as inputs. The operation cost represents any comfort, fuel, deteri-
oration or other cost associated with the operation of the device, and the
power function returns the power that the device either consumes (+ve)
or produces (−ve). Finally, devices have a vector-valued constraint function
g : RM×RL×RM×RL 7→ RN which applies to the variables and parameters
in consecutive time steps and which is satisfied when the component-wise in-
equality g(xt, rt, xt−1, rt−1) ≤ 0 holds. This generic constraint function can
be used to do anything from placing bounds on variables to constraining
state transitions.
3.3.2 Optimisation Problem
A house is simply a set of devices D, together with bounds
¯
P and P¯ on the
instantaneous amount of power that the house can transfer to or from the
grid. The EMS controls the decision variables for each of these devices in
order to minimise the costs for the overall house.
We make use of a deterministic formulation of the EMS optimisation
problem as a building block for the stochastic formulations. In this formula-
tion we have a forward horizon of T time steps, over which the values of all
parameters are known. The objective is to choose device actions to reduce
the total cost over this future horizon. Inputs include the device initial states
xd,0, electricity price λt, house background power usage P
b
t (the aggregation
of uncontrollable electrical consumption, e.g., lighting, entertainment and
cooking), and device parameters rd,t. The variables at each time step in-
clude the device variables and the total house power consumption Pt.
1To simplify the fomulation we assume ∆τt is one of the parameters in this vector.
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The deterministic optimisation problem is as follows:
min
xd,t,Pt
T∑
t=1
∆τtλtPt +
∑
d∈D
T∑
t=1
fd(xd,t, rd,t) (3.6)
s.t. Pt ∈ [
¯
P, P¯ ] ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (3.7)
Pt = P
b
t +
∑
d∈D
hd(xd,t, rd,t) ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (3.8)
gd(xd,t, rd,t, xd,t−1, rd,t−1) ≤ 0 ∀d ∈ D, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (3.9)
The appropriate solver for this optimisation problem depends on the
form of the device functions. For example, if all functions are linear, then
an linear programming (LP) solver can be used, or if they are convex an
interior point convex solver. The device models presented in the next section
result in a mixed-integer linear program (MILP), which in our experiments
is solved with Gurobi [Gurobi Optimization, Inc., 2014].
3.4 Device Models
What makes this problem particularly interesting is the behaviour of the
different types of devices that the EMS needs to control. Before moving
onto the stochastic part of the problem, we take a look at the some of these
devices and the models that will be used in the experiments.
These descriptions are less formal in order to make them easier to un-
derstand. With reformulation they all fit into the general device definition
of the previous section which is more useful at a higher level of abstraction.
Unique symbols are used for variables and parameters instead of dealing
directly with the vectors xt and rt for a device. Variables for device power
Pt = h(xt, rt) and operation cost ct = f(xt, rt) are used in place of the as-
sociated functions. Finally, individual constraints are provided instead of
explicitly writing the vector-valued constraint function g.
The physical behaviour of devices has been approximated by linearising
their physical equations. Only significant steps of this process are mentioned
in the device descriptions. Parameters used in the experiments were selected
to be representative of typical devices. For example, the EV battery capacity
is equivalent to that of a Nissan Leaf, and the house floor area is typical for
an average Australian house. Some parameters were difficult to source so
had to be estimated, for example, the efficiency of the EV battery.
Battery— A battery has a stored energy state Et ∈ [0, E¯] and action vari-
ables that represent the rate of charge/discharge: P ct ∈ [0, P¯ c], P dt ∈ [0, P¯ d].
The battery has a fixed efficiency η ∈ [0, 1], and the stored energy transitions
according to the following constraint:
Et = Et−1 + ∆τt
(
ηP ct − P dt
)
(3.10)
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The overall power consumption of the battery is Pt = P
c
t − P dt . A battery
lifetime cost ct is associated with power that is discharged from the battery
through a lifetime price ψ: ct = ∆τtψP
d
t .
Electric Vehicle— An EV is the same as the above battery, but with a few
additional constraints. Firstly the parameter uh ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether
the EV is home, and the battery can only be charged/discharged when this
is the case:
uht = 0 =⇒ Pt = 0 (3.11)
The parameter P rt ∈ R+ represents the power drawn from the battery whilst
driving. This modifies the state update function as follows:
Et = Et−1 + ∆τt
(
ηP ct − P dt − P rt
)
(3.12)
The final constraint is on the amount of energy stored in the battery. The
house occupants provide an parameter Emt ∈ [0, E¯] that represents the min-
imum energy that the EV battery should have in it at each time step. This
value represents how much energy the occupant expects to need if they drive
away in the car at a given time. This is not a hard constraint as the draw
from driving can bring the battery charge below this limit, but it ensures
that if the battery power does fall below, then it charges back up as fast as
possible (at the maximum charging rate P¯ c).
uht = 1 =⇒ Et ≥ min
[
Et−1 + ∆τtηP¯ c, Emt
]
(3.13)
Hot Water Heating— The hot water system is made up of a storage tank
and an electric heating element. We ignore the details of the interaction
between hot and cold water in the tank and consider the state of the tank
as being the amount of energy Et ∈ [0, E¯] it contains above the inlet cold
water temperature. The tank is considered empty of hot water when this
value is zero. The action variable is the power setting of the electric heater
Pt ∈ [0, P¯ ] at each time step. The parameter P dt ∈ R+ is the amount of
power drawn from the tank to meet occupant demand. The energy state
update function is given by:
Et = Et−1 + ∆τt
(
Pt − P dt − P lt + P ut
)
(3.14)
The variable P lt ∈ R+ represents thermal losses from the tank to the out-
door environment. The rate of loss depends on how full the tank is and
the difference in temperature between the water set point T s ∈ R and the
outdoor temperature T ot ∈ R through a thermal resistance R ∈ R+:
P lt =
1
R
Et
E¯
(T s − T ot ) (3.15)
The variable P ut ∈ R+ is a recourse variable that is used to indicate the
amount of hot water demand which goes unmet, i.e. water drawn from the
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tank when it is empty. This is heavily penalised as a cost ct through an
unmet demand price ψ: ct = ∆τtψP
u
t .
The hot water system has a minimum stored energy level Em ∈ [0, E¯],
much like the electric vehicle. If drawn water brings the energy level of
the tank below this value then the heater must work as hard as possible to
bring the energy back up. Occupants can adjust this parameter to reduce
the likelihood of running out of hot water.
Et ≥ min
[
Et−1 + ∆τt
(
P¯ − P dt − P lt + P ut
)
, Em
]
(3.16)
Heating and Cooling— The house temperature is controlled by a heat pump
that heats/cools water, which is then pumped through piping embedded in
the floor of the house. The temperatures of the floor and the air in the
room T ft , T
a
t ∈ R are state variables. The action variables are the amount of
thermal energy used to heat or cool the floor of the house P ht , P
c
t ∈ R+. This
is limited by the heat pump electrical power consumption Pt ∈ [0, P¯ ] through
heating and cooling coefficients of performance (COPs) ηht ∈ [
¯
ηh, η¯h], ηct ∈
[
¯
ηc, η¯c]:
Pt =
1
ηht
P ht +
1
ηct
P ct (3.17)
The COPs depend on the temperatures of the two thermal wells between
which the heat pump is operating. We assume that the internal thermal well
is at a constant temperature and that the external well is at the outdoor
temperature T ot ∈ R. We approximate the COPs as linear functions of T ot
for some constants ah, ac ∈ R+ and bh, bc ∈ R, with hard upper and lower
limits:
ηht = min
[
max
[
ahT ot + b
h,
¯
ηh
]
, η¯h
]
(3.18)
ηct = min
[
max
[−acT ot + bc,
¯
ηc
]
, η¯c
]
(3.19)
Heat can transfer between the floor and the outdoor environment P fot ∈ R,
the floor and the air in the room P fat ∈ R, and the air in the room and the
outdoor environment P aot ∈ R. We use simple lumped thermal resistances
Rfo, Rfa, Rao ∈ R+ to govern these heat flows:
P fot =
1
Rfo
(T ft −T ot ), P fat =
1
Rfa
(T ft −T at ), P aot =
1
Rao
(T at −T ot ) (3.20)
The temperature state update is given by:
T ft = T
f
t−1 +
∆τt
mfκf
(
P ht − P ct − P fot − P fat +AfIt
)
(3.21)
T at = T
a
t−1 +
∆τt
maκa
(
P fat − P aot + P gt
)
(3.22)
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where mf ,ma, κf , κa ∈ R+ are the floor and air, mass and specific heat
capacity coefficients respectively. Sunlight enters through the windows at an
irradiance It ∈ R+ and lands on a floor area Af ∈ R+. The input P gt ∈ R+ is
thermal power generated by occupant metabolisms and background electric
appliances which contributes to heating the air in the room.
The final relation we have is for the comfort cost ct which depends on
the distance of the air temperature from an occupant specified set point
temperature T st ∈ R. The occupants also specify two time-varying comfort
prices ψa, ψb, one of which is only included after a threshold temperature
difference ∆T th:
ct =
{
∆τt(ψ
a
t + ψ
b
t )|T at − T st | if |T at − T st | ≥ ∆T th
∆τtψ
a
t |T at − T st | otherwise
(3.23)
This is a flexible way of allowing occupants to represent their thermal com-
fort preferences. They can have relatively low costs associated with temper-
atures close to their ideal temperature, but then have a much higher cost
take over once the threshold is exceeded.
The ASHRAE [2013] handbook describes thermal comfort as a complic-
ated function of not just the air temperature, but also other factors including
the clothing worn by occupants, humidity, radiative heat transfers and the
season. Many of these factors will be slow changing with the seasons or a
function of the house design itself. Our simple but flexible temperature set
point and temperature bounds can be adjusted by occupants as the seasons
change. Alternatively, something like the Nest thermostat can be used to
learn the best temperature set point as a function of a whole range of other
factors, from intuitive occupant feedback.
Shiftable Load— Shiftable loads are devices that need to run once within a
time window. An occupant sets two parameters: a start time ts and a last
allowed start time tl, between which the controller must schedule the device
to run. Examples of this kind of device include washing machines, clothes
dryers and dish washers. We model non-preemptive shiftable loads which
can have time varying power consumptions.
The variables ut ∈ {0, 1} are used to indicate when the shiftable load
starts. A value of ut = 1 indicates that the run starts at time step t. A
shiftable load has a function χ : R+ 7→ R+ that represents the cumulative
energy consumed by the device. It is a monotonic function which takes a
run duration and returns the cumulative amount of energy that the device
has consumed up to that duration. Constraints on the start time indicator
ut and the device powers Pt ∈ R+ are given by:
tl∑
k=ts
uk = 1, Pt =
t∑
k=ts
uk
χ(τt − τk−1)− χ(τt−1 − τk−1)
∆τt
(3.24)
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Photovoltaics— PV panels have no action variables as the amount of elec-
tricity they generate is purely determined by the solar irradiance parameter.
We model a PV system ignoring temperature and shading effects and by as-
suming the panels lay on a horizontal surface. The generated electric power
Pt ∈ R− is then a simple function of the panel area A ∈ R+, efficiency
η ∈ [0, 1] and global irradiance parameter It ∈ R+: Pt = −ηAIt.
3.5 Stochastic EMS Problem
The deterministic EMS formulation requires perfect knowledge about what
will happen over the time horizon, while in practice the values of some
of the device parameters will be unknown in advance. These include the
outdoor temperature, solar irradiance, internal heat generation, hot water
demand, EV usage and shiftable load requests. Future electricity prices
and background house power consumption are also unknown. The values
of these parameters only become known to the EMS in real time (e.g., a
measurement of temperature), or in some cases a small amount of time in
advance (e.g., dynamic prices published half an hour in advance).
This is a problem because the state-based nature of devices requires the
EMS to plan ahead in order to make sensible decisions. The approach we
take is to model the parameters as random variables, and then use online
stochastic optimisation [Van Hentenryck and Bent, 2006] in the EMS to ex-
ploit these statistical models in order to make the best decisions on average.
The EMS can learn these models over time using data it collects.
3.5.1 Random Parameters
We use the term random parameter in place of random variable to avoid
confusing them with the decision variables in our optimisation problem. We
introduce a vector Wt = (Wt,1,Wt,2, . . .) for each time step which contains
the random parameters for the electricity price λt, background house power
P bt and device parameters rd,t. A random parameter may depend on random
parameters within the same or previous time steps, but not on future time
steps.
A value of the random parameter Wt,k is represented by wt,k (a random
variate). An asterisk ∗ is used to indicate a known value of a parameter. For
example, if Wt,k represents the random parameter for outdoor temperature
at time step t, then w∗t,k denotes its actual measured value.
At a real world time of τ , the indices of all known parameters for time
step t is given by the set Kτ,t (recall that a parameter becomes known a
short time in advance or only in real-time). These sets monotonically grow
in size as τ increases.
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3.6 Online Stochastic Optimisation
Online stochastic optimisation algorithms make decisions for one step at a
time using stochastic information for any unknowns. After each time step
more parameter values become known and the result of actions is revealed.
Decisions for the next period are then computed and the process is repeated.
Online stochastic optimisation has been used successfully on a wide variety
of problems (e.g., see Powell et al. [2012], Van Hentenryck and Bent [2006]).
Our algorithms make use of a receding horizon, as illustrated in figure 3.2.
Optimisation is performed for each horizon using stochastic information for
any unrevealed parameters and then the actions for the first time step are
executed in the real world. In the formulations that follow we assume that
the horizon is T time steps long and that the first step in the horizon cor-
responds to t = 1. The online algorithm performs its optimisation for the
horizon when the current time is equal to the time at the start of the horizon,
in this case τ = τ0.
1 2
1 2
1 2
T
T
T
Figure 3.2: Receding horizon for 3 consecutive iterations.
The next section discusses the executives which are used to actually
implement the scheduled decisions, and then in the following sections two
approaches to solving the stochastic optimisation part of the problem for
each horizon: an expectation and a 2-stage algorithm.
3.6.1 Executives
Some parameters might still be uncertain in the first time step, which means
that it might not be possible to execute the decisions made by the optim-
isation directly as given. For example, if the hot water heater is scheduled
to run at full power, but the demand for hot water turns out to be less than
expected, then the tank might be heated beyond its limits.
In order to manage this problem, we develop simple executives which
take in the scheduled actions and modifies them based on what actually
occurs in real-time as the uncertainty is revealed. Our EMS therefore is
comprised of two parts: an online scheduling algorithm, and an executive
controller that implements the schedule decisions for the next time step using
very simple policies that can run in real-time. When shorter time steps are
used in the online scheduling, the intervention of an executive will become
less necessary.
36 CHAPTER 3. HOME ENERGY MANAGEMENT
The core action variables for the devices are: the power into the device
for the battery, EV and hot water tank; the heating and cooling power of
the underfloor heat pump; and the start time of the shiftable loads. The
executive modifies these actions based on what happens during the first
time step in real-time, and calculates the resulting values of all other state
or auxiliary variables at the end of the time step. Using the hot water
heating example from above: if the tank reaches its upper limit during the
first time step, then the executive cuts back the scheduled power so that the
tank is not overheated.
3.6.2 Expectation Formulation
The expectation online algorithm takes the conditional expected value of
any unknown parameters in the optimisation horizon, and solves the de-
terministic version of the problem given in equations (3.6–3.9). We use the
term expected value loosely because, in truth, the expected value is used
only where it makes sense, which is typically for continuous inputs. For the
rest of the inputs, the most likely value is calculated instead. For example,
the expected value is used for outdoor temperatures and the most likely
value is used for the washing machine requests.
Both of these calculations are performed using the joint distribution for
any unknown parameters in the horizon, conditioned on any known paramet-
ers in the horizon and prior to it. For example, assuming that the random
parameters have a dependence that stretches at most Q time steps into the
past, the probabilities of the unknown random parameters in the horizon
are given by:
P( Wt,k = wt,k ∀k 6∈ Kτ0,t ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
| Wt,k = w∗t,k ∀k ∈ Kτ0,t ∀t ∈ {−Q, . . . , T}
)
(3.25)
3.6.3 2-Stage Formulation
In this algorithm, 2-stage stochastic programming is used within each hori-
zon. This provides an approximation to a full multi-stage stochastic program
which are, in general, known to be extremely computationally challenging
[Shapiro, 2006].
The 2-stage algorithm uses more information from the random para-
meter probability distributions by working directly with samples instead
of the expectation. Figure 3.3 provides a selection of samples and the ex-
pectated value for outdoor temperature over 12 hours. This highlights how
a collection of samples can capture the variance of the random parameter.
Traditionally, in 2-stage stochastic programming there is no uncertainty
in the first stage [Shapiro et al., 2009]. The most natural choice of a first
stage is the first time step but, as we have discussed, the first time step may
have uncertainty in it. There are two ways forward.
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Figure 3.3: Five conditional samples and expected value (dashed line) for outdoor
temperatures over 12 hours.
The first approach is to treat the first time step as fully deterministic,
by taking the expected values of uncertain parameters in the first time step
(as done in the previous section). The first stage includes time step 1, and
the second stage time steps 2, . . . , T . The scenarios in the second stage
are then sampled from the joint distribution of random parameters in the
second stage, conditioned on any known parameters in and prior to the
second stage, and the expected values that were calculated for the unknown
first stage parameters. Using w†1,k to represent the expected values in the
first stage, the joint distribution to sample from is:
P( Wt,k = wt,k ∀k 6∈ Kτ0,t ∀t ∈ {2, . . . , T}
| Wt,k = w∗t,k ∀k ∈ Kτ0,t ∀t ∈ {−Q, . . . , T},
W1,k = w
†
1,k ∀k 6∈ Kτ0,1
)
(3.26)
The sample average approximation is used to limit the problem to m
scenarios, which are given by the set S := {1, . . . ,m}. We subscript variables
and parameters by an s ∈ S to indicate which scenario it belongs to. The
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2-stage optimisation problem is:
min
xd,t,s,Pt,s
1
m
∑
s∈S
[
T∑
t=1
∆τtλt,sPt,s +
∑
d∈D
T∑
t=1
fd(xd,t,s, rd,t,s)
]
(3.27)
s.t. xd,1,s1 = xd,1,s2 ∀d ∈ D, s1, s2 ∈ S (3.28)
P1,s1 = P1,s2 ∀d ∈ D, s1, s2 ∈ S (3.29)
Pt,s ∈ [
¯
P, P¯ ] ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, s ∈ S (3.30)
Pt,s = P
b
t,s +
∑
d∈D
hd(xd,t,s, rd,t,s) ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, s ∈ S (3.31)
gd(xd,t,s, rd,t,s, xd,t−1,s, rd,t−1,s) ≤ 0
∀d ∈ D, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, s ∈ S (3.32)
Equations (3.28) and (3.29) tie together the variables in the first time step
(first stage) so that they share a common value. As discussed above, expec-
ted values were used for all uncertain parameters in the first time step, which
means that for a device d and any two scenarios s1 and s2: rd,1,s1 = rd,1,s2 .
The second 2-stage approach is to represent the behaviour of the ex-
ecutives for the first time step within the scheduler. The first stage then
only represents the first time step device action variables. The second stage
covers the whole horizon, where the scenarios are sampled from the joint
distribution given by (3.25). The first stage variables are linked with the
first time step in the second stage through constraints that implement the
device executives.
For example, for the hot water heating (with reference to its model in
section 3.4), we link the first stage action variable P ′ to the second stage
variable P1,s in the first time step for scenario s with the relation:
P1,s = min(max(P
′,
¯
Ps), P¯s)) (3.33)
The parameters
¯
Ps and P¯s are calculated for the particular scenario of in-
terest, depending on the values of P d1,s and T
o
1,s, and the amount of energy
in the tank at the beginning of the horizon E0. They represent the min-
imum and maximum amount of power that can go toward heating the tank
in order to satisfy the minimum tank energy heating trigger, and so that
the tank does not exceed its maximum energy. The relation above can be
implemented as a piecewise-linear constraint between the two variables P1,s
and P ′.
We do not formalise the second approach here or provide its results in
detail because, as we will discuss in section 3.8.2, it does not produce results
that are much different from the first approach.
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3.7 Parameter Stochastic Models
In this section we present the stochastic models that we developed for our
experiments. The focus is not to provide high accuracy models of the un-
derlying processes, which in itself is a significant research task, but rather
for them to be representative enough so that a reliable comparison of the
EMS strategies can be made.
A particular requirement of the 2-stage EMS strategy is the generation of
not just the expectation of the random parameters into the future, but also
the generation of possible scenarios for these parameters conditioned on past
events. We investigated a number of different model types before settling on
generalised additive models for the continuous parameters like temperature,
and Markov models for the more discrete occupant driven behaviours such
as shiftable load requests.
3.7.1 Generalised Additive Models
A generalised additive model (GAM) [Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990] is a
hybrid statistical model which combines properties of a generalised linear
model (GLM) and an additive model (AM). For a GAM a probability dis-
tribution from the exponential family is selected for the response random
variable Y . The expectation of the response is related to the predictor vari-
ables xi through a link function g that has been appropriately selected for
the chosen distribution:
g(E[Y ]) = β0 + f1(x1) + f2(x2) + . . . (3.34)
where the functions fj are some parametric or non-parametric smooth func-
tions. The backfitting algorithm is one such algorithm that can be used for
performing estimation.
The mgcv R package [Wood, 2011] was used for fitting the models and
generating scenarios for the continuous stochastic parameters. Through ex-
perimentation, we found a Gaussian distribution produced the best results
for each model, which in effect reduces the model from a GAM to an AM.
However, we make use of some of the more advanced features in the mgcv
tool, such as using multivariate smooth functions, which are absent from the
standard AM formulation.
We will now describe some of the models that were used for the continu-
ous random parameters. The models were constructed to predict the value
of a stochastic parameter rt at the upcoming time step, using the value of
the parameter at the previous time step rt−1, the time of the day tod, the
day of the week dow and other quantities as predictors.
Weather forecast data was used as predictors for the parameters temper-
ature, global irradiance, wind and total network electricity demand (used to
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estimate the electricity price). These forecasts and actual data for the para-
meters relevant to the states of NSW and ACT in Australia were obtained
from the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) and the Australian Energy Market
Operator (AEMO) and used to train the models and in EMS experiments.
The forecasts include daily predictors of minimum and maximum temperat-
ures tmin, tmax and morning and afternoon cloud cover cldam, cldpm and
wind speeds windam,windpm.
The mgcv models are presented below in mgcv pseudo-code for the con-
tinuous stochastic parameters. The identify link function was used for each
model, in line with the use of Gaussian distributions. The s functions rep-
resent smoothing functions which optionally have their basis dimension re-
stricted by setting k.
E[tempt] = s(tempt−1) + s(tod, tmax, tmin, k = 20) (3.35)
E[globalt] = s(globalt−1) + s(tod, cldam, cldpm, k = 20) (3.36)
E[windt] = s(windt−1) + s(tod,windam,windpm, k = 20) (3.37)
E[demandt] = demandt−1 + s(tod,dow, tmax, k = 20) (3.38)
From top to bottom these are: the outdoor temperature, global irradiance,
wind and aggregate network load. The wind and aggregate network load
are used in predictions of the dynamic price as we will discuss shortly.
Once the models have been fit to training data, the expected values of
the continuous variables over a forward horizon (for the distribution 3.25)
can be calculated by repeatedly calling the mgcv predict function. Each
time it is conditioned on the known predictors and previous values. In
order to generate a scenario, a sample is drawn from a normal distribution
with standard deviation equal to the result returned by the original fit,
and then added to the result of the prediction step. This value is then
used to condition the predictor for the next prediction, and the process is
repeated until enough values for the number of time steps of interest have
been generated.
Figure 3.4 shows five scenarios sampled from the outdoor temperature
model. The temperatures are sampled for 10 days into the future, condi-
tioned on the current temperature and the forecast minimum and maximum
temperatures.
The best approach to implementing dynamic pricing in retail markets is
still an open question. It will likely have a shape that is representative of the
wholesale market, but with less volatility. We designed our dynamic price
to be a quadratic function (which represents an increasing marginal supply
price [Ramchurn et al., 2011]) of the amount of power that fossil fuel sources
must supply to meet total network load. This is the total network demand
(estimated with a GAM) minus the generation from renewable sources such
as wind and solar. The dynamic price is only revealed to the EMS 30 minutes
in advance.
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Figure 3.4: Five scenarios for outdoor temperature, generated from the forecast
minimums and maximums (dashed lines) over ten days.
The resulting prices have a similar magnitude to wholesale market prices
in the NEM (see section 2.1). This is only a part of the overall residential
retail prices, which also include network tariffs and other retail fees, but it
is the part that has the strongest time dependence. This means that the
costs presented in our experiments section should not be treated as absolute
values as they do not include these additional retail charges and fixed costs.
3.7.2 Markov Models
A Markov model uses a random variable to model the state of the system,
where the distribution of the variable in future states only depends on the
current state, not on the states preceding it. In particular we make use
of a semi-Markov models, which allows the distribution to also rely on the
amount of time that the model has been in the current state.
Semi-Markov models were used to capture the behaviour of four occu-
pants of a particular house in the ACT in Australia. These models provide
the consumption patterns and profiles for the stochastic parameters such
as hot water demand, uncontrollable energy consumption, shiftable load re-
quests and EV usage. Each occupant had its own model that captured key
activities, for example, watching TV, taking a shower and driving to work.
Two dedicated models for clothes washing/drying (see figure 3.5) and dish
washing were also developed. In addition to the states, the models also
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specify the probability of transitioning from one activity to the next within
certain time windows.
sleep
dry morning
dry evening
sleep
skip
wash morning
wash evening
wash night
dry night
Figure 3.5: Model of washing machine and clothes dryer usage.
A state transition can trigger the use of a resource. A simple example is
the cooking activity/state which can trigger use of the oven resource. An-
other one is the work activity which removes the EV resource from the home
and turns the lighting off. These resources have a direct impact the para-
meters in our optimisation problem. Conditional sampling through these
models is used to generate scenarios.
Whilst this scheme was convenient for our experiments, other more data-
driven options are possible: we could simply gather and use a database of
raw scenarios, or learn model parameters from disaggregated demand data
[Kolter et al., 2010, Parson et al., 2012].
3.8 Experiments
We implemented the expectation (Expect) and 2-stage (Stage) online al-
gorithms in Python using Gurobi as a backend to solve the MILPs for each
horizon. The devices in section 3.4 were implemented and included in the ex-
perimental house, and conditional samplers were created for the uncertain
parameters in section 3.7. We developed a simulator that uses the same
physical equations as the optimisation to simulate the execution of actions
in the real world. We compare the performance of the expectation and 2-
stage controllers with two purely reactive controllers (Naive and Simple),
and a controller that has perfect information (Perfect).
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The naive reactive controller represents a household that either has no
ability or no desire to respond to a dynamic price. It starts shiftable devices
as soon as a request is received, fills up the hot water tank in off-peak hours,
charges the EV only if it is below the requested minimum level, maintains
the room at the set point temperature and never uses the battery bank.
This corresponds to what people do now, in a setting without an EMS.
The simple reactive controller uses simple device action policies to decide
how to respond to changes in price. It delays running a shiftable device until
it reaches either a cheap price or the last available start time; uses thresholds
about a moving average of the price to decide when to charge or discharge
the battery, EV and hot water system; and maintains the room at the set
point temperature like the naive controller.
The perfect controller has perfect foresight about what will happen in the
future. It optimises the deterministic problem in equations (3.6–3.9) over
the whole experiment duration with full knowledge of w∗t . This controller
(which is not possible in a real setting) produces a lower bound on the
objective, for comparison with the other controllers.
3.8.1 Controller Comparison
Nine problem instances were generated for the controllers to be tested on.
Each instance spans 7 days and is made up of known parameter values that
are typical of a week in February in the ACT Australia. The online al-
gorithms were set up to use 16 hour optimisation horizons (the gains are
minimal beyond this length as seen in section 3.8.4), with 15 minutes for
the first two time steps and 30 minute time steps for the remainder of the
horizon. This was done to demonstrate the ability of the algorithm to fo-
cus the computation on the more immediate actions, where there is more
certainty about random parameters. The reactive and perfect controllers
had 15 minute time steps. The 2-stage algorithm sampled 60 scenarios for
each second stage. The amount of time spent optimising in Gurobi per day
was on average 1 second for the expectation algorithm and 4 minutes for
the 2-stage algorithm (using a single core of an Intel i7-2600 3.4GHz CPU).
Whilst the 2-stage is much slower, its computation time is still small when
spread out over a day.
The controller costs are plotted in figure 3.6 for each problem instance.
These results are adjusted to account for any energy that remains in the
battery, EV, or hot water system at the end of the experiment. This is
done by valuing the left-over energy at the average price for the last 24
hours. Without this adjustment it would not be a fair comparison since
any controller that anticipates the need to store energy for a future purpose
would perform poorly if it does so just before the experiment ends. This is
an artefact of the finite length of our experiments. With longer durations
this problem is less significant.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of controller costs for each problem instance.
The results show that the expectation and 2-stage algorithms get quite
close to the performance of the controller with perfect foresight (except for
instance 5) and they achieve significant cost reductions over the two reactive
controllers (approximately 35% and 52% less costs than the simple and naive
controllers). This justifies the assumption we made earlier that planning
EMS actions ahead of time can produce much better outcomes than purely
reactive control. It also highlights how an EMS can significantly reduce costs
in a dynamic pricing environment, as all the controllers greatly improve over
the naive results (which represents a house with no EMS).
To test the robustness of the 2-stage algorithm, we reran the experiments
4 times using different random seeds for the scenario generator. The stand-
ard deviation of the results was typically less than 2 cents for each instance,
except instance 5 which had a standard deviation of 42 cents (caused by a
volatile hot water consumption scenario that will be discussed shortly).
The expectation controller slightly outperforms the 2-stage controller
on average and in each individual instance except 9. This tells us that
the nature of the stochastic EMS problem is handled well by the simpler
online algorithm that just looks at the expectation of unknown parameters.
We anticipated that the 2-stage approach would do at least as well as the
expectation approach, but in fact it appears to be let down by the volatility
of some of the unknown parameters and the limited number of samples taken
in its second stage, which we will discuss in the next section.
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3.8.2 Device Cost Contributions
Figure 3.7 shows the costs attributed to each device, averaged across all
instances. The costs for the expectation and 2-stage algorithms are very
similar, and also close to the perfect algorithm. The devices that gain the
most benefit from using these receding-horizon algorithms over the react-
ive controllers are the battery, EV and underfloor heating/cooling system
(HVAC). The shiftable devices also gain a benefit, but the overall affect on
cost for these is much smaller.
Battery EV HVAC Water Dish Wash Dryer
0
1
2
3
4
5
C
o
st
 (
$
)
Perfect
Expect
Stage
Simple
Naive
Figure 3.7: Costs for each device averaged over all problem instances.
The 2-stage algorithm performs fractionally better than the expectation
algorithm on all devices except the hot water heater. In fact, its poor
performance on the hot water heater outweighs the small gains it makes on
the other devices. Also, interestingly, the simple reactive controller actually
performs better on the hot water heater than both of the online receding
horizon algorithms.
If we recall the hot water heater model, it has a recourse variable that
represents the unmet hot water demand. This recourse variable has a very
high cost which represents the dissatisfaction associated with a cold shower.
This along with the high volatility of hot water use (e.g., the large spikes
in consumption for shower usage), means that mistakes in predictions can
have a significant cost associated with them.
For this reason the reactive controllers are designed to be quite conservat-
ive, and so do not take much advantage of price differences. Unfortunately
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the expectation and 2-stage controllers get it wrong often enough that they
actually do worse than the simple reactive controller. This is not too sur-
prising for the expectation algorithm, but the 2-stage algorithm performs
even worse than this.
The first thing we checked was whether or not this was just a statistical
anomaly. We extended the problem instances from 9 to 36, but still experi-
ence the same trend. We also thought this might be caused by our treatment
of the first time step unknowns. To completely remove all unknowns from
the first stage we implemented the second approach described in section
3.6.3, where we explicitly model the executives in the optimisation. This
only improved the results by 1.5% on average relative to the original 2-stage
approach.
We tried to increase the number of second stage scenarios from 60 up to
100, but this did not significantly improve the results either. More samples
beyond this point would start to become computationally prohibitive in both
experimental and real world settings.
The best explanation we have is that the intrinsically volatile nature of
hot water usage makes it difficult to apply stochastic programming directly
to the probability distribution with only a limited number of samples. Extra
outside rules (e.g., to keep a certain minimum charge level at certain times)
can be used to make up for this lack of predictive power. For example, we
see that the simple reactive controller that uses simple rules can produce
good results for the hot water system.
A combination of the 2-stage approach with the reactive control rules
for the hot water system would produce the best overall outcome. The
expectation approach with the reactive hot water rules would only be a
fraction worse off. From a practical point of view, the expectation online
algorithm is faster and much simpler to implement. The stochastic models
are also simpler to implement because they do not require a diverse range
of scenarios to be generated.
3.8.3 Device Operation Examples
An example of the control provided by the 2-stage algorithm for the under-
floor heating/cooling operation is provided in figure 3.8 for problem instance
1. This figure shows the room air temperature, outdoor temperature and
the set point temperature. The white sections indicate when temperature
control is required. The figure shows how the controller pre-cools the house
before occupants arrive home on hot afternoons (for example, around the
times 3.7, 4.7 and 5.7).
Figure 3.9 gives an example of the power exchanged between the house
and the grid for one day, along with the price. As expected, most con-
sumption occurs when the price is low and then sold back to the grid from
the battery, EV and PV when it is high. The expectation and 2-stage con-
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Figure 3.8: Example of underfloor heating/cooling control.
trollers follow the general trend of the perfect controller with some small
divergences.
3.8.4 Horizon Length
Figure 3.10 shows the results of an experiment that investigates how the
horizon length affects performance. This plot shows the performance of the
perfect controller running as an online algorithm where it is restricted to
only having perfect foresight a certain distance into the future (the horizon
length). The experiment is performed on instance 1 for a number of dif-
ferent horizon lengths and the results are compared to the original perfect
controller that can see the full 7 days. The results show that there is little
to be gained by looking any further into the future than 20 hours.
3.9 Related Work
Much of the existing literature on residential energy management and DR fo-
cuses on deterministic formulations over a fixed horizon where the scheduler
has perfect foresight [Ramchurn et al., 2011, Gatsis and Giannakis, 2012].
The work that has considered uncertainty in the problem typically focus on
just one aspect (e.g., dynamic pricing) [Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia,
2010], or use simple stochastic models (e.g., no correlation between time
steps) [Tischer and Verbic, 2011, Jacomino and Le, 2012]. Model-predictive
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Figure 3.9: House power profiles for one day (inverse power is plotted: −Pt).
control has been used with uncertainty in device model parameters and
measurement noise [Yu et al., 2012], but not the uncertainty used for the
underlying processes.
Dynamic programming [Tischer and Verbic, 2011, Kim and Poor, 2011]
and Q-learning [Levorato et al., 2010] have been used in conjunction with
Markov decision process (MDP) formulations of the residential load schedul-
ing problem, to generate policies that allocate power to each device. Dy-
namic programming has also been used to develop optimal policies for
batteries exposed to uncertain PV production and uncertain price signals
[Carvalho et al., 2012, Grillo et al., 2012]. MDP approaches suffer from
severe scalability issues, especially since the state space needs to be discret-
ised. Moreover, MDPs seem somewhat excessive for our problem, given that
uncertainty does not depend on the decisions taken. Our online approach is
more scalable and natural in the presence of exogenous uncertainty.
Tischer and Verbic [2011] found that acting on the basis of an optimal
dynamic programming solution did not provide any benefit over acting on
expectations. Our results extend this finding to cover more diverse uncer-
tainty models, as we found in most instances that our expectation algorithm
performs just as well as the 2-stage approach we developed.
The work closest to ours (which was done independently) compares ro-
bust optimisation against 2-stage stochastic programming for scheduling
residential loads [Chen et al., 2012]. Uncertainty is restricted to the dy-
namic pricing which is known for the first stage but becomes uncertain
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Figure 3.10: Costs for different horizon lengths compared to the cost achieved by
the perfect controller.
thereafter. The objective includes minimising expected cost and the prob-
ability mass of “risky” scenarios whose price exceeds a certain threshold.
Comfort is handled by imposing hard constraints under which appliances
must run, rather than by inclusion into the objective. In this setting, 2-
stage stochastic programming was observed to provide benefits over robust
scheduling.
Industry is now offering products for home automation. While gen-
eral energy management solutions are not yet widely available, there are
well developed solutions for specific problems. A well known example is
the Nest smart thermostat. Over time it learns occupant preferences from
manual temperature adjustments, so that it can perform these adjustments
automatically at different times of day and under different external factors.
This has the potential to improve occupant comfort and to improve energy
efficiency. It is more focused on these aspects than responding to wider
electricity network pricing signals.
Reposit provides an EMS product that optimises the combined operation
of solar PV and battery storage in homes. It takes into consideration the
electricity tariffs, solar generation and household energy use to work out the
best utilisation of a battery system. This EMS could be expanded to work
with smart appliances and other controllable DETs in homes, as we have
presented in this chapter.
The scope of our analysis goes significantly beyond these results, by
exploring uncertainty from a large range of sources and by identifying the
value of stochastic information. We enable richer sources of uncertainty
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to be considered in our framework, by allowing inputs to be revealed at
arbitrary points in time.
3.10 Conclusion and Future Work
The EMS we have developed in this chapter is crucial for enabling house-
holds to efficiently operate DETs, and through them modify their pattern of
consumption. Creating this flexibility in household consumption is what is
needed to help networks with balancing renewable energy and keeping the
network within its operating limits.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to produce a scalable
and accurate solution in the presence of uncertainty about future prices,
occupant behaviour and environmental conditions. Using models represent-
ative of physical devices and random processes, we have shown the monetary
and comfort cost savings that can be achieved by using online stochastic al-
gorithms over reactive control, and the comparison of performance between
a 2-stage approach and acting on expectations. Studies such as the one
provided in this chapter are important for rallying industry and customers
towards more effective energy management schemes.
Further research is needed to investigate how closely reality can be mod-
elled with random processes, and if in turn they are suitable for online
learning. We also need to further investigate how time step sizes influence
performance, and to conduct more experiments for different months of the
year to get a broader understanding of the value of such technologies. The
experimental setup we have developed can be used to experiment with and
compare different pricing schemes, for example: TOU pricing, RTP and
prices that change depending on whether the house is buying or selling elec-
tricity.
Chapter 4
Network-Aware
Coordination
4.1 Introduction
The EMS presented in the previous chapter successfully reduces costs for a
home exposed to dynamic electricity prices by automatically controlling local
DETs. From the point of view of a utility, dynamic pricing can be used to
coordinate the combined actions of many thousands of such homes; however,
if not done carefully, this can cause undesirable herding or other unexpected
impacts. In this chapter we present a method of calculating these prices,
and hence for coordinating multiple EMSs, so that the combined result is
the most efficient for the overall system.
Conventional networks use centralised markets to solve the similar prob-
lem of dispatching generators (see section 2.1.1). These markets, to one
degree or another, seek to achieve an optimal power flow (OPF) [Glover
et al., 2011, chapter 12], which is a traditional power systems optimisation
problem that is concerned with minimising operational costs. The goal is to
dispatch generators in a way that minimises costs, so that all loads are met
and without overloading the network. Such markets and the traditional OPF
problem were not designed to operate in the new world of prosumers where
every customer is potentially an active participant. This massive increase
in scale, the time-coupled behaviour of DETs and the unique preferences of
prosumers means that a different approach is needed.
We envisage a future where network operators provide a competitive
electricity market that anyone can participate in, and where the distinction
between generators, loads and prosumers is removed. The overall operation
of this market is managed through distributed algorithms and with each
EMS calculating their own small local part of the overall problem. This will
be of particular importance for the operation of microgrids, which require
more finesse to ensure that demand and supply are balanced and that the
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network is in a safe operating state in each instance.
Several works have applied distributed solving techniques to the prob-
lem of coordinating many participants [Kraning et al., 2014, Gatsis and
Giannakis, 2012, Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010]. These distributed algorithms
greatly parallelise the problem and help to preserve the privacy of parti-
cipants. As a by-product, they provide a natural market mechanism for
allocating payments between participants. Theoretically, these algorithms
require the problem to be convex in order to guarantee convergence to a
globally optimal solution. However, the behaviour of many household loads
are discrete in nature [Ramchurn et al., 2011], and the equations that govern
how power physically flows on the network are non-convex.
We show that these theoretical problems can in practice be dealt with,
specifically in the context of microgrids where the problem of balancing sup-
ply and demand is more challenging because individual participants have
more influence. We show that for a distributed algorithm in a microgrid,
exact non-convex power flow models perform well compared to inexact con-
vex models, which makes them a valuable candidate in practice. Secondly,
we find that the non-convex nature of discrete house loads to be a non-issue,
and that in practice simple approaches to handling these discrete loads are
effective at the microgrid level. By solving these problems, we show that
the use of distributed algorithms for managing the balance of power in a
microgrid is in practice not only possible, but also highly effective.
We formulate our EMS coordination problem as a multi-period OPF
problem to account for multiple time steps over a day, which can be used
as part of a day-ahead pricing scheme or, as we propose, a receding horizon
control algorithm. We solve the multi-period OPF problems in a distrib-
uted manner by adapting the alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) approach presented in [Kraning et al., 2014]. We experiment with
a range of power flow models of varying degrees of accuracy, to compare
their relative behaviour in a distributed algorithm. We then introduce and
compare several approaches layered on top of ADMM which manage the
introduction of discrete variables into the problem. Technically, our contri-
butions can be summarised as:
• A comprehensive experimental comparison of the convergence of five
commonly used power flow models when used for distributed OPF in
a microgrid context.
• The identification that the exact non-convex power flow model in prac-
tice not only converges in this context, but also finds near-optimal
solutions in a timely fashion relative to other models.
• The introduction and comparison of three simple but effective ap-
proaches to managing the discrete shiftable loads that are typically
found within houses.
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Combined, these results show that distributed EMS coordination using
ADMM can achieve near optimal solutions in a time frame that is prac-
tical for receding horizon control in this challenging microgrid setting, even
though the theoretical results do not extend this far. This work brings dis-
tributed DR closer to the point where it can be deployed in real networks,
including microgrids.
In the next two sections we provide some background on the different
power flow models and distributed optimisation. In sections 4.4–4.6 we
formulate the multi-period OPF problem and present the distributed al-
gorithm we use to solve it. The test microgrid is introduced in section 4.8
before presenting our results in sections 4.9–4.10 on power flows and discrete
decisions.
4.2 Power Flows
In the majority of cases, alternating current (AC) is used for transporting
electrical energy across networks. AC power flow equations model the phys-
ical behaviour of such systems, making them useful in simulations and in
decision making processes.
In this section we introduce network power flows and the different power
flow equation variations that we experiment with later in this chapter. We
assume a balanced 3-phase network, for which we use a single-phase AC
equivalent. We also make a quasi-steady-state approximation of the system,
which ignores transient effects and discretises time. Appendix A provides an
introduction to AC power, which might be worth reading before continuing
here.
4.2.1 Network Power Flow Equations
The networks we investigate are made up of three main categories of com-
ponents: buses, lines and participants (which includes traditional generat-
ors, loads and prosumers). Participants connect to buses, and lines connect
between buses.
We use some non-standard diagrams and notation throughout this thesis.
This is done to make it easier to understand and formalise the problem for
use with a distributed algorithm. A compact matrix representation of the
power flow problem is typically used in power systems literature, whereas
we use a more explicit and flexible component-based representation.
Figure 4.1 illustrates a common line diagram and a component-based
diagram of the network. In the component-based form, a network is made
up of buses (small circles), lines (rectangles) and participants (large circles).
Components connect to buses through their terminals (small solid squares).
In power systems, network equations are typically formulated in terms
of voltages and power flows instead of voltages and currents. Power flows
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Figure 4.1: A 3-bus 3-line network with 4 participants (2 generators and 2 loads),
shown as a line diagram (left) and a component-based diagram (right). A single-
phase network with implied ground connections is used to represent an equivalent
balanced 3-phase network.
are more natural to use, as many traditional generators and loads can be
treated as constant power sources or sinks. Current formulations are more
appropriate where there are only current sources and constant impedance
components. Below we derive a power flow equivalent for Kirchhoff’s current
law (KCL).
Let each bus n have a complex voltage Vn. Let Tn represent the termin-
als connected to bus n, and Ii the complex current entering the bus from
terminal i ∈ Tn. At each bus KCL must hold. It can be transformed into
an equivalent power form by taking the complex conjugate of (A.8), and
multiplying it by the voltage at the node. For a bus n:
0 =
∑
i∈Tn
IiVn =
∑
i∈Tn
Si (4.1)
In rectangular form this breaks into two equations which conserve power:∑
i∈Tn
Pi = 0 (4.2)∑
i∈Tn
Qi = 0 (4.3)
Pi and Qi represent the real and reactive power (relative to ground) entering
the bus from connected terminal i. Components need to relate the quantit-
ies of V and S at their terminals. We have seen that for the bus this is given
by a common voltage for all connected terminals, and the conservation of
power. Additional constraints such as bus voltage bounds can be provided
to represent operating limits. In the next section we will discuss the rela-
tions for a line, which for the power flow formulation is where much of the
computational complexity comes in.
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4.2.2 Lines
Models of varying degrees of accuracy exist for overhead and underground
power lines (see Glover et al. [2011, chapter 5]). One of the simplest ap-
proaches is to model a balanced 3-phase power line as a series impedance.
Higher accuracy finite element models can be used, but the series imped-
ance is accurate enough for our problem where we are primarily interested
in distribution lines which are relatively short. Using a and b to indicate
the two terminals (as shown in figure A.1), Ohm’s law provides the current
flowing in a series impedance:
(Va −Vb) = ZIab (4.4)
The power consumed by the line is:
Sab = Iab(Va −Vb) (4.5)
The power “flowing into” terminal a of the line is:
Sa = IabVa (4.6)
Cancelling the current term by using Ohm’s law:
Sa = Y(Va −Vb)Va (4.7)
= Y(V 2a − VaVb∠(θa − θb)) (4.8)
= (G− iB)(V 2a − VaVb cos(θa − θb)− iVaVb sin(θa − θb)) (4.9)
Breaking it up into components:
Pa = GV
2
a −GVaVb cos(θa − θb)−BVaVb sin(θa − θb) (4.10)
Qa = −BV 2a +BVaVb cos(θa − θb)−GVaVb sin(θa − θb) (4.11)
The equations for terminal b can be obtained from the above by switching
a and b where they appear. The end result is a set of 4 nonlinear equations
which relate the terminal voltages in polar form to the powers in rectangular
form. If the admittance is considered constant, then we have a set of 8 real
variables and 4 equations.
Lines have an upper bound on how much current they can carry before
they get too hot and either destroy something or deform and short out.
This is called the line thermal limit. This is often approximated by setting
a bound on apparent power. If Sth is the line thermal limit then:
P 2a +Q
2
a ≤ S2th (4.12)
P 2b +Q
2
b ≤ S2th (4.13)
We refer to these 4 equations and 2 inequalities as simply just the AC power
flow model or sometimes the exact model.
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Power flow equations are used in many network optimisation problems,
including optimal power flow (OPF) [Coffrin et al., 2015, Momoh et al.,
1999], optimal transmission switching (OTS) [Coffrin et al., 2014, Fisher
et al., 2008], capacitor placement [Aguiar and Cuervo, 2005, Huang et al.,
1996] and expansion planing [Taylor and Hover, 2011]. Unfortunately, the
equations presented above are nonlinear and non-convex, which in general
makes it difficult for optimisation techniques to find and/or prove globally
optimal solutions to the above problems.
For these reasons, the equations are often either approximated or re-
laxed before being used in network optimisation problems. Approximations
attempt to simplify the equations without losing too much accuracy. Con-
vex relaxations of the equations ensure that when used in an optimisation
context, the resulting objective is a lower bound on what is possible in the
original problem. We present some of the alternative forms that we test
with our distributed algorithm.
Linear DC (LDC)— This approximation is a common linearisation known
as the linear DC model [Schweppe and Rom, 1970, Stott et al., 2009]. By
assuming Va ≈ Vb ≈ 1, R  X =⇒ G ≈ 0, and |θa − θb| is small, the
equations simplify to:
Pa = −B(θa − θb) (4.14)
Qa = 0 (4.15)
This reduces the number of variables from 8 to 4: Pa, Pb, θa and θb. Because
Pa = −Pb, the model is lossless.
Dist-Flow (DF)— The dist-flow relaxation [Farivar et al., 2011, Baran and
Wu, 1989] and an equivalent SOCP relaxation [Jabr, 2006, Bose et al., 2014]
provide a convex relaxation of the line model which ignores voltage phase
angles. By manipulating Ohm’s law and relaxing two equalities (equations
(4.18–4.19)) the following relations can be produced:
Pa + Pb = RI
2
ab (4.16)
Qa +Qb = XI
2
ab (4.17)
P 2a +Q
2
a ≤ V 2a I2ab (4.18)
P 2b +Q
2
b ≤ V 2b I2ab (4.19)
V 2b − V 2a + 2(RPa +XQa) = (R2 +X2)I2ab (4.20)
The voltages and currents only appear as squared terms, which can be re-
placed by new variables, resulting in a convex problem with linear equalities
and second-order cone constraints. The voltages at the buses must also be
replaced with their squared versions.
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Quadratic Constraint (QC)— The quadratic constraint model developed by
Coffrin et al. [2015] and Hijazi et al. [2014] is also a convex relaxation. It
is a strengthening of the DF model, which reintroduces the voltage phase
angles. It introduces intermediate variables, takes relaxations of the sine
and cosine terms in the exact model and sequentially applies MacCormick
relaxations to multilinear terms. The full formulation is omitted due to its
length, but can be seen in Hijazi et al. [2014].
Quadratic Approximation (QA)— A quadratic approximation (QA) was
proposed by Kraning et al. [2014]. While it does not appear to be in com-
mon use, it is provided here for comparison because of its use in a similar
distributed optimisation setting. By assuming that Va ≈ Vb ≈ 1 and that
|θa − θb| is small, the exact equations can be simplified to:
Pa − Pb = −2B(θa − θb) (4.21)
Pa + Pb =
1
4G
(Pa + Pb)
2 +
G
4B2
(Pa − Pb)2 (4.22)
A convex relaxation of this approximate model (not the original exact model)
can be obtained by changing the equality in equation (4.22) to an inequality:
Pa + Pb ≥ 1
4G
(Pa + Pb)
2 +
G
4B2
(Pa − Pb)2 (4.23)
Others Models— Other common models include a semi-definite program
[Bai et al., 2008] and linearisation that incorporates reactive power and
voltage, the LPAC model [Coffrin and Van Hentenryck, 2014].
4.3 Distributed Optimisation
Distributed computation can greatly speed up certain calculations through
parallelisation. It can also be used in circumstances where input data for
the computation cannot be brought together to one central location, for ex-
ample, when there are privacy concerns surrounding the data. These are
some of the reasons why we apply a distributed algorithm to the prosumer
coordination problem. In this section we introduce some of the different dis-
tributed optimisation techniques and provide sources for more information
on the topic. This is not a comprehensive review of the literature, but rather
a gentle introduction to some of the most significant approaches.
Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1989] present a range of distributed numerical
techniques for solving different problems, from systems of equations to dy-
namic programming and constrained optimisation. Not all problems gain
a speed advantage from being solved in a distributed manner, for example,
when there is a tight coupling between the different parts of the problem.
To distribute an optimisation problem it is first decomposed into smal-
ler subproblems. These subproblems can then be solved in parallel on the
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same machine or on distributed infrastructure. Some problems are trivially
decomposable while others may require a significant reformulation. The
subproblem results are communicated either amongst each other or with a
master problem (see figure 4.2). In all but the most simple problems, mul-
tiple solving and communication iterations are required before a solution is
obtained for the overall problem. A master node can be used to coordin-
ate the actions of subproblems (e.g., terminate the algorithm on reaching a
solution), whereas a distributed approach is required when the problem is
fully decentralised.
Master
SP1 SP2 SP3 SP1
SP2
SP3
Figure 4.2: Decomposition into subproblems with and without master problem
coordination.
Specialised algorithms have been developed for different types of optim-
isation problems. Some algorithms can provide global optimality guaran-
tees whereas others only attempt to find a local optimum or approximate
solution. The theory behind distributed optimisation is well developed for
convex optimisation problems, with efficient algorithms that converge to a
globally optimal solution.
For convex problems two decomposition methods are commonly used:
primal and dual decompositions. They differ on whether the master prob-
lem solves a primal or a dual version of the original problem. We provide
examples from Boyd et al. [2007] of these decompositions for the uncon-
strained optimisation problem:
min
x1,x2,y
f1(x1, y) + f2(x2, y) (4.24)
Here y is a complicating variable as it prevents us from trivially separating
the functions f1 and f2. For the primal decomposition the problem is split
up into a master problem and two subproblems:
min
y
φ1(y) + φ2(y) (4.25)
φ1(y) := min
x1
f1(x1, y) (4.26)
φ2(y) := min
x2
f2(x2, y) (4.27)
For the dual decomposition we first reformulate the original problem by
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duplicating the complicating variables and tying them together with a con-
straint:
min
x1,x2,y1,y2
f1(x1, y1) + f2(x2, y2) (4.28)
s.t. y1 − y2 = 0 (4.29)
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
L(x1, x2, y1, y2, ν) = f1(x1, y1) + f2(x2, y2) + ν(y1 − y2) (4.30)
Where ν is a Lagrangian multiplier. Finally, the dual decomposition consists
of a master problem and two subproblems based on this Lagrangian:
max
ν
φ1(ν) + φ2(ν) (4.31)
φ1(ν) := inf
x1,y1
f1(x1, y1) + νy1 (4.32)
φ2(ν) := inf
x2,y2
f2(x2, y2)− νy2 (4.33)
The master problem for the primal (dual) problem is solved with an
iterative algorithm that fixes the value y (ν), solves the subproblems for
this fixed value, and then updates y (ν) to a new value. The update of
the primal (dual) values can be done using gradient, subgradient or quasi-
newton methods depending on the form of f1 and f2.
We show an example of the subgradient method applied to the dual de-
composition. For the k-th iteration, given a value νk−1 for the Lagranagian
multiplier at the previous iteration, the algorithm proceeds as follows:
xk1, y
k
1 := arg min
x1,y1
f1(x1, y1) + ν
k−1y1 (4.34)
xk2, y
k
2 := arg min
x2,y2
f2(x2, y2)− νk−1y2 (4.35)
νk := νk−1 + ρk(yk1 − yk2 ) (4.36)
where ρk is a positive step parameter. The subproblems given by equations
(4.34) and (4.35) can be solved in parallel, which is then followed by the
master problem dual variable update in equation (4.36).
The distributed algorithm we use is the alternating direction method of
multipliers (ADMM) [Boyd et al., 2011, Douglas and Rachford, 1956, Gabay
and Mercier, 1976]. It is a distributed version of the method of multipliers,
which has improved convergence on problems that are not strictly convex
compared to dual gradient and subgradient methods [Boyd et al., 2011].
There are a whole range of other distributed algorithms that are de-
signed to improve convergence over the more basic methods. These include
distributed Newton-like methods [Jadbabaie et al., 2009, Zargham et al.,
2011], Nesterov-like methods [Jakovetic et al., 2012] and distributed interior
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point algorithms [Pakazad et al., 2013]. These can greatly speed up con-
vergence, but are often specialised to particular problems and result in a
greater subproblem computation and communication burden.
There are several other common decomposition methods and algorithms
that are worth mentioning. For LPs, Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition [George
B. Dantzig, 1960] and Benders’ decomposition [Benders, 1962] can solve very
large problems with particular structures. Distributed constraint optimisa-
tion (DCOP) has been used to solve constraint programming problems in a
distributed manner [Faltings, 2006, Modi et al., 2005].
4.4 Multi-Period Optimal Power Flow
Chapter 3 has shown how online algorithms, in particular receding horizon
algorithms, are effective at making decisions in the presence of uncertainty.
We adopt a receding horizon algorithm here, but instead of minimising the
costs for a single house in each horizon, we minimise the costs for the whole
network by solving a multi-period OPF problem. We are primarily interested
in the new aspects of the problem in this chapter, so we just focus on the
performance of the distributed algorithm within a single horizon.
In this section we formalise the multi-period OPF problem for a single
horizon in a way that is readily decomposable and can be used with the
ADMM algorithm. This horizon has a length of T time steps.
We adopt a component-based representation of the network similar to
that presented in section 4.2. The difference is that we treat buses just
like any other component, providing them with terminals and only allowing
connections between pairs of terminals. An illustration of this is provided
in figure 4.3 where small solid squares represent terminals and solid lines
between terminals represent connections. This enables us to decompose the
problem by breaking the network up at connections.
P3
P4
P2
P1 L1
L2L3
B1 B2
B3
Figure 4.3: Component-based representation.
In our model a network consists of a set of components D := {1, . . . , |D|},
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a set of terminals T := {1, . . . , |T |} and a set of connections E ⊆ T ×T which
are pairs of terminals. Each component d ∈ D (e.g., bus, line, generator,
load, prosumer) has a set of terminals Td ⊆ T which can be connected to
the terminals of other components, where the Td sets partition T .
4.4.1 Connections
Connections exist between the terminals of two different components. We
use the quantities of real power, reactive power, voltage and voltage phase
angle, Pi, Qi, Vi, θi ∈ RT respectively, to model the flow of power into a
component through a terminal i ∈ T . These are vectors in order to capture
each time step in the horizon. For convenience, we use a vector yi ∈ R4T to
represent all variables for a terminal i ∈ T , where yi := (Pi, Qi, Vi, θi)T.
When two terminals are connected together, (i, j) ∈ E , we pose the
following connection constraints:
Pi + Pj = 0, Qi +Qj = 0, Vi − Vj = 0, θi − θj = 0 (4.37)
The first two constraints ensure that any power leaving one terminal enters
the other. The second two ensure that the connected terminals have the
same voltage and phase angle. This duplication of variables is necessary in
order to decompose the problem for our distributed algorithm. To avoid
confusion, recall that connections and terminals are different from lines and
buses (see figures 4.3 and 4.1).
We rewrite these constraints as yi +Ayj = 0 for the terminal vectors yi
and yj , where A is the appropriate 4T ×4T diagonal matrix that reproduces
(4.37). For convenience we also define the connection function h : R4T ×
R4T 7→ R4T as the LHS of this constraint: h(yi, yj) := yi +Ayj .
4.4.2 Components
Each component d ∈ D has a vector of variables xd ∈ RMd which implicitly
includes the variables for its terminals (yi for all i ∈ Td) plus any additional
internal variables. Internal variables can be used, for example, to model the
start time of shiftable loads or a battery’s state of charge (section 3.4 offers
other examples). Components also have an objective function fd : RMd 7→ R
and a constraint function gd : RMd 7→ RNd , where gd(xd) ≤ 0.
The objective function is used to model any costs or preferences that
a component may have other than the direct payments they make to the
market for their consumption. Examples include generator fuel costs and
thermal comfort preferences in houses (as discussed in chapter 3). Compon-
ents such as lines and buses, will typically have no objective function.
Component constraints relate the component terminal variables to each
other and to any internal variables. They provide hard limits on what power
the component can exchange with its connected neighbour components.
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4.4.3 Optimisation Problem
The objective of the multi-period OPF problem for one horizon is to minim-
ise the sum of all component cost functions, subject to internal component
constraints and external terminal connection constraints. This is a utilit-
arian view of the problem, where we minimise the total combined cost of
the system. Formally for a network this is:
min
xd∀d∈D
∑
d∈D
fd(xd) (4.38)
s.t. gd(xd) ≤ 0 ∀d ∈ D (4.39)
h(yi, yj) = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E (4.40)
4.5 Component Models
In the following section we describe the models used for the components in
our experiments. We avoid writing the constraint functions gd explicitly, but
instead write the component constraints in a way that is easy to understand.
The constraints we present for each component, including the equalities, can
be transformed into a function of the form gd, which is more convenient when
formulating the optimisation problem at a higher level.
When necessary, we use t ∈ {0, . . . , T} to index vectors by time, other-
wise we imply standard vector operations. The index where t = 0 is used to
represent the value of the variable at the beginning of the current horizon,
which we assume is a known fixed value.
Bus— A bus has a variable number of terminals which depends on how
many other components connect to it. For example, a bus might be connec-
ted to a generator, a load and 3 lines for a total of 5 terminals. Regardless
of the number of terminals, the constraints take the form:∑
i∈Td
Pi = 0
∑
i∈Td
Qi = 0 (4.41)
Vi = Vj , θi = θj ∀i, j ∈ Td (4.42)
The first two constraints are an expression of KCL as described in section
4.2.1. The remaining constraints ensure that all terminal voltages and phase
angles are the same. Recall that these constraints can be reworked into
constraint functions gd for bus components.
Line— A line is a two terminal component which transports power from bus
to bus. In our experiments we use the various line models discussed in section
4.2.2. We use a maximum apparent power S ∈ R+ to represent a thermal
limit. In addition we have voltage magnitude limits
¯
V, V¯ and a phase angle
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difference limit θ¯ to ensure safe operating conditions. Let {i, j} = Td be the
line’s terminals, then these limits translate to the following constraints:
Vi,t, Vj,t ∈ [
¯
V, V¯ ] ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (4.43)
|θi,t − θj,t| ≤ θ¯ ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (4.44)
Generator— A generator is a single terminal component which produces
real and reactive power. Let i be the generator’s terminal. In our formula-
tion the generator has a floating phase angle and voltage. A generator has
lower and upper real and reactive power limits
¯
P, P¯,
¯
Q, Q¯, a ramping rate
P r ∈ R+ and a quadratic cost function f :
f(xd) = P
T
i ΨPi − ψTPi (4.45)
|Pi,t − Pi,t−1| ≤ P r ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (4.46)
Pi,t ∈ [
¯
P, P¯ ], Qi,t ∈ [
¯
Q, Q¯] ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (4.47)
where the diagonal matrix Ψ ∈ RT×T+ and vector ψ ∈ RT+ are price coef-
ficients for the horizon. More advanced generator models with non-convex
start up costs and minimum outputs can be modelled in this framework but
are not considered here.
House— Houses are the final type of component we consider. A house
can be further decomposed into components, e.g., one for each device, but
instead we stop decomposing the problem once we reach the house EMS.
As in chapter 3, the EMS centrally controls the rest of the house devices.
At the scale of a single house the problem is tractable, so there is little
benefit in further distributing the problem. Also the privacy advantages of
distributed control are not nearly as important within a single house as they
are between house and the rest of the network.
Houses have a single terminal and just like for generators we leave their
voltages and phase angles floating. As in chapter 3, a house is made up of a
set of devices and limits on its terminal powers, but now we also model the
reactive power of devices. We use a hat to distinguish house devices dˆ and
the device set Dˆ from components d and the component set D. This notation
highlights how the decomposition into components could have extended to
house devices.
If a component d is a house with terminal i, then the power limit on the
house is P 2i,t + Q
2
i,t ≤ S2i . The house’s real and reactive power is the sum
of any uncontrollable background power consumption P b and Qb and the
power consumed by its devices Dˆd:
Pi = P
b +
∑
dˆ∈Dˆd
Pdˆ (4.48)
Qi = Q
b +
∑
dˆ∈Dˆd
Qdˆ (4.49)
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Any of the devices modelled and tested in chapter 3 could be included
in the house. Within this framework we implemented models for shiftable
loads, batteries and solar PV. Most of our experiments are focused around
houses with just shiftable loads, as they are a source of non-convexity that
we are interested in.
A shiftable load is a single terminal component used to model electrical
loads like dish washers and clothes dryers. The starting time of the shiftable
load is flexible, and the EMS will schedule them to minimise electricity costs.
The shiftable load model used is a simplified version of that presented in
section 3.4. We expect the results presented here will carry over to the more
complicated model.
Shiftable loads must start running between an earliest te ∈ N and a latest
tl ∈ N start time. To model this we introduce binary variables u ∈ {0, 1}T for
the horizon. A value of 1 indicates that the device starts at the corresponding
time step. The device has a runtime of tr ∈ N consecutive time steps, during
which it consumes a (nominal) load of P nom ∈ R. For a shiftable device dˆ
the following constraints apply:
Pdˆ,t = P
nom
t∑
t′=t−tr+1
ut′
tl∑
t=te
ut = 1 (4.50)
ut = 0 ∀t 6∈ {te, . . . , tl} (4.51)
A convex relaxation of this component can be obtained by relaxing the
integrality requirement, i.e. allowing u ∈ [0, 1]T .
4.6 Distributed Algorithm
The next step is to show how this multi-period optimisation problem can
be solved in a distributed manner. The end result is an iterative algorithm
where each component (household, generator and network device) selfishly
optimises its own consumption/production profile for the currently standing
terminal prices. These profiles are then communicated amongst connected
components and the terminal prices are updated in a way that helps drive
agreement.
We use the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) al-
gorithm introduced in section 4.3 to distribute and solve the problem. It
is a dual decomposition method that applies the augmented Lagrangian to
the complicating constraints. For our problem the augmented Lagrangian
applied to the connection constraints (4.40) is:
L :=
∑
d∈D
fd(xd) +
∑
(i,j)∈E
[ρ
2
‖h(yi, yj)‖22 + λTi h(yi, yj)
]
(4.52)
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where λi ∈ R4T are dual variables for each connection (i, j) ∈ E and ρ ∈
(0,∞) is a penalty parameter.
The dual variables represent the locational marginal prices in our prob-
lem, or put another way, connection dependent dynamic prices. These prices
are used to charge (or pay) components for the power that they exchange
through their terminals. For example, a component with a terminal i (where
(i, j) ∈ E) will pay an amount equal to:
λTi,PPi + λ
T
i,QQi + λ
T
i,V Vi + λ
T
i,θθi (4.53)
where we have split up the dual variables so that it is clear how they associate
with each physical power quantity. These prices are based on not just the
cost of generation, but also account for line losses and adjust to prevent
congestion. They provide a natural market mechanism for the distribution
of payments from consumers to producers.
4.6.1 Algorithm
A single iteration of the ADMM algorithm is broken down into 3 steps. The
first two steps involve solving subproblems for two groups of components,
and the third step updates the dual prices. It is this alternating between
solving subproblems for different groups of components that gives the al-
gorithm its name.
Each component is allocated to either group I or group II, as indicated
by the sets DI and DII. The variables of the components in these groups
are represented by xI := (xd : d ∈ DI) and xII := (xd : d ∈ DII). Figure 4.4
shows two examples of how a network can be grouped.
Figure 4.4: Two different groupings for the same network. The solid regions indicate
components in group I and the striped regions components in group II. Contigu-
ous regions indicate a set of components that have intra-group connections. The
example on the left shows a case where all buses are in a group of their own, which
allows the network to be fully decomposed (no intra-group connections). The ex-
ample on the right does not decompose as much, which makes subproblems harder
to solve, but it may converge in fewer iterations.
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The connections are split into three sets: the intra-group connections EI
and EII, and the inter-group connections EIII. The intra-group connections
are the connections between components in the same group, while the inter-
group connections are those between components in different groups:
EI := {(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ E , i ∈ Td1 , j ∈ Td2 : d1, d2 ∈ DI} (4.54)
EII := {(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ E , i ∈ Td1 , j ∈ Td2 : d1, d2 ∈ DII} (4.55)
EIII := {(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ E , i ∈ Td1 , j ∈ Td2 : d1 ∈ DI, d2 ∈ DII} (4.56)
For simplicity, we assume that the first terminal in each inter-group connec-
tion belongs to a component in the first group. The augmented Lagrangian
relaxation is applied to the inter-group connections, so we only need dual
variables for the connections in the set EIII. The intra-group connections are
treated as hard constraints.
Superscripts such as x(k) are used to indicate the value of a variable x
after the k-th algorithm iteration. At the start all inter-group connection
terminal and dual variables are initialised to some values y
(0)
i and λ
(0)
i . For
the k-th iteration the ADMM algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Minimize L for xI, holding xII constant at its k − 1 value
2. Minimize L for xII, holding xI constant at its k value
3. Update the dual variables λ
For our optimisation problem this becomes:
x
(k)
I = arg min
xI
∑
d∈DI
fd(xd)
+
∑
(i,j)∈EIII
[
ρ(k)
2
‖h(yi, y(k−1)j )‖22 + λ(k−1)i
T
h(yi, y
(k−1)
j )
]
(4.57)
s.t. gd(xd) ≤ 0 ∀d ∈ DI
h(yi, yj) = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ EI
x
(k)
II = arg min
xII
∑
d∈DII
fd(xd)
+
∑
(i,j)∈EIII
[
ρ(k)
2
‖h(y(k)i , yj)‖22 + λ(k−1)i
T
h(y
(k)
i , yj)
]
(4.58)
s.t. gd(xd) ≤ 0 ∀d ∈ DII
h(yi, yj) = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ EII
λ
(k)
i = λ
(k−1)
i + ρ
(k)h(y
(k)
i , y
(k)
j ) ∀(i, j) ∈ EIII (4.59)
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In the simple case when ρ is held constant, fc and gc are convex, and h is
affine, ADMM converges to a global optimum [Boyd et al., 2011].
If a component has no intra-group connections, then it is separable in
the subproblem for its group, and can therefore be solved in parallel. We
adopt the partitioning scheme where DII contains all buses and DI the rest
of the network (the example on the left in figure 4.4). This allows us to
fully separate all components within groups, since buses will never connect
to other buses (EII = ∅) and non-bus components will never connect to
other non-bus components (EI = ∅). In this way each component acts as
an independent agent and communicates only to other directly connected
agents. As an additional benefit, some components are simple enough when
separated that they have closed-form solutions that can be calculated at each
iteration, instead of invoking an optimisation routine [Peng and Low, 2014].
We adopt such closed-form solutions for buses as proposed in [Kraning et al.,
2014].
4.6.2 Residuals and Stopping Criteria
As in [Kraning et al., 2014], we use primal and dual residuals to define
the stopping criteria for our algorithm. The primal residuals represent the
constraint violations at the current solution. We combine the residuals of
all connections into a single vector rp. By indexing into the inter-group
connections {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . .} = EIII, the primal residuals are:
r(k)p := ((y
(k)
i1
+Ay(k)j1 ), (y
(k)
i2
+Ay(k)j2 ), . . .) (4.60)
The dual residuals give the violation of the KKT stationarity constraint at
the current solution. We collect the dual residuals for each connection into
the vector rd. For ADMM, the dual residuals are (see [Boyd et al., 2011] for
derivation):
r
(k)
d := (ρ
(k)A(y(k)j1 − y
(k−1)
j1
), ρ(k)A(y(k)j2 − y
(k−1)
j2
), . . .) (4.61)
These residuals approach zero as the algorithm converges to a KKT point.
We consider that the algorithm has converged when the scaled 2-norms of
these residuals are smaller than a tolerance : 1√
n
‖r(k)p ‖2 < , 1√n‖r
(k)
d ‖2 < .
Here n is the total number of inter-group terminal constraints 4T |EIII| minus
the number of terminal constraints that are trivially satisfied (e.g., floating
voltages and phase angles for generators). This is used to keep the tolerance
independent of problem size.
4.7 Implementation
In a fully distributed real-world implementation every house, generator, bus,
line, and other component could have its own collocated computational node.
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In practice it might make more sense to have the computational parts of the
network located separately from their components and even grouped to-
gether. For example, all the buses and lines of a single distribution feeder
could be managed by a single node, which communicates to downstream
houses and the upstream substation. A whole range of practical issues
around speed, communications, costs, maintenance and robustness would
need to be considered before a decision could be made on the right archi-
tecture.
We developed an experimental implementation of the algorithm and
models presented in previous sections. It is a sequential implementation
of the ADMM algorithm so that it can be run on a single machine; however,
we timed the slowest component at each iteration to get an idea of how long
a fully distributed implementation would take. This implementation was
designed with flexibility in mind, so that a wide range of experiments could
be conducted.
The implementation is written in C++ using Gurobi [Gurobi Optimiza-
tion, Inc., 2014] and Ipopt [Wa¨chter and Biegler, 2006, HSL Archive, 2014]
as backend solvers for subproblems. Gurobi is used for mixed-integer linear
or quadratically constrained problems, and Ipopt for more general nonlinear
problems. CasADi [Andersson, 2013] was used as a modelling and automatic
differentiation front end to Ipopt. The experiments were run on machines
with 2 AMD 6-Core Opteron 4184, 2.8GHz, 3M L2/6M L3 Cache CPUs and
64GB of memory.
4.8 Test Microgrid
Our experiments are based around a modified 70 bus 11kV benchmark distri-
bution network [Das, 2006] (shown in Figure 4.5), which was chosen because
it has a comparable size to that of an Australian suburb. We close all tie
lines in the network in order to change it from a radial to a meshed con-
figuration. Over time we expect microgrids to take on more of a meshed
network structure to improve reliability and efficiency, and to better utilise
distributed generation (this is currently the case in some city centres).
The benchmark comes with a static PQ load at each bus, which we
replace with a number of houses (around 50 on average) that depends on
the size of the static load. The houses are connected directly to the 11kV
buses as we have no data on the low voltage part of the network. We assume
that the power bounds we place on each house will be sufficient to prevent
any capacity violation of the low voltage network.
For our experiments, each house includes an uncontrollable background
power draw and two shiftable loads. Each house has an apparent power
limit of S = 10kVA, which in practice would be chosen just below the point
where the circuit breakers in each house would trip.
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Figure 4.5: The 70 bus test network showing only the buses and lines. Each bus
has on average around 50 houses connected to it, and generators/substations are
located at the grey buses.
We develop a typical house load profile P lt by modifying an aggregate au-
tumn load profile for the ACT region in Australia (data from the Australian
Energy Market Operator (AEMO)). We assume that houses consume on
average 20kWh per day. This provides the basis for all uncontrollable house
background loads. For the purposes of these experiments, we assume that
the static PQ loads in the benchmark were recorded when loads were at 75%
of their peak. We divide the benchmark static real power at each bus by how
much power a typical house consumes at 75% of its peak power (1.45kW).
Rounding down this number gives us an estimate of the number of houses
which would be located at a given bus. This approach produces a total
of 3674 houses for the network, about the number in a typical Australian
suburb.
We place two generators in the network where the distribution system
connects to upstream substations. These can be thought of as either dis-
patchable microgenerators or as representing the cost of importing power
into the microgrid.
We randomise some of the generator and house load parameters to pro-
duce different problem instances, as can be seen in table 4.1. The time
horizon spans 24 hours with 15 minute time steps, which produces a prob-
lem instance with over 2 million variables per horizon. The experiments
were run with a primal and dual stopping tolerance of  = 10−4 and a fixed
penalty parameter of ρ = 0.5. To improve numerical stability, we scale the
system to a per-unit representation with base values at 11kV and 100kVA.
This means that a real power residual of 10−4 translates to 10W for a con-
nection, or about 1% of the average house load.
The starting values for the distributed algorithm are the same for all
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Table 4.1: Component parameters.
Comp Param Value Units
Gen ψt max(4,∼ N (40, 82)) $/MWh
Gen Ψt,t max(1,∼ N (10, 22)) $/MWhMW
Gen
¯
P, P¯ −S × h/2, 0 kW
Gen
¯
Q, Q¯ 0.2
¯
P,−0.2
¯
P kvar
House Pt ∼ N (P lt , (0.2lt)2) kW
House Qt 0.3Pt kvar
Shift 1 tr max(15,∼ N (90, 182)) min
Shift 1 P nom max(0.3,∼ N (3, 0.62)) kW
Shift 2 tr max(15,∼ N (60, 122)) min
Shift 2 P nom max(0.1,∼ N (1, 0.22)) kW
Shift te, tl 0, T − tr
terminals and all time steps. All are zero except for the voltage magnitudes
Vt = 1 and the real power connection constraint dual variables λ
P
t = 5,
which translates to a price of $200/MWh. This is a naive (or cold) starting
point as it uses no information about the particular network instance.
In addition to the microgrid, we also ran a series of experiments on
randomly generated networks, similar to those described in [Kraning et al.,
2014]. These randomly generated networks ranged in size from 20 to 2000
buses, and were designed to be highly congested. We will occasionally men-
tion some of the results from these random networks when they differ from
those of our 70 bus microgrid.
4.9 Impact of Power Flow Models
In this section we investigate how the ADMM method performs with differ-
ent power flow models. We assess 5 different models, of varying degrees of
accuracy and complexity, in order to establish the relative trade-offs when
used as part of a distributed algorithm.
4.9.1 Power Flow Models
As discussed in section 4.2.2, the non-convex AC power flow equations are
often either relaxed or approximated before being used in power systems
optimisation problems. The convex relaxations provide a lower bound on
the globally optimal solution while the approximations can produce results
with a cost higher or lower than the true global optimal. The relaxations
and approximations often produce solutions that are not feasible for the
exact model; however, they are often much simpler to compute, and their
solutions can be used as a heuristic or to provide bounds.
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Some of these models have been used with distributed algorithms, which
we will discuss in greater detail in section 4.12. What is lacking is a compar-
ison of the relative strengths and weaknesses between the different models
when used in this context. In this section we compare how the distributed
ADMM algorithm performs when using the AC, QC, DF, LDC, and QA
line models. We compare the differences in the solution quality, feasibility,
processing time and number of iterations for our test network. What we
find is that even though the AC equations are non-convex, in practice they
converge and perform well compared to the other approaches. We also find
that there is the potential to obtain faster convergence using the QA model,
but at the expense of accuracy.
We generate 60 random instances of our test microgrid with the binary
variables for the shiftable loads relaxed. These are then solved using the
distributed algorithm presented in section 4.6, for each of the 5 different
power flow models. Below we discuss the convergence of the algorithm and
then the quality and accuracy of the solutions.
4.9.2 Convergence
For all 60 instances and all 5 power flow models the algorithm converged.
This was expected for all the convex models, but we had no guarantee for
the non-convex AC model. This gives us confidence that the exact AC
model, even though non-convex, can in practice be used within distributed
algorithms, at least to find a local optimum.
Table 4.2 provides the number of iterations and time taken to converge
in the form of means and standard deviations for the 60 instances. The
parallel solve time is the amount of time required to solve the problem in a
fully distributed implementation. This was measured by summing together
the time of the slowest component for each group in each iteration. In
absolute terms, the parallel solve time is relatively small despite the fact that
our implementation was designed with flexibility in mind, not performance.
The QA model is much faster than the other models. It converges in half
the number of iterations required by the next fastest model, but as we will
see in the next section, it gives us an inaccurate result.
Table 4.2: Iterations and parallel solve time for line models.
Model Iterations (std.) Time in sec (std.)
AC 1945 (17) 148 (12)
QC 1951 (14) 546 (33)
DF 1933 (26) 110 (8)
LDC 4140 (50) 244 (8)
QA 1027 (52) 15 (1)
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The congested random networks produce similar results. One difference
is that for a number of instances the QA model was infeasible (would not
converge) due to its tendency to exaggerate line losses, where we had a valid
AC solution. It is expected that the LDC model, and the relaxations to
some degree, will exhibit the reverse effect: returning a solution when there
is no feasible solution for the exact model. However, we did not come across
such a scenario in our experiments with the microgrid and congested random
networks.
Figure 4.6 shows an example of the primal residual (see section 4.6.2)
convergence for different line models (the dual residuals are similar). The
AC, QC and DF model curves are indistinguishable from one another.
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Figure 4.6: Convergence of primal residuals. AC, QC and DF overlap.
One result that might be unintuitive is the fact that the LDC model
converges poorly when it is in fact a very simple linear model. Large oscil-
lations build up across the network during the solution process which slows
the rate of convergence. This appears to be due to the fact that the LDC
line model is not strictly convex and that it ignores line losses. This means
it can be very sensitive to changes in dual variable prices. The quadratic
term in the augmented Lagrangian is supposed to aid convergence in such
cases, but it still struggles with the LDC line model.
The “stronger” convexity of the QA line model and the fact that it
overestimates the line losses provides it with a fast convergence devoid of
oscillations. The AC, QC and DF models are somewhere in between these
two extremes. In these models the primal and dual values associated with
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terminal powers are faster to converge than the voltage values. Quickly
finding good voltage values appears to be key to improving the convergence
of these models.
Warm Starting— We are giving the algorithm a relatively naive starting
point for both the primal and dual variables, as described in section 4.8. In
practice, the receding horizon control scheme will provide an excellent warm
starting point, because the values from the previous horizon can be used for
all but one time step.
As a sanity check, we performed warm starting experiments for the
AC model. Similar to what was done in [Kraning et al., 2014], we du-
plicate a problem instance and then randomly resample the house back-
ground power and shiftable device power parameters according to the rule:
P ∼ PN (1, σ2). We used the solution of the original instance as a starting
point for the modified instance. For σ = 0.2 the warm started run only
needed 11% of the original iterations on average. In a second experiment
we fully correlated the resampling step, which could represent a correlated
change in solar panel output for many houses. With σ = 0.2, only 29% of
the original iterations were required on average.
Communication— Communication delay will play a major part in the total
solve time for an actually distributed system. The communications could
be done over existing internet infrastructure, or dedicated wired or wireless
communications could be built for the system to enable more direct commu-
nications. Regardless of what technology is used, for each iteration messages
need to be communicated from group I components to group II components
and then back again. If we assume each of these hops takes 60ms, then 1000
iterations would require up to 2 minutes of communication time.
The significant communication overhead suggests that in certain cir-
cumstances it may be beneficial to cut down the total number of iterations,
even if it requires more processing time per iteration. This can be done by
changing the grouping strategy which was discussed in section 4.6.1. The
example on the right in figure 4.4 leaves large parts of the network coupled
together. These coupled components need to be solved together in each
iteration, which requires more computation per iteration in a parallel envir-
onment; however, it can reduce the total number of iterations required for
convergence and therefore also the communication burden.
We expect the mechanism can be designed to be quite robust to intermit-
tent drops in communication. For example, if a component fails to receive a
message from another connected component, then they can continue work-
ing by using the last received message. If a connection is dropped for an
extended period, then the system could fall back to load predictions based
on historical data and some conservative pricing scheme could come into
place.
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4.9.3 Solution Quality
Next we show the quality of the solutions obtained for the different line
models. For each model we calculate the percentage difference in objective
value relative to the best known AC solution: 100 · (f − fbest)/fbest. The
means and standard deviations of these values for the 60 instances are shown
in table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Object values for the different line models relative fo AC model. Means
and standard deviations given as percentages.
QC DF LDC QA
-0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) -3.54 (0.07) 4.73 (0.09)
Because the AC equations are non-convex, we have no guarantee that the
solutions they produce are globally optimal, but they do provide a feasible
upper bound on the global optimal. On the other hand, the QC and DF
models are convex relaxations of the AC equations, so they provide a lower
bound on the global optimal. Therefore the global optimal solution resides
somewhere between the values of the AC solution and the QC and DF
solutions.
With this in mind, we find that the AC, QC and DF models all produce
solutions which are very close to each other. The difference is within the
margin of error of the objective function afforded by our stopping criteria,
which we estimate to be 1% (see section 4.8). This indicates that the AC,
QC and DF models produce solutions that are within 1% of the global
optimal. They may in fact be closer than this, but we would need to run the
experiments with tighter tolerances in order to check (on a limited number
of instances we tested this was the case).
These results give us confidence that the non-convex AC model, which
is the only one that guarantees Ohm’s law is satisfied, produces solutions
that are very close to optimal. The QC and DF models produce results
with an objective that is very close to the AC model, but even with this
small difference, there is the risk that the solutions violate constraints in
the exact AC model. Other work has come to a similar conclusion, but in
a more traditional OPF setting [Hijazi et al., 2014, Phan and Kalagnanam,
2014, Erseghe, 2014].
The approximate models tell a different story. On average the LDC
model underestimates the optimal value by around 3.5% while the QA model
overestimates it by around 4.7%. Part of the reason for this is that the LDC
model completely ignores line losses while the QA model overestimates them.
Even though the QA model has fast convergence, it is unlikely to useful on
its own in a realistic setting due to its poor accuracy.
These results show the feasibility of using the non-convex AC power flow
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equations for solving a distributed OPF problem in a microgrid context.
The QA model, used by Kraning et al. [2014] in a simpler distributed OPF
setting, converges much faster, but it is unlikely to work with a real network,
as it ignores voltages and reactive power and produces overly high costs.
4.10 Discrete Decisions
We now move onto finding solutions for the multi-period OPF problem where
the binary variables in the shiftable loads are satisfied. In order to do this we
extend the algorithm so that it can manage discrete decisions. The focus here
is on the scheduling of shiftable loads within houses. Discrete decisions can
also occur in some generator models and for automated network switching
events, which will require a separate analysis.
We identify 3 different approaches to managing discrete decisions. Al-
though quite simple, they nonetheless prove to be very effective at managing
the shiftable loads within houses.
4.10.1 Methods
We investigate 3 tractable methods for dealing with integer variables which
have no global optimality guarantees. Just as we did for the AC equations,
we will compare our result to a lower bound in order to get an understanding
of the optimality gap. We categorise these methods as:
• Relax and price (RP)
• Relax and decide (RD)
• Unrelaxed (UR)
The RP and RD approaches are broken up into 2 and 3 stages respectively.
The first stage, called the negotiation stage, is common to both methods.
All integer variables are relaxed and the distributed algorithm is run until
convergence, just like what was done for the power flow experiments. At
this point the integer variables may take on fractional values. This solution
provides a lower bound on the global optimal. In the second stage each
component makes a local decision in order to force any fractional values to
integers. Recall from section 4.5 that shiftable devices have a binary variable
ut for each time step, only one of which can take on the value 1 to indicate
the starting time.
Relax and Price— In the second stage of the RP method, each house per-
forms a local optimisation to determine how to enforce integer feasibility of
ut. We designed a range of cost functions which penalise a component if
it changes its terminal values from those that were negotiated in the first
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stage. For a given cost function each house solves a MIP to obtain an
integer-feasible solution.
For a particular house terminal i with final terminal values yi, let y
′
i
and λ′i be the negotiated terminal values and prices respectively. The most
effective cost function that we identified was (assuming the house terminal
is the first element in the connection):
fRP(yi, y
′
i, λ
′
i) = λ
′T
i yi + α‖yi − y′i‖22 (4.62)
where α is a penalty parameter. The function charges houses at the nego-
tiated price for what they actually consume, but they are also charged a
quadratic penalty for operating away from the negotiated consumption.
After this local optimisation step, we check that the solution is feasible
and what the overall cost is. At this point it would be possible to restart
the distributed algorithm with the integer variables fixed (as we do in the
second method). Instead of this we allow the frequency regulating gener-
ators to make up the difference between the negotiated and actual power
consumption.
In networks the dispatch of generators is established in advance in re-
sponse to an estimated demand. This forecast is never perfect, so a certain
number of generators are paid to perform frequency regulation in order to
balance demand in real time (see section 2.1.1). In our RP experiments we
employ both our generators for this use by allowing them to adjust their
output. For these experiments we assume that if the generators have to
raise their output they get paid extra, and if they have to lower their output
they get paid what was originally negotiated. This means that they are in-
centivised to participate in frequency regulation because they make money
from both raise and lower actions.
Relax and Decide— In the second stage of the RD method, the largest ut
value of each shiftable component is chosen to be fixed at 1 and the rest set
to 0. In the third stage the distributed algorithm is restarted in order to
converge to a new solution that is integer feasible.
Unrelaxed— The final approach, UR, consists of a single stage where it
attempts to enforce the integrality requirement at each iteration of the dis-
tributed algorithm. We have already foregone theoretical convergence guar-
antees due to our adoption of the non-convex AC equations. Here we push
the ADMM algorithm even further by allowing discrete variables into the
algorithm (4.57–4.59), where Gurobi solves MIQP subproblems for houses,
and Ipopt solves NLP subproblems for lines.
We ran experiments on 60 microgrid instances for each of the three ap-
proaches. We use the AC line model for each experiment and a penalty
of α = 10 for the RP approach. In the following sections we discuss the
convergence of the methods and the quality of the solutions.
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4.10.2 Convergence
Although none of the approaches are guaranteed to find an integer feasible
solution if one exists, in practice they all converged to feasible solutions
(within our stopping tolerance) except for 2 out of 60 UR experiments which
ran out of time.
The RP method only marginally increases the solve time above the res-
ults in section 4.9. The RD method requires a small amount of extra time
as it performs a warm restart of the distributed algorithm. The UR method
takes 1.7 times longer on average, which is a result of the fact that it has to
solve MIQP instead of QP subproblems for houses during each iteration.
4.10.3 Solution Quality
In order to assess the solution quality for each method, we compare the
change in objective value relative to the relaxed version of the problem.
The results are shown in figure 4.7, where we have separated the objective
into terms for the cost of generation and the charge to houses. The charge is
the sum of house objective functions, which represents the amount of money
they pay for their electricity. For the RP method this is given by the cost
function fRP. For the RD and UR methods the charge is simply the final
λTi yi for each house.
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Figure 4.7: Change in generator cost and house charge relative to relaxed solution.
For the relaxed problem itself, the true generation costs can be different
from the amount houses are charged, as we are using marginal prices. In
addition to this, network congestion typically produces additional revenue
above the cost of generation. An increase in cost for the integer feasible
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solution relative to the relaxed problem is an indication of the additional
cost to the generators for balancing supply. When house charges increases
relative to the relaxed solution, this indicates that houses were forced to
change their consumption from the originally negotiated amount to ensure
integer feasibility of the shiftable loads.
All methods produce costs that are within 1% of the relaxed prob-
lem, and hence also the global optimum. There is no significant difference
between the methods as they reside within our estimated margin of error
based on our stopping tolerance. What these results suggest is that we have
a tight relaxation of the integer problem. A contributing factor is that each
shiftable load only contributes a tiny amount to the overall power demand.
A significant gap between the relaxed and candidate solution was found
for some instances that where we artificially increased the size of the shift-
able loads by more than an order of magnitude and heavily congesting the
network. However, the relaxation was tight for the realistically-sized resid-
ential shiftable loads utilised in our test microgrid.
The charges to houses are higher for the RP method without gaining any
benefit in terms of reduced costs. We noticed that smaller α value decreased
the charges without a significant increase to costs. When battery storage
is introduced, we expect houses will have even more flexibility in how they
reach their negotiated consumptions, therefore further reducing incurred
charges. This suggests that for the sole purpose of managing shiftable loads,
there is no need to have a strong penalty; however, the penalty might help
manage the effects of uncertainty in the network or prevent agents from
lying during the negotiation stage.
The presented methods provide efficient means for dealing with the dis-
crete decisions in a house. The UR method should probably be avoided as
it can significantly increase the runtime. Other factors such as the way they
can handle uncertainty or the need for a penalty to prevent agents from
attempting to game the system (as discussed in chapter 5) will influence the
choice between these methods.
4.11 Pricing Uncertainty
In this section we investigate the inclusion of stochastic components into
our system. Many parameters such as background house power consump-
tion and solar PV output can only be estimated. Generators set up to
regulate frequency can be used to balance this mismatch in real time, but
such regulation can be expensive so we would like to minimise the error.
There also exist certain circumstances where frequency regulation on its
own is not enough. For example, if the output of house solar PV systems
turns out lower than expected, then certain lines in the network could be
overloaded if the network was already running near capacity.
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Receding horizon control as we tested in chapter 3 and discussed in
section 4.4 can help significantly with this by only ever acting on the most
immediate time step before reoptimising. In this section we use the RP
method from the previous section to encourage houses to correct for any
local sources of uncertainty. To simplify the experiments we do not perform
full receding horizon control. With full receding horizon control we expect
the same trends, but with a further improvement to costs.
4.11.1 PV Generation Uncertainty
We perform a simple experiment on the 70 bus microgrid where we have
added 2kW PV systems and 2kWh batteries independently at random to
half of the houses. The battery efficiencies η were uniformly sampled from
the interval [0.85, 0.95]. For normalised solar irradiance we use the simple
relation: It = max(0, sin(2pit/96− pi/2)). We solve the first stage of the RP
method with this irradiance, and then either lower or raise it 20% before
running the RP second stage. Figure 4.8 shows the resulting costs and
charges relative to the first stage result.
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Figure 4.8: Performance of RP with lowering (L) and raising (R) solar output.
Lowering solar output produces increases to generation costs of 8% rel-
ative to the original solution. Nearly this full amount is recovered through
extra house charges. When raising solar output the houses take advantage
of the increased effectively free energy. The overall cost remains unchanged,
because as described in section 4.10.1 we have to pay the frequency regu-
lating generators at their originally negotiated price on a output lowering
event. This creates a discrepancy in payments.
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As we found in the previous section, generator costs are relatively inde-
pendent of the RP cost function penalty parameter α; however, α can be
used to increase house charges. This means that α can be tuned over time
to ensure that the market is budget balanced. For example, these extra pen-
alties can be used to recover frequency regulation costs or to help pay for
fixed network costs. Houses with batteries have more flexibility in how they
can deal with local sources of uncertainty, especially in a receding horizon
setting, so a system with batteries and reasonable penalties might produce
the best outcome.
4.12 Related Work
Dynamic pricing (or real-time pricing) has be used extensively, including
by us in the previous chapter, as a control signal for influencing household
behaviour and performing DR [Ramchurn et al., 2011, Mohsenian-Rad and
Leon-Garcia, 2010, Chen et al., 2012, Tischer and Verbic, 2011, Gast et al.,
2014]. In these methods, participants receive a price signal and individually
optimise their own behaviour so as to minimise their costs. Other approaches
have utilised non-pricing control signals, which are simpler to implement,
but are more limited in the types of devices that they can model [van den
Briel et al., 2013, Shinwari et al., 2012].
These approaches implement a form of open loop control, because the
agent that sets the control signal (dynamic price or otherwise) at best can
only estimate how consumers will respond to it. In order to reduce the
amount of guesswork and improve solutions, Gatsis and Giannakis [2012]
developed a closed loop approach to dynamic pricing. In this scheme, the
prices are iteratively updated by a central agent, with consumers commu-
nicating their best responses to the price prior to acting. Mohsenian-Rad
et al. [2010] introduce an alternative iterative procedure not based on dy-
namic pricing, where consumers cooperate to reduce total generation costs
in a distributed manner.
The approaches discussed so far do not model the electricity network, so
cannot account for real power losses, reactive power, voltage limits or line
thermal limits. Without these considerations, we cannot be sure that the
coordinated outcome is efficient, safe or even possible. Many of the works on
distributed algorithms which explicitly model the network have used ADMM
as a solving technique, due to its ease in decomposition, and its convergence
guarantees on a wide range of problems [Boyd et al., 2011]. However, most
of these works have focused on more traditional OPF problems rather than
coordinating prosumers in a microgrid context.
Some of the earliest work that used ADMM to solve power network
problems was by Kim and Baldick [2000], who decomposed a convex ap-
proximation of the OPF problem into regions, and compared ADMM to
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two other approaches. They found it to have a significant speed improve-
ment over a centralised approach, and that it preserved privacy between
regions. Erseghe [2014] also performed region-based decomposition of the
network and found exact local solutions to the OPF problem. Instead of
decomposing on the network structure, Phan and Kalagnanam [2014] de-
composed across scenarios in a security-constrained OPF. The recent work
by Magnu´sson et al. [2014] decomposes the network to a greater extent than
these other methods, and they solve the underlying non-convex OPF by
taking sequential convex approximations. One thing all these works have
in common is that they are focused on the more traditional OPF problem,
whereas in our work we consider a microgrid where distributed participants
act independently.
Region-based decomposition was also used by Dall’Anese et al. [2013]
to control distributed generation on radial feeders. They used ADMM to
solve an unbalanced OPF problem using a semi-definite programming (SDP)
relaxation. In our work we consider each customer to be independent, for
privacy reasons, and we also allow for meshed microgrid topologies. Sˇulc
et al. [2014] use the relaxed DF (SOCP) equations to perform reactive power
control on radial networks. For a similar problem, Peng and Low [2014]
provide closed-form solutions for ADMM subproblems, greatly reducing the
computational requirements. Again these works focus on radial networks.
Distributed optimisation has been used for more specialised power net-
works problems, for example, managing the load on low voltage transformers
[Vandael et al., 2010] and performing voltage regulation on radial networks
[Zhang et al., 2012].
The work that is closest to ours is that presented by Kraning et al.
[2014], and indeed we build on their approach. They decompose all network
components for a multi-period OPF problem using a quadratic power flow
approximation (the QA model). This procedure is effectively a principled
method for settling dynamic prices for each bus. Their experiments showed
that very large problems could be solved efficiently in a parallel environment.
All these works have taken different approaches to modelling the power
flows on the network. There is no comparison of the relative performance
between these different power flow models in a distributed algorithm for a
prosumer-focused microgrid setting, which is what we achieve in this chapter
for five different models. Our results in this area indicate that exact local
methods can produce close to optimal solutions in a competitive number of
iterations relative to other models. In addition, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to incorporate discrete decisions into a distributed prosumer
coordination method that models the network. Our work brings ADMM
to the point where it can be considered a practical approach for efficiently
balancing power in a prosumer focused setting.
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4.13 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a distributed mechanism for coordinating prosumers and
DETs across a network. It can coordinate a range of distributed agents with
time-coupled behaviours, whilst preserving network constraints. It provides
a natural way of pricing power (a distribution-level market) which enables
prosumers and networks to work together to more intelligently operate the
overall power system. It also allows for new flexible and efficient network
designs including microgrids.
Using this mechanism, we have successfully compared the performance of
a range of power flow models in a meshed microgrid, and introduced simple
but effective approaches to handling the shiftable loads within households.
We developed a suburb-sized test microgrid, and found that the full non-
convex AC equations produce close to optimal solutions in short solve times.
All three of our methods for handling household shiftable loads produce close
to optimal solutions with only a moderate increases in solve times.
Our work has shown that in practice distributed algorithms are not only
feasible, but also highly effective at coordinating prosumers in a microgrid
context.
In future research we will investigate alternative distributed solving tech-
niques with the aim of further improving the rate of convergence. There are
opportunities for finding closed-form solutions for the exact AC equations,
and to further parallelise the problem by decomposing certain components
across time. It might also be possible to build a frequency regulation market
into the distributed algorithm.
We need further experiments to investigate if our results carry over to
larger discrete decisions, for example, those related to large industrial plant,
generator start-up costs, and line switching.
Chapter 5
Receding Horizon
Manipulation
5.1 Introduction
The prosumer coordination mechanism from chapter 4 converges to a so-
cially optimal solution (from a utilitarian perspective), but only under the
assumption that all prosumers (agents) act truthfully. An agent that mis-
represents their true costs or constraints can lead the mechanism to a solu-
tion where they are personally better off, but which is socially suboptimal.
This manipulation of the mechanism can harm other agents and the overall
outcome, especially if multiple agents are involved in such behaviour.
Such manipulation is not uncommon in markets including current whole-
sale electricity markets; however, the presence of strong competition often
limits such behaviour. What is different in our prosumer coordination mech-
anism, is the presence of overlapping receding horizons, which present unique
opportunities for agents to lie about their preferences. There appears to be
a strong conflict between managing uncertainty and deterring manipulation.
This chapter investigates how vulnerable the receding horizon mechan-
ism is to manipulation, and devises methods for identifying it. We simplify
and abstract the prosumer coordination problem in chapter 4 to one of
clearing an electrical energy exchange market. In this market agents have
private preferences and constraints around their usage of power, and are
paid or charged at the marginal market clearing price.
Our first contribution is the presentation of a method for calculating an
optimal strategy for a manipulative agent in a complete information setting.
This agent is used to establish empirically how much a single agent can gain
by manipulating the mechanism, and how this harms the social objective.
Our second contribution is a privacy-preserving method for identifying
when manipulation has occurred and who is responsible. Supporting theor-
etical and empirical results show how this approach can identify agents that
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are driving change, and distinguish a manipulative agent from an uncertain
agent.
In practice, these identifiers can be used in auditing the actions of agents
participating in a distributed receding horizon algorithm without altering
the algorithm itself. This provides the full benefits of a receding horizon
mechanism whilst significantly limiting the opportunities for manipulation.
Section 5.2 provides background material on mechanism design, which
we draw on when discussing the properties of our coordination mechanism.
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 introduce the simplified power balancing problem and
the mechanism for solving it. Section 5.5 provides a formal definition of
receding horizon manipulation. Sections 5.6 and 5.7 develop and experi-
ment with an approach for calculating optimal manipulative actions for a
single agent. This is followed by the development of manipulation identifi-
ers in sections 5.8–5.10 and experiments showing these identifiers working
in section 5.11. The chapter finishes with related work and a conclusion in
sections 5.12 and 5.13.
5.2 Mechanism Design
The overall objective of the prosumer coordination algorithm is to minimise
the total system costs (see section 4.4.3). This can be rephrased within the
field of social choice, which investigates how to combine individual agent
preferences, in order to produce a collective decision [Shoham and Leyton-
Brown, 2009]. Preferences are combined by defining a social choice function
that maps agent preferences to an overall outcome.
For our power systems problem, prosumers and other participants are
the agents, their preferences are over different patterns of electricity con-
sumption and the collective outcome is the allocation of power for each
agent. The social choice function for this problem returns an outcome that
minimises the total system costs.
Mechanism design is a sub-field of game theory and economics that is
related to social choice. A mechanism defines the rules around how agents
interact and how decisions are made in a strategic setting where agents can
lie about their preferences [Nisan et al., 2007, Shoham and Leyton-Brown,
2009]. The goal of a mechanism is to produce the same outcome as a social
choice function, but in a strategic setting.
Auctions are an example of a class of mechanism, that can be used for
allocating a finite resource to potential buyers. In this setting, the social
choice function might be to allocate an item to the agent that values it most.
For a particular mechanism, game theory can be applied to find the out-
come. When agents know the true preferences of all other agents, it is called
a complete information game1. More commonly, if agents only have beliefs
1For such cases to remain interesting in mechanism design, the mechanism itself does
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about the preferences of others, this is called an incomplete information
game. A mechanism successfully implements a social choice function if it
creates a game that has dominant strategies or Bayes-Nash equilibria that
produce the same outcome as the social choice function applied to the true
agent preferences [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, definitions 10.2.3-4].
5.2.1 Incentive Compatibility
An agent manipulates a mechanism when it gains an advantage by being
untruthful (see Nisan et al. [2007, definition 9.4]), which can prevent the
mechanism from achieving the social outcome. If it is not possible for agents
to manipulate a mechanism (their best strategy is to be truthful) then it is
incentive compatible. More precisely, a mechanism is:
• dominant-strategy incentive compatible if being truthful is a weakly-
dominant strategy for agents; or
• Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if there is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
where all agents act truthfully.
Unfortunately, there are strong theoretical results that show incentive com-
patibility to be incompatible with other desirable properties.
One of the leading results is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. It
states that for a social choice problem with three or more outcomes, any
incentive compatible social choice function that does not preclude an out-
come from winning must be a dictatorship [Nisan et al., 2007, theorem 9.8].
A dictatorship, where one agent gets to decide the outcome for the whole
system, is clearly not a desirable property.
This suggests that it is futile to design any useful incentive compatible
social choice function; however, this result is for the case where agents are
allowed to specify arbitrary preferences. By restricting the class of pref-
erences, it turns out that one can develop useful mechanisms that achieve
incentive compatibility.
5.2.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
One way of restricting the class of preferences is to work with utilities and to
introduce monetary payments. An agent’s utility function maps each out-
come to a real value, where the larger the value the greater their preference.
This utility function also takes as input any money paid to, or paid by, the
agent. A common assumption is that the money appears as a linear term in
the utility function, making it a quasilinear utility function:
u(o,m) = m+ v(o) (5.1)
not have access to the agents’ true preferences, otherwise it could trivially just apply the
social choice function to determine the outcome.
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where o is an outcome, m is money (positive when paid to agent), u is
a utility function and v is a valuation function. Here we have made the
assumption that the agent is risk neutral (otherwise the money term appears
as a monotonically increasing function) [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009,
definition 10.3.1]. We also assume that the property of transferable utility
holds, allowing utility to be transferred between agents through payments.
When money is involved, mechanisms have a rule for choosing an out-
come given the preferences, and a rule for allocating payments to agents.
This provides mechanisms with greater flexibility, where payments can be
used to induce incentive compatibility.
A commonly used social choice function in this setting is the maximisa-
tion of social welfare, where social welfare for a particular outcome is the
sum of all agent valuations:
∑
i∈A vi(o). This is equivalent to our desire to
minimise total system costs for the prosumer coordination problem.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are an important family of
mechanisms, that break free of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result within this
new restricted preference setting. They maximise social welfare and are
dominant-strategy incentive compatible. They achieve this because the pay-
ments are designed in such a way that each agent’s utility becomes dependent
on the social welfare.
Many of the mechanisms in the VCG family are impractical because
they are not budget balanced (the net sum of payments in the mechanism is
non-zero), requiring large amounts of funds to be externally sourced or sunk.
One common VCG mechanism (often referred to as the VCG mechanism)
uses the Clarke pivot rule to fully define the payments. Under some, often
mild, additional conditions, this rule achieves the desirable properties of
weak budget balance and individual rationality.
A mechanism is weakly budget balanced when the net sum of payments
made to mechanism is non-negative. This means that only an external sink
of funds is required, which is much easier to achieve than an external source
(in the worst case the money can be burnt). A mechanism is individually
rational if all agents receive a positive utility. The idea is that if this were
not the case, then certain agents would not participate in the mechanism
(assuming they have a utility of zero for not participating).
The VCG mechanism has some great properties as we have discussed, but
it does come with its negatives [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, section
10.4.5]. It requires agents to fully reveal their preferences to the mechanism,
which has severe privacy implications. Also, it can be computationally in-
tractable to calculate agent payments (largely due to the Clarke pivot rule)
for many real-sized problems.
Another problem is that the weak budget balance property only holds
in certain domains. For example, it no longer holds in exchange settings
where there are multiple buyers and sellers (as is the case in our prosumer
coordination problem). Also, while VCG is incentive compatible in a fully
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competitive setting, it remains susceptible to collusion. This means that
when there is a group of agents that work together, it is no longer necessarily
the case that their best strategy is to be truthful.
These negatives illustrate the compromises that need to be considered
when adopting an incentive compatible mechanism. These compromises,
especially the issues with tractability and privacy, can be too onerous in a
large, complex and uncertain distributed system. Section 5.4 discusses how
the mechanism we adopt foregoes incentive compatibility in order to achieve
many of these other desirable properties.
5.3 Power Balancing Problem
This section introduces the power balancing problem, which is a simplifica-
tion of the full OPF problem from chapter 4.
The power balancing problem has A agents and a horizon of T time
steps. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , A} has a power profile Pi ∈ RT , a cost function
fi : RT 7→ R and Ni constraint functions ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} : gi,j : RT 7→ R.
For now these functions are restricted to being continuously differentiable
and/or convex.
The problem now splits into three versions: the single horizon (SH),
receding horizon (RH) and terminating receding horizon (TRH) problems.
5.3.1 Single Horizon Version
For the SH version, the objective is to minimise the cost functions of all
agents, subject to the agent constraints and a power conservation constraint:
min
Pi
A∑
i=1
fi(Pi) (5.2)
s.t. gi,j(Pi) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , A}, j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.3)
A∑
i=1
Pi = 0 (5.4)
5.3.2 Receding Horizon Version
The RH version of the problem is an infinite sequence of SH problems. Let
each horizon h ∈ {1, 2, . . .} be T time steps long. The functions and variables
become indexed by the horizon to which they belong: fh,i, gh,i,j and Ph,i.
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The optimisation problem for the h-th horizon is:
min
Ph,i
A∑
i=1
fh,i(Ph,i) (5.5)
s.t. gh,i,j(Ph,i) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , A}, j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.6)
A∑
i=1
Ph,i = 0 (5.7)
We use an index t to access individual time steps within the power vectors
(and later on also the price vectors). For convenience and consistency with
the final formulation, the index t is relative to the time steps in the first
horizon, no matter which horizon it is used with (see figure 5.1). This means
that the powers in the first and second horizons P1,i ∈ RT and P2,i ∈ RT
are accessed with the indices t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and t ∈ {2, . . . , 2 + T − 1}
respectively. For example, t = 3 represents the third time step no matter
what the horizon is, and the values P1,i,3 and P2,i,3 represent the powers in
time step 3 for agent i, but as calculated in two different horizons.
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Figure 5.1: A visualisation showing how the time step index t is relative to the first
horizon for all horizons.
5.3.3 Terminating Receding Horizon Version
We cannot directly perform experiments on the RH version of the problem
because it runs over an infinite sequence of horizons. The TRH version
reduces the problem to a finite number of horizons which truncate at a
particular time step. It is made up of T single horizon power balancing
problems h ∈ {1, . . . , T}, where the horizons shrink in size until the last
horizon only contains a single time step.
For our formulation, instead of explicitly shrinking the horizon lengths,
we model this as T perfectly overlapping horizons, each of length T , and
force some of the variables in later horizons to take on the values of earlier
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horizons. For the h-th horizon the optimisation problem is:
min
Ph,i
A∑
i=1
fh,i(Ph,i) (5.8)
s.t. gh,i,j(Ph,i) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , A}, j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.9)
A∑
i=1
Ph,i = 0 (5.10)
Ph,i,t = Ph−1,i,t ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , A}, t < h (5.11)
5.3.4 Agents
This chapter uses a small subset of DETs to assess the opportunity for
manipulation and the accuracy of our identifiers. They are: fuel-based gen-
erators, deferrable loads and fixed power loads. They were chosen as they
provide the basic behaviour of network agents, without making the strategic
agent that we develop too complicated to implement or solve.
Generator— We assume the fuel-based generator has the quadratic cost:
f(p) =
T∑
t=1
ψtP
2
t (5.12)
where ψ ∈ RT+, and with bounds on power Pt ∈ [¯P, 0].
Deferrable Load— A deferrable load is similar to the relaxed model of the
shiftable loads that we have encountered in previous chapters. The power
of the deferrable load has bounds which change over time Pt ∈ [0, P¯t]. The
deferrable load has a zero cost function, but it must consume a total amount
of energy E where:
T∑
t=1
Pt = E (5.13)
Fixed Power— The fixed power agent has a zero cost function and fixed
power P = PF, where PF ∈ RT is a constant.
5.4 Power Balancing Mechanism
The mechanism we propose to solve the power balancing problem is the same
as the distributed algorithm from chapter 4. This mechanism is not incent-
ive compatible (see section 5.5.1 for examples), but it is computationally
efficient, preserves privacy, is budget balanced, and converges to a socially
optimal outcome when agents act truthfully.
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For this chapter, only the solutions (outcomes) that the mechanism
achieves are important, rather than the algorithm specifics. ADMM and
other distributed optimisation algorithms can be categorised as finding a
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point for the problem. We therefore abstract
our mechanism to that of iteratively finding a KKT point for each horizon
in turn.
5.4.1 KKT Conditions
For a given power balancing problem, we assume that there exists at least
one KKT point for each horizon (section 5.4.4 discusses what happens when
a point cannot be found). Under certain regularity conditions (constraint
qualifications) on the problem functions, a KKT point becomes necessary for
optimality [Kuhn and Tucker, 1951, Karush, 1939]. Under other conditions
such as convexity, a KKT point is sufficient for optimality [Martin, 1985].
When the functions are continuously differentiable, the KKT conditions
for an agent i in horizon h are:
∇fh,i(Ph,i) +
Ni∑
j=1
µh,i,j∇gh,i,j(Ph,i) + λh = 0 (5.14)
gh,i,j(Ph,i) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.15)
µh,i,jgh,i,j(Ph,i) = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.16)
µh,i,j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.17)
where µh,i,j ∈ R are the KKT multipliers for the agent constraints and
λh ∈ RT is the KKT multipliers for the power conservation constraint.
Particular powers Ph,i and prices λh satisfy the KKT conditions for agent i
if there exists some µh,i,j where this is true.
The KKT conditions for the overall problem in horizon h is the combin-
ation of KKT conditions for all agents along with the power conservation
constraint:
A∑
i=1
Ph,i = 0 (5.18)
When dealing with convex functions, which might be non-differentiable,
we allow a subgradient to be used in place of the gradient. Therefore, if f
is a convex function, then we define ∇f(P ) ∈ ∂f(P ), where ∂f(P ) is the
subdifferential (set of subgradients) of f at P . We will explicitly mention
when this overloading of the differential operator leads to any ambiguities.
Using this notation the KKT stationarity condition (5.14) remains the
same, except we have the implicit assumption that ∇f(P ) can be used to
represent a subgradient for any convex cost or constraint functions.
5.4. POWER BALANCING MECHANISM 91
5.4.2 Payments
Agents are paid (charged) for their power production (consumption) at the
marginal prices λh,t ∈ R. As discussed, these are the KKT multipliers for
the power conservation constraints:
∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} :
A∑
i=1
Ph,i,t = 0 (λh,t) (5.19)
The expected total cost ch,i for an agent i in horizon h is the combination
of their cost function and their expected payments over the horizon:
ch,i := fh,i(Ph,i) + λ
T
hPh,i (5.20)
This is only what is expected in horizon h, because the actual costs will
change as solutions are allowed to change in later horizons. Defining the
costs like this assumes that agents have quasilinear utilities and are risk
neutral (as discussed in section 5.2.2). The power conservation constraint
ensures that our mechanism is budget balanced, as all payments between
consumers and produces sum to zero for each time step.
In the receding horizon problem we assume that agents must consume or
produce the power negotiated in the first time step of each horizon, which
(recalling the discussion from section 5.3.2) is where t = h. The powers and
prices beyond the first time step in each horizon are just hypothetical at
that point in time.
5.4.3 Convexity
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed how power consumption decisions can be discrete
or non-convex in nature, which raises doubt about the applicability of the
KKT conditions. However, there are some strong arguments for why in
practice convex relaxations or approximations of prosumer device models
will produce high quality results:
• Chapter 4 found that the most common source of discrete decisions
for houses (shiftable loads) are well approximated by their convex re-
laxation when the number of participants reaches realistic levels.
• Many new household devices are becoming more continuously variable.
Variable speed compressors used in devices such as air conditioners
can provide a more efficient alternative to discrete on/off switched
compressors.
• More intelligent control can be used to apply a duty cycle to discrete
components to mimic more continuous power levels.
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• Household batteries will be able to compensate for the discrete power
levels of other devices.
As a result, convex functions can be used with only a small hit to quality.
We require, as a condition of participation, that agents reformulate any
non-convex cost and constraint functions into a convex approximations or
relaxations. Any increase in cost will be more than offset by the benefits of
being able to efficiently solve large systems in a distributed manner.
5.4.4 Limits
Power Limits— In order to participate in the mechanism, each agent must
first negotiate a contract which restricts how much power they can consume
and supply. This contract establishes limits such that ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} :
Pi,t ∈ [
¯
Pi, P¯i]. They can be set at the physical limits of the equipment
connecting the agent to the rest of the network, or to a subinterval of these
physical limits if the agent does not need the extra capacity.
It is likely that agents will be provided with a financial incentive to set
tighter limits as it provides the market operator with more certainty. A
benefit of having these limits is that it restricts the outcomes available to
strategic agents. For example, without any limits, a two-bedroom house
could indicate to the mechanism that they will provide the network with
the equivalent output of a large nuclear power station, which would clearly
have serious consequences for the mechanism.
We assume that these limits are enforced in the private constraints of
each agent. In practice this would be combined with a simple check by
the utility, with adequate penalties that would deter agents from choosing
tighter limits than they can meet.
Price Limits— A second set of limits is on the allowed prices λ, which are
commonly referred to as market caps in wholesale electricity markets. This
can be set at a point where participants become indifferent towards being
disconnected (shed) from the network. If the solver finds a KKT point with
costs outside the price caps or if no KKT point is found at all, then the
market operator can shed loads in an attempt to find a feasible solution.
Agents have the ability to respond to prices, so they will tend to reduce
their loads on their own as the prices increase. The price caps and load
shedding by the operator will likely only be needed as a last resort, for ex-
ample, if agents do not have enough flexibility or if something goes seriously
wrong.
The market operator could choose to shed those agents that are operating
outside their normal behaviour combined with some degree of randomisa-
tion. Although we do not go into specific approaches to shedding [Concordia
and Fink, 1995], it is worth noting that the actions of strategic agents could
cause them to be shed if they push the price outside the market caps. This
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is how the price limits further restrict the possible outcomes for strategic
agents.
5.5 Manipulation
This section defines truthfulness, consistency and receding horizon manip-
ulation. It then provides some simple examples of manipulation with and
without a receding horizon and discusses agent strategies. First some nota-
tion is introduced.
When we focus on an arbitrary pair of consecutive horizons h and h+ 1,
we drop the horizon subscript from functions, powers and prices, and instead
indicate the later horizon with a prime. For example, the cost functions for
agent i in two consecutive horizons are fi := fh,i and f
′
i := fh+1,i. To make
comparisons easier, we time shift powers and prices from the later horizon
so that they line up with the values from the earlier horizon (see figure 5.2).
These vectors are marked with an asterisk and are defined as:
P ∗i,t :=
{
Ph,i,t if t = h
Ph+1,i,t if h < t < h+ T
(5.21)
λ∗t :=
{
λh,t if t = h
λh+1,t if h < t < h+ T
(5.22)
We define vectors for the change in the power and price as ∆Pi := P
∗
i − Pi
and ∆λ := λ∗ − λ. We also define the change in cost with respect to the
earlier horizon as ∆ci := fi(P
∗
i ) + λ
∗TP ∗i − fi(Pi)− λTPi.
1 T2 3
2 3 T+1
Figure 5.2: For consecutive horizons, the shaded time steps represent the values
used for the time shifted price and power vectors.
As discussed in chapter 3, agents, especially household prosumers, are
exposed to a lot of uncertainty that influences their electricity consumption.
Instead of modelling this through random parameters, we instead more ab-
stractly allow agents to update their cost function and constraints for each
horizon. We use a hat to indicate an agent’s best estimate of these functions
for a particular horizon fˆh,i and gˆh,i,j .
The functions that the agent uses to interact with the mechanism are
fh,i and gh,i,j . When these are the same as their predicted functions, the
agent is truthful. Formally:
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Definition 1 (Truthfulness). For a horizon h, let fh,i and gh,i,j be the
functions that agent i uses with the mechanism and fˆh,i and gˆh,i,j be the
functions the agent expects are most likely to be true at that moment in time.
Agent i is truthful in a horizon h if fh,i = fˆh,i and for all j : gh,i,j = gˆh,i,j .
Otherwise agent i is untruthful.
An agent is consistent between consecutive horizons when the preferences
they provide in the earlier horizon could have produced the result from the
later horizon (for those time steps that overlap). This is more complicated
than saying the functions are equivalent in both horizons, because in the RH
problem the functions accept powers from different time steps. Formally:
Definition 2 (Consistency). Let the KKT points for the power balancing
problem in two consecutive horizons be (Pi, λ) and (P
′
i , λ
′) for agent i. If
the later horizon time shifted point (P ∗i , λ
∗) satisfies the KKT conditions
for agent i in the earlier horizon, then agent i is consistent between the
horizons. That is, the following conditions must hold:
∇fi(P ∗i ) +
Ni∑
j=1
µ∗i,j∇gi,j(P ∗i ) + λ∗ = 0 (5.23)
gi,j(P
∗
i ) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.24)
µ∗i,jgi,j(P
∗
i ) = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.25)
µ∗i,j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.26)
for some multipliers µ∗i,j . Otherwise agent i is inconsistent between the
horizons.
An agent manipulates the receding horizon mechanism when it is un-
truthful in order to create an inconsistent result. Formally:
Definition 3 (Receding Horizon Manipulation). If agent i is inconsistent
between consecutive horizons and untruthful in the earlier horizon, then
agent i is manipulating the receding horizon problem between these horizons.
5.5.1 Examples
This section provides two examples of how untruthful agents can manipulate
the power balancing problem. The first example demonstrates how agents
can manipulate the SH problem and the second example demonstrates re-
ceding horizon manipulation (which is the focus of this chapter) in the TRH
problem.
Consider a SH problem instance with a single time step on a network with
a fixed load of PˆL = 5 and two generators (A and B) with true generation
prices ψˆA = 2 and ψˆB = 4 (equation (5.12) provides their cost functions).
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Figure 5.3 shows how the outcome of the mechanism changes as generator
A misreports its cost function. The optimal total cost (social optimal) is
achieved when it reports truthfully, i.e. ψA = ψˆA = 2; however, the figure
shows that generator A can reduce its individual costs if it falsely reports a
higher cost function. This action from A also reduces the costs of generator
B, which is reporting truthfully in this example, with the savings coming at
the expense of the load.
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Figure 5.3: Change in outcome as generator A changes its reported cost function.
The social optimal occurs at ψA = 2, when the generator truthfully reports its cost.
The lack of incentive compatibility in the general case can be insignificant
in a particular problem instance if there is sufficiently strong competition,
as in other markets [Makowski et al., 1999]. We expect there to be a reas-
onable level of competition in future prosumer driven networks, especially
in comparison to existing electricity markets.
For the second example that demonstrates receding horizon manipula-
tion, consider a TRH problem with two time steps on a network with two
deferrable loads (A and B) with EˆA = EˆB = 2 (to simplify assume no upper
power bounds) and a single generator with prices in the two time steps of
ψˆ1 = 4 and ψˆ2 = 2. Load A can take advantage of the cheaper prices in the
second time step by discouraging B from consuming at this time.
The results in figure 5.4 show how the overall outcome changes as load
A lies during the first horizon about how much it needs to consume in the
second time step P1,A,2. In each instance A reports zero consumption in
the first time step P1,A,1 = 0, and it corrects the lie in the second horizon
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by stating truthfully how much power it still needs in the second time step
(after which it is too late for B to make a correction).
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Figure 5.4: Change in outcome as deferrable load A changes its reported power
consumption for the second time step P1,A,2. The total costs are equivalent to the
social outcome when P1,A,2 = 2.
As load A increases P1,A,2, load B responds by decreasing its second
time step consumption P1,B,2, which in turn reduces the costs for A. The
outcome where P1,A,2 = 2 is socially optimal, and is equivalent to outcome
of the mechanism with A acting truthfully.
5.5.2 Strategies
There are many reasons why it might be difficult for an agent to manipulate
the mechanism in a practical setting, including the:
• computational intractability of computing a beneficial strategy in real-
istically sized settings;
• limited information about the private preferences and constraints of
others;
• strong competition between agents;
• need for collusion with other agents with complementary needs; and
• rarity of circumstances where a worthwhile benefit can be achieved.
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However, we cannot rule out the existence of very simple (sub-optimal)
strategies that, both in theory and in practice, can cause significant problems
when adopted by many agents. In this section we discuss some possible
strategies.
In general, the power balancing mechanism results in an incomplete in-
formation game. This means that each agent knows how the mechanism
works and the type of functions that it allows, but not necessarily the num-
ber of other agents or their types. Some information, for example, a distri-
bution over the types of agents that might be present, will be needed to make
sensible strategic decisions. In general, only knowing how the mechanism
works is not enough.
For example, consider the task of developing a pure strategy for an agent
that has a fixed power that is non-zero at the very first time step of the
horizon. The agent must be honest about the first time step, but they can
lie in future ones. We find that for any strategy that involves lying about
what the agent can achieve in a future time step, we can always construct
another agent that will actually increase the costs for the fixed power agent
relative to their truthful strategy (see lemma 3 in appendix B).
As agents gain information about the other agents in the market, they
may start to form mixed or pure strategies that can reliably manipulate the
mechanism. They may also decide to form coalitions of agents that work
together to have a larger impact. The exact formation of such coalitions and
any equilibria in the mechanism will be strongly dependent on what agents
are present, and the nature and amount of information that is known. We
leave it to future work to investigate such Bayes-Nash equilibria in incom-
plete information cases.
Instead, in this chapter we focus on a simple concrete case where a single
“greedy” agent has complete information about all other agents.
5.6 Greedy Agent Strategy
The “greedy” agent we develop has complete information about all other
agents (which act truthfully) and optimises its costs by manipulating the
mechanism. This provides it with the best possible chance of manipulating
the mechanism.
This section describes a general algorithm for calculating an optimal
strategy for such a greedy agent. This is an artificial scenario designed to
establish the worst case harm that a single agent (or coalition of such agents
working together) can cause. Later on in the chapter we will demonstrate
techniques for identifying untruthful agents such as this greedy one.
The approach relies on solving a bilevel program, where the greedy agent
at the top level chooses its optimal preferences given that it knows how the
mechanism will respond at the lower level [Migdalas et al., 1998]. In general,
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even linear bilevel programming is NP-hard [Migdalas et al., 1998, chapter
6]. This will dramatically limit the size and type of problems that can be
solved optimally. We will use bounds and solve simple instances in order to
gain insights despite the complexity.
The algorithm is formulated for the TRH problem. The greedy agent
has index i = 1 and it knows the preferences of all other agents who act
truthfully. The greedy agent can lie about their preferences by fixing their
power consumptions to fixed values during each horizon. There is no un-
certainty: for all h let fh,i = fi and gh,i,j = gi,j . We assume that there are
market cap prices
¯
λ, λ¯ and that the greedy agent will avoid a solution which
violates these because of the risk of being shed from the network.
We make the optimistic bilevel assumption, which allows the greedy
agent to choose between lower level solutions if more than one exists for a
given upper level decision. This is the same as allowing the greedy agent to
choose between KKT points of the lower level mechanism. This allows the
problem to be immediately flattened into a single level problem:
min
Ph,i,λh
f1(PT,1) + λ
T
TPT,1 (5.27)
s.t. g1,j(PT,1) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N1} (5.28)
Ph,i,t = Ph−1,i,t ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , A}, h ∈ {2, . . . , T}, t < h (5.29)
λh,t = λh−1,t ∀h ∈ {2, . . . , T}, t < h (5.30)
Ph,1 ∈ [
¯
P1, P¯1]
T ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , T} (5.31)
λh ∈ [
¯
λ, λ¯]T ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , T} (5.32)
(Ph,1, Ph,2, . . . , Ph,A, λh) ∈ KKTh ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , T} (5.33)
The optimisation problem is over the powers for all agents and the prices in
all horizons. The objective is to minimise the actual costs of the greedy agent
(i = 1) at the end of the TRH problem. This is given by the agent’s true
cost function f1 and monetary payments. The powers and prices in the last
horizon (h = T ) are used for these calculations, because at this point they
are fully finalised (in earlier horizons some of these are still hypothetical).
The constraints for the agent are enforced on the final true powers for
the greedy agent with inequality (5.28). Equations (5.29) and (5.30) tie
together powers and prices between horizons (those that have been finalised),
in accordance with the TRH formulation. Constraints (5.31) and (5.32)
limit the greedy agent’s power values and the prices according to the limits
discussed in section 5.4.4.
KKTh is defined to be the set of feasible KKT points for the problem
when for all time steps where t < h the prices and powers are fixed to some
arbitrary values, and for all time steps the powers of agent 1 are fixed to
some arbitrary values. For a given h, constraint (5.33) can be expanded into
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the constraints:
A∑
i=1
Ph,i,t = 0 ∀t ≥ h (5.34)
and for all i ∈ {2, . . . , A}:
∇tfi(Ph,i) +
Ni∑
j=1
µh,i,j∇tgi,j(Ph,i) + λh,t = 0 ∀t ≥ h (5.35)
gi,j(Ph,i) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.36)
µh,i,jgi,j(Ph,i) = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.37)
µh,i,j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.38)
The stationarity (5.35) and complementary slackness (5.37) equalities and
the multiplication of λT in the objective (5.27) are all possible sources of
non-convexity. We will now further develop our three devices so that they
can be used in this formulation as one of the truthful agents.
5.6.1 Generator
The KKT conditions for a truthful generator i can be reduced to ∀t ≥ h:
2ψi,tPh,i,t + µ
u
h,i,t − µlh,i,t + λh,t = 0 (5.39)
Ph,i,t ≤ 0 (5.40)
¯
Pi − Ph,i,t ≤ 0 (5.41)
µuh,i,tPh,i,t = 0 (5.42)
µlh,i,t(¯
Pi − Ph,i,t) = 0 (5.43)
µuh,i,t ≥ 0 (5.44)
µlh,i,t ≥ 0 (5.45)
The generator has upper and lower power bounds at each time step, for
which we associate the dual variables µuh,i,t and µ
l
h,i,t. The time index is used
to indicate which time step the dual variables are for. This is reformulated as
a series of mixed-integer linear constraints by introducing binary variables
zuh,i,t and z
l
h,i,t, and combining the KKT multipliers. The complementary
slackness requires that µuh,i,t > 0 =⇒ µlh,i,t = 0 and µlh,i,t > 0 =⇒ µuh,i,t =
0. This means that we can replace each pair of upper and lower bound KKT
multipliers by a single multiplier, νh,i,t ∈ R, where νh,i,t = µuh,i,t−µlh,i,t. Big-
M style constant bounds
¯
νi,t and ν¯i,t are used for these new multipliers. The
reformulation is ∀t ≥ h:
2ψi,tPh,i,t + νh,i,t + λh,t = 0 (5.46)
νh,i,t ≤ zuh,i,tν¯i,t, Ph,i,t ≥ (1− zuh,i,t)¯Pi (5.47)
νh,i,t ≥ zlh,i,t¯νi,t, Ph,i,t ≤ z
l
h,i,t¯
Pi (5.48)
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The market price caps and the stationarity condition provide bounds for the
multiplier νh,i,t:
¯
νi,t = −λ¯ (5.49)
ν¯i,t = −
¯
λ− 2ψi,t
¯
Pi (5.50)
5.6.2 Deferrable Load
For a truthful deferrable load, the KKT conditions can be transformed into
mixed-integer linear constraints in the same way as the generator:
γh,i + νh,i,t + λh,t = 0 ∀t ≥ h (5.51)
T∑
t=1
Ph,i,t = Ei (5.52)
νh,i,t ≤ zuh,i,tν¯i,t, Ph,i,t ≥ zuh,i,tP¯i,t ∀t ≥ h (5.53)
νh,i,t ≥ zlh,i,t¯νi,t, Ph,i,t ≤ (1− z
l
h,i,t)P¯i,t ∀t ≥ h (5.54)
A difference here is the presence of a KKT multiplier γh,i associated with
the energy consumption constraint, which makes νh,i,t unbounded in general.
However, there exist finite bounds which do not cut off any feasible KKT
point if we are only interested in the values of Ph,i and λh (which are all
that matter for the overall problem).
If (P˜h,i, λ˜h, z˜
u
h,i, z˜
l
h,i, γ˜h,i, ν˜h,i) is a KKT point, then so is (P˜h,i, λ˜h, z˜
u
h,i, z˜
l
h,i,
γ˜h,i+, ν˜h,i−~1), where  = ν˜h,i,τ given τ = arg min t∈{h,...,T} |ν˜h,i,t|, and ~1 is
the the appropriate all-ones vector. This means that for any values (Ph,i, λh)
that satisfy the KKT conditions, we can choose the other multipliers in such
a way that there exists some τ where νh,i,τ = 0. By cancelling γh,i, the
stationarity conditions require that for all t ≥ h:
νh,i,t + λh,t = νh,i,τ + λh,τ (5.55)
=⇒ νh,i,t + λh,t = λh,τ (5.56)
Therefore the market price caps provide the bounds:
¯
νi,t =
¯
λ− λ¯ (5.57)
ν¯i,t = −
¯
λ+ λ¯ (5.58)
5.6.3 Fixed Power Device
The conditions for a truthful fixed power device are trivial ∀t ≥ h: Ph,i,t =
PF,t. When the fixed power device is greedy the problem is also nicely
simplified, as the objective becomes linear.
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5.7 Greedy Agent Experiments
We perform experiments which show how much the greedy agent has to
gain, and how much this hurts the efficiency of the overall system. We have
two sets of experiments, one where the greedy agent is a deferrable load and
the other where it is a fixed power load.
5.7.1 Problem Instances
Each experiment has 4 truthful deferrable loads and 1 truthful generator
(A = 6 including the greedy agent). We randomly sampled TRH instances
with 4 time steps (T = 4), where the prices, energy and power requirements
vary.
The required energy of each deferrable load is sampled from a uniform
distribution Eˆi ∼ U(1, 5). The power bound for each time step for each
load is also sampled from a uniform distribution ˆ¯Pi,t ∼ U(0, Eˆi). If this
sampling results in a
∑T
t
ˆ¯Pi,t < Eˆi, then the power bounds are resampled
until a feasible result is obtained. The generator has no limit on how much
power it can supply and its prices are sampled from a uniform distribution
ψˆi,t ∼ U(1, 5).
The greedy agent is sampled differently so that we can vary its size. We
introduce a scale parameter s, which represents this agent’s size relative to
the other agents. A value of s = 1 means that the greedy agent has the same
energy requirements (on average) as the truthful agents. Because there are
in total 5 loads, this means that the agent requires 1/5th of the energy in
our problem. We run experiments with the greedy agent scale set at 0.1,
0.2, 0.5 and 1, which ranges from 1/40th to 1/5th of the total system load.
The greedy agent’s energy requirement is Eˆi ∼ s × U(1, 5). The power
bounds are sampled using this energy requirement as for the other deferrable
agents. For the experiments with the deferrable greedy agent we stop here,
for the fixed greedy agent we take these values as a basis for building a fixed
load: PˆF,i,t = Eˆi
ˆ¯Pi,t/
∑T
t=1
ˆ¯Pi,t. The greedy agent is given negotiating power
limits (see section 5.4.4) of
¯
Pi = 0 and P¯i = s× 5.
Ideally we want to find globally optimal solutions for the greedy agent, so
that we have a bound on the worst case manipulation. This, along with the
complexity of bilevel programming, severely limits the size of the problems
in our experiments. Our experiments only have a total of 6 agents whereas in
chapter 4 our microgrid had over 3000. The experiments have been designed
to capture the main behaviour of a more realistic setting, so that we can
still draw useful insights into receding horizon manipulation.
The first design choice is the use of truthful deferrable loads which have
time coupled behaviour and a total energy consumption requirement. Many
DETs including hot water heating, space heating and cooling, electric vehicle
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charging and smart appliances are well represented by deferrable loads as a
first approximation.
In most scenarios small agents will have very little influence on the rest
of the network. In order for small agents to gain a meaningful benefit from
manipulation, they will have to collude with other agents. The single greedy
agent in our experiments can represent such a coalition. By varying the scale
parameter we investigate the cases where such a coalition (or single agent)
controls between 1/40th and 1/5th of the total system load.
5.7.2 Solving
When the greedy agent is a fixed load the problem can be reduced to a
MILP. These problems were solved to optimality using Gurobi 6.5. The
problem is a MINLP when a deferrable greedy agent is used. An attempt
was made to use the global solver Couenne (versions 0.4 and 0.5), which
in many cases appeared to return an optimal solution. Unfortunately the
powers and prices that were returned from the solver were not feasible for
the problem when independently checked. Instead Bonmin 1.8 was used to
find local solutions and was given a 5 hour time limit for each instance.
Bonmin is only expected to return local solutions for the deferrable
greedy agents (due to the bilinear term in the objective); however, there
are a few signs to indicate that it found close to optimal solutions. Firstly,
the objectives returned by Bonmin and Couenne were almost the same. We
do not know what went wrong with the Couenne returned solution, but if
this is a simple bug in the interface rather than the solver itself then this
would indicate that the Bonmin results are near optimal. Secondly, the
deferrable greedy agent results followed the same trend as the fixed greedy
agent, which we do know to be optimal.
5.7.3 Greedy Agent Results
For both types of greedy agent (fixed and deferrable) and each scale para-
meter value, 50 random problem instances were generated. For comparison,
we calculated an optimal solution when all agents are truthful for each in-
stance, which is also known as the social outcome.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the results for the fixed and deferrable greedy
agents. The results are provided as changes in costs for the greedy agent
and the total system costs, relative to the optimal social outcome. These
are provided as an average, and 10th and 90th percentile regions over all
instances for each scale parameter.
As expected, greedy agents can reduce their costs, which also ends up
increasing the total system costs. When the fixed and deferrable greedy
agents have 1/5th of the total load (s = 1), they can reduce their average
costs by 10% and 25% respectively. With 1/40th of the total load (s = 0.1),
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Figure 5.5: Percent change in fixed power greedy agent and total costs relative
to social solution. Shaded areas give 10th and 90th percentiles for all 50 problem
instances.
these values are 2% and 5% respectively. The fixed and deferrable greedy
agents consume the same amount of power on average for a given scale, but
the greater flexibility of the deferrable greedy agent allows it to form more
successful strategies.
At small scale values the total costs do not deviate far from the optimal
social solution. This means that the cost increases (for the sum of the
truthful agents) are almost equal to the cost reductions (for the greedy
agent). At large scales, the cost increases are significantly more than the
cost decreases, so the greedy agent does much more harm relative to what
they gain.
We have shown that agents have the potential to gain significant bene-
fits through receding horizon manipulation, but the question remains as to
whether or not it will be plausible in practice. Take the suburb-sized mi-
crogrid from chapter 4 as an example. To achieve the scale value of s = 0.1
would require around 90 of the 3674 houses to work together. Assuming
they are made up of a combination of fixed and deferrable loads, in the best
case they could achieve a cost reduction of a few percent.
There are two main reasons why achieving even this small reduction of
a few percent will be challenging. Firstly, the greedy agents will not have
complete information, so at times they will make mistakes that actually
cost themselves more than the social outcome. Secondly, the computational
burden of calculating a strategy in such a setting is high. Approximate
methods would almost certainly have to be used, which in turn will lead a
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Figure 5.6: Percent change in deferrable greedy agent and total costs relative to
social solution. Shaded areas give 10th and 90th percentiles for all 50 problem
instances.
further degradation of their expected outcome. Overall it will not be a very
attractive proposition.
However, the formation of larger coalitions may remain attractive (as-
suming the computational challenge can be overcome), and also smaller
numbers of agents can have a larger impact in parts of the network where
network constraints (e.g., thermal or voltage) are commonly active. When
active, the constraints can effectively isolate one part of the network from
another. For example, if the line feeding an area is at its maximum capa-
city, then any additional generation needs to come locally from within that
area. The number of active agents is now reduced to the smaller area, and
so individual agents can now have a much larger impact.
In practice these situations are likely to be relatively rare, but they are
plausible enough to make it worth investigating what we can do to prevent or
reduce the impact of manipulation. In the section that follows we investigate
ways of identifying receding horizon manipulation.
5.8 Identifying Manipulative Agents
Instead of attempting to adopt an incentive compatible mechanism and for-
going the other desirable properties discussed in section 5.4, we propose a
lightweight monitor which can detect receding horizon manipulations. Im-
portantly, it does not affect the other desirable properties of the mechanism
when agents act truthfully.
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It may not identify all manipulation, but it will be able to deter the worst
offenders, and limit the social harm. The major challenge is to distinguish
an agent that is behaving strategically from one that is uncertain about their
consumption for legitimate reasons (e.g., uncertain occupant behaviour or
weather patterns). For the most part we do not want to penalise uncertainty
because it will discourage agents from providing their latest predictions,
which is the main advantage of receding horizon control.
Another complicating factor is that truthful agents will change their
behaviour across successive horizons in response to the actions of others,
even if they have no uncertainty. Indeed, they might even gain a benefit
by the unscrupulous behaviour of others. We do not want to penalise these
agents because they are not the cause of the change.
In the next section we will show how agents can be correctly identified
as the cause of change. The section after investigates identifiers that can be
applied to an agent that has caused change, to determine whether they are
manipulative or just uncertain.
5.9 Inconsistency Identification
In this section we develop an identifier that in most cases can identify
whether or not an agent is being inconsistent between horizons. This iden-
tifier is made up of two parts: the revealed preference activity rule and the
cost change proxy.
5.9.1 Revealed Preference Activity Rule
Activity rules are used in iterative mechanisms, for example, clock auc-
tions and simultaneous ascending auctions, to limit the bidding strategies
of agents [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, chapter 11]. They help en-
sure that an agent’s bids are “consistent” with earlier bids. The revealed
preference activity rule (RPAR) proposed by Ausubel et al. [2006] has been
of particular interest. Chapman and Verbic [2015] used a RPAR within a
single horizon to prevent agents from manipulating their bids in a electricity
demand allocating clock auction.
We derive a rule analogous to the RPAR that works with the notion
of consistency between horizons to identify those agents that have changed
their convex preferences. Unlike a conventional activity rule, we do not
use this to enforce particular behaviour as this would prevent agents from
reacting as they gain more information about uncertain events. Instead we
use it to monitor the behaviour of agents to determine who is driving change.
Assume that agent i is consistent between consecutive horizons. From
definition 2 this means that the time shifted solution from the later horizon
satisfies the earlier KKT conditions as given in equations (5.23–5.26). The
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KKT conditions for agent i in the earlier horizon must also hold:
∇fi(Pi) +
Ni∑
j=1
µi,j∇gi,j(Pi) + λ = 0 (5.59)
gi,j(Pi) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.60)
µi,jgi,j(Pi) = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.61)
µi,j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni} (5.62)
for some multipliers µi,j . Subtracting (5.59) from (5.23) and multiplying by
∆Pi:
0 = [∇fi(P ∗i )−∇fi(Pi)]T ∆Pi
+
Ni∑
j=1
[
µ∗i,j∇gi,j(P ∗i )− µi,j∇gi,j(Pi)
]T
∆Pi
+ ∆λT∆Pi (5.63)
The inequality f(y)−f(x) ≥ ∇f(x)T(y−x) holds for any convex function f
(recall ∇f(x) is a subgradient when f is non-differentiable). Assuming that
fi and gi,j are convex, applying the above rule and using (5.62) and (5.26):
0 ≥ fi(P ∗i )− fi(Pi) + fi(Pi)− fi(P ∗i )
+
Ni∑
j=1
[
µ∗i,jgi,j(P
∗
i )− µ∗i,jgi,j(Pi) + µi,jgi,j(Pi)− µi,jgi,j(P ∗i )
]
+ ∆λT∆Pi (5.64)
By cancelling and using (5.61) and (5.25) this simplifies to:
0 ≥−
Ni∑
j=1
[
µ∗i,jgi,j(Pi) + µi,jgi,j(P
∗
i )
]
+ ∆λT∆Pi (5.65)
The inequalities (5.60), (5.62), (5.24) and (5.26) require that the sum term
must be non-negative. Finally this produces an inequality which is called
the revealed preference activity rule (RPAR):
0 ≥ ∆λT∆Pi (5.66)
Any convex agent that is consistent between consecutive horizons will sat-
isfy the RPAR. The converse is not necessarily true: a convex agent that
is inconsistent between consecutive horizons can also possibly satisfy the
RPAR.
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5.9.2 Cost Change Proxy
The cost change proxy is used to calculate how the costs of a consistent
convex agent changes between consecutive horizons when the RHS of (5.66)
is zero.
Theorem 1 (Cost Change Proxy). For consecutive horizons, if ∆λT∆Pi =
0, then the change in costs with respect to the earlier horizon for a consistent
convex agent i is ∆ci = ∆λ
TPi = ∆λ
TP ∗i .
Proof. As agent i is consistent and ∆λT∆Pi = 0, equation (5.63) provides:
0 = [∇fi(P ∗i )−∇fi(Pi)]T ∆Pi
+
Ni∑
j=1
[
µ∗i,j∇gi,j(P ∗i )− µi,j∇gi,j(Pi)
]T
∆Pi (5.67)
This equation along with the other consistent KKT conditions (5.23–5.26)
and (5.59–5.62) are sufficient to invoke lemma 1 (see appendix B). Because
the agent is convex we know that:
∇fi(P ∗i )T∆Pi ≥ fi(P ∗i )− fi(Pi) (5.68)
∇fi(Pi)T∆Pi ≤ fi(P ∗i )− fi(Pi) (5.69)
Lemma 1 has the result that [∇fi(P ∗i )−∇fi(Pi)]T ∆Pi = 0. Adding this
to the second inequality above, cancelling and comparing it to the first
inequality requires:
∇fi(P ∗i )T∆Pi = fi(P ∗i )− fi(Pi) (5.70)
From the convexity of the constraints we have for all j ∈ {1, . . . , Ni}:
∇gi,j(P ∗i )T∆Pi ≥ gi,j(P ∗i )− gi,j(Pi) (5.71)
∇gi,j(Pi)T∆Pi ≤ gi,j(P ∗i )− gi,j(Pi) (5.72)
Lemma 1 gives the result that
[
µ∗i,j∇gi,j(P ∗i )− µi,j∇gi,j(Pi)
]T
∆Pi = 0 and
µi,jgi,j(Pi) = µ
∗
i,jgi,j(P
∗
i ) = µ
∗
i,jgi,j(Pi) = µi,jgi,j(P
∗
i ) = 0. Multiplying the
first inequality above by µ∗i,j , the second by µi,j and applying these equalities
results in:
µ∗i,j∇gi,j(P ∗i )T∆Pi = 0 (5.73)
Multiplying (5.23) by ∆Pi and substituting results (5.70) and (5.73) pro-
duces:
fi(P
∗
i )− fi(Pi) + λ∗T∆Pi = 0 (5.74)
=⇒ fi(P ∗i )− fi(Pi) = −λ∗T∆Pi (5.75)
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By adding λ∗TP ∗i − λTPi to both sides we get:
∆ci = λ
∗TP ∗i − λTPi − λ∗T∆Pi (5.76)
=⇒ ∆ci = ∆λTPi = ∆λTP ∗i (5.77)
If all agents are convex and consistent then lemma 2 (see appendix B)
ensures that ∆λT∆Pi = 0, and hence theorem 1 applies to all agents. Mul-
tiplying the power balancing constraint by the change in price produces∑A
i=1 ∆λ
TPi = 0. Applying theorem 1 to this gives
∑A
i=1 ∆ci = 0. There-
fore, if the expected cost for an agent increases, one or more other agents
must have a decrease in expected cost. Those that have a decrease in ex-
pected cost stand to gain an advantage by the change.
5.9.3 Inconsistency Identifier
We now bring these results together to form an identifier for inconsistency.
Given the powers Pi and P
∗
i and prices λ and λ
∗ for two consecutive horizons,
an agent i is labelled as:
• inconsistent if ∆λT∆Pi > 0;
• notionally inconsistent if ∆λT∆Pi = 0 and ∆λTPi < 0; and
• notionally consistent otherwise.
The notional adjective is used to indicate labels that are not exact; there
may exist false positives or false negatives.
Agents labelled as notionally inconsistent may actually be consistent.
What is important is that they are not further falsely identified as being
manipulative in the next step.
Although agents labelled as notionally consistent may actually be incon-
sistent, the impact of their inconsistency is not as significant. To understand
this consider the two possible cases.
The first case is if ∆λT∆Pi < 0. The conservation of power requires that∑A
i=1 ∆λ
T∆Pi = 0 always holds (see lemma 2 proof). This sum ensures that
there must be some other agent j that definitely is inconsistent ∆λT∆Pj > 0,
and therefore has a stronger impact on the system.
The second case is if ∆λT∆Pi = 0 and ∆λ
TPi ≥ 0. Here either no one
is any worse off or the inconsistent agent itself is expected to be worse off.
This is not the action of a rational manipulative agent, so this inconsistency
is most likely caused by agent uncertainty.
Some inconsistent agents will be missed, but the agents that have the
most significant impact on the system will be correctly identified.
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5.10 Manipulation Identification
The inconsistency identifier can identify who caused a solution to change,
the next step is distinguish whether this change was due to uncertainty or
whether it was manipulative. As agents’ true preferences are kept private,
the only way to distinguish between these two is to apply statistical tests to
the data that is public. No test will perform perfectly in every case, and they
will likely have to be developed over time to match the type of participants
and the form of their uncertainty. Here we propose a simple test, which we
will demonstrate to be effective on our greedy agent.
5.10.1 Cost Anticipation Test
The cost anticipation test analyses how agents anticipate their future mon-
etary costs. In many instances an agent manipulates the actions of others
by pretending to have high electricity requirements in a future time step. As
the horizons progress forwards, the strategic agent eventually changes their
estimate to their true consumption requirements. They appear to anticipate
higher costs in earlier horizons for particular time steps.
For a given agent i, horizon h and time step t > h, the anticipated cost
error αh,i,t is defined as the difference between the anticipated monetary cost
and the actual monetary cost that eventuates:
αh,i,t := λh,tPh,i,t − λt,tPt,i,t (5.78)
When this value is positive the agent has overestimated what their costs
will be, and when it is negative they have underestimated them. The index
d := t − h measures the distance of a time step t from the beginning of a
horizon h. It represents how many horizons must advance before the value
in the time step is finalised. In our experiments the anticipated cost errors
are grouped by d to help identify patterns in the strategies of agents. When
analysing up to H horizons the set of anticipated cost errors for a given d
is defined as:
Ai,d := {∆αh,i,t|h ∈ {1, . . . ,H}, d = t− h} (5.79)
The mean of Ai,d should tend towards zero for a particular d if the agent is
subject to simple forms of uncertainty. If the agent is being manipulative,
then in many cases patterns will show up as non-zero mean values. These
statistical results can be used to further distinguish between the inconsistent
agents, and label them as either being uncertain or manipulative.
5.11 Identification Experiments
In this section we test the consistency and cost anticipation identifiers on
the greedy agent experiments from section 5.7, and new problem instances
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where the agent is uncertain instead of being strategic.
5.11.1 Uncertain Problem Instances
The uncertain deferrable agent resamples its power bounds ˆ¯Ph,i,t after each
horizon according to the rule ˆ¯Ph,i,t ∼ ˆ¯P1,i,t max(0,N (1, 0.52)). These values
are then scaled to ensure that the sum of these new power bounds is equal to
max(
∑T
t=h
ˆ¯Ph−1,i,t, Eˇh,i), where Eˇh,i is the power remaining to be consumed
for the agent in horizon h. This ensures that the problem remains feasible
for the uncertain agent. These values are used as the basis for calculating
fixed powers for the fixed uncertain agent (using the same approach as in
section 5.7).
The uncertain agent experiments are based off the instances generated in
section 5.7, with 50 instances per scale parameter value. They were solved
using Gurobi.
5.11.2 Inconsistency Results
The first experiments look at how the inconsistency identifier performs when
applied to the strategic, truthful uncertain and truthful certain agents. As
we are using a numerical method to solve the problem, we introduce toler-
ances for the inconsistency identifier. These tolerances are biased so that
we avoid misreporting inconsistency.
Any consecutive horizons where ∆λT∆Pi > 10
−4 are labelled as incon-
sistent. They are notionally inconsistent when 0 ≤ ∆λT∆Pi ≤ 10−4 and
∆λTPi < −10−4. Otherwise the horizons are notionally consistent.
In tables 5.1 and 5.2 we show the percentage of horizons that are labelled
in each of these categories for the fixed and deferrable agent experiments
respectively. Within each table the results are shown for the greedy and
uncertain agent experiments. Further, the results are then split up between
either the greedy (Greedy) or uncertain (Uncer) agent, and one of the certain
truthful (Truth) deferrable agents within each type of experiment. The
results are provided as a percentage identified out of all consecutive horizons
in all 50 instances generated for each experiment.
The greedy agents are found to be inconsistent for almost all horizons.
The uncertain agents are identified as being inconsistent much less often,
10–19% of the time. Even though they are uncertain in each horizon, this
does not always lead to an inconsistent result. The deferrable uncertain
agents are marginally less inconsistent than the fixed ones because of their
greater flexibility.
The truthful certain agents are often identified as notionally inconsistent,
when we know that they are actually consistent. They are identified in this
way when they appear to gain a benefit from the actions of the greedy or
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Table 5.1: Percent of horizons identified as inconsistent and notionally inconsistent
(in brackets) for different agents in fixed power experiments.
Greedy Exp Uncertain Exp
Scale Greedy Truth Uncer Truth
0.1 99 (0) 0 (33) 14 (0) 0 (5)
0.2 99 (0) 0 (36) 14 (0) 0 (3)
0.5 99 (0) 0 (33) 15 (1) 0 (5)
1.0 99 (0) 0 (37) 19 (1) 0 (5)
Table 5.2: Percent of horizons identified as inconsistent and notionally inconsistent
(in brackets) for different agents in deferrable load experiments.
Greedy Exp Uncertain Exp
Scale Greedy Truth Uncer Truth
0.1 99 (0) 0 (47) 10 (1) 0 (3)
0.2 99 (0) 0 (43) 10 (1) 0 (2)
0.5 100 (0) 0 (40) 13 (1) 0 (3)
1.0 100 (0) 0 (35) 13 (1) 0 (3)
uncertain agents. There is no strong trend that is observed as the scale of
the problem varies.
5.11.3 Anticipated Cost Results
The next step is to calculate the anticipated cost errors for the inconsistent
agents. We only calculate anticipated costs for an agent in horizon h if it
has been identified that it was inconsistent (not notionally inconsistent or
notionally consistent) between horizons h and h + 1. The results for the
greedy and uncertain agents are shown in figures 5.7 and 5.8 for the two
load types respectively.
These results show the anticipated cost errors obtained for each scale
value. These are split up into separate means depending on how far in ad-
vance the anticipated cost error occurred (see section 5.10.1). Also provided
are the 10th and 90th percentiles over all anticipated costs aggregated to-
gether for all instances. The mean of the uncertain agent remains around
zero, which indicates that on average the agent underestimates its costs in
advance just as often as it overestimates them.
The overestimation of costs in earlier horizons is exactly how the greedy
agents manipulate the other agents in this setting to gain an advantage.
This is clearly seen as a non-zero mean for the greedy agents. This is more
pronounced for the deferrable greedy agent because it gains a greater ad-
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Figure 5.7: Anticipated cost errors for fixed power greedy and uncertain agents.
Means for each instance are taken separately based on how far in advance the
cost was anticipated (given by d). The shaded sections provide the 10th and 90th
percentiles over all instances for the greedy and uncertain agents.
vantage.
A threshold can be used to separate anticipated cost error means of
the truthful uncertain agents from the greedy agents. This threshold can
increase as the contracted agent power limits (scale parameter) varies. After
a number of measurements, if the agent crosses over the threshold then
they can either be targeted for further auditing or fined for manipulative
behaviour. This will provide a strong deterrent.
It might still be possible for agents to gain some benefit by staying within
the threshold we select, but the benefit is reduced. The computational
burden is increased for the calculation of strategies that attempt to remain
within the threshold. For example, it introduces bilinear terms for the fixed
greedy agent, converting it from a MILP to a MINLP.
Using the anticipated cost error identifier with a threshold will limit the
type of uncertainty that agents can exhibit. Those with more complex forms
of uncertainty may be penalised if they produce results that look similar to
manipulative actions. If too many false positives are made in a particu-
lar setting then new identifiers can be developed. The great advantage of
having privacy-preserving identifiers is that they can always be modified or
more can always be added without affecting the operation of the underlying
distributed algorithm.
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Figure 5.8: Anticipated cost errors for deferrable greedy and uncertain agents.
Means for each instance are taken separately based on how far in advance the
cost was anticipated (given by d). The shaded sections provide the 10th and 90th
percentiles over all instances for the greedy and uncertain agents.
5.12 Related Work
Our development and calculation of greedy agent strategies is related to
other work that has looked at equilibria in electricity markets. Hu and Ralph
[2006] study equilibria in electricity markets with locational marginal prices
where each agent solves a bilevel problem to obtain their strategy. They
find sufficient conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria. Weber
and Overbye [1999] similarly develop a method for finding Nash equilib-
ria for producers and consumers that have linear price functions. Li and
Shahidehpour [2005] develop a method for the case where agents have in-
complete information about other agents.
Instead of searching for Nash equilibria, Kozanidis et al. [2013] develop
optimal bidding strategies for a strategic producer in a single time period
market with no network constraints. This is closer to what we developed
in section 5.6, but we look at multiple time steps which overlap between
horizons, and with different types of agents.
Compared to these works our problem is more complicated in certain
areas but simpler in others. For example, instead of a single time horizon, we
consider strategies over multiple overlapping horizons given by the receding
horizon structure. We also focus more on a prosumer oriented setting where
each agent can have a diverse set of preferences and constraints instead of
a market dominated by large generator units. However, as a first step we
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ignore network constraints.
Mechanism design and game theory have been used in demand response
[Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010, Chen et al., 2011, Tanaka et al., 2012, Akasi-
adis and Chalkiadakis, 2013, Samadi et al., 2012], as well as other network
problems including electricity markets and storage adoption [Andrianesis
et al., 2010, Tanaka et al., 2012, Vytelingum et al., 2011].
VCG mechanisms have been utilised by Samadi et al. [2012] and Tanaka
et al. [2012]. As discussed in section 5.2, VCG quickly becomes intractable
for realistically sized problems, and requires agents to fully disclose their
preferences. Tanaka et al. [2012] acknowledges these problems and proposes
that future work looks at the development of approximate methods.
Chapman et al. [2013] provide a detailed review into the practicality of
these existing game-theoretic approaches. They develop four important con-
siderations which any realistic mechanism should take into account, which
paraphrased are:
1. The power consumption in houses can take on both discrete and con-
tinuous values.
2. Each house has a private state that represents the state of the occu-
pants’ goals.
3. Houses have private preferences which are state-based, combinatorial
and non-convex.
4. Household behaviour is strategic.
In section 4.10 we showed how the most common source of household discrete
decisions can be effectively dealt with, and furthered this argument in section
5.4.3 by discussing other practical methods for dealing with non-convexities.
To this list we add a fifth consideration which acknowledges the uncertain
nature of the problem:
5. The system is inherently uncertain as a result of household occupant
behaviour and weather patterns.
A realistic mechanism should at least work in the presence of uncertainty
and ideally reduce its impact on the system performance.
Mhanna et al. [2015] use a scoring rule to charge consumer agents based
on both their actual consumption and their deviation from day-ahead al-
locations. By requiring agents to provide information on their uncertainty,
they can reduce the incentive for agents to lie about their requirements over
the day ahead. They find it to be “asymptotically” incentive compatible
as system size or reported precision increases; however, the approach does
not enable agents to share information they gain throughout the day and
re-optimise their allocation in an online fashion.
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Other works have adopted or suggested a receding horizon approach
[Venkat et al., 2008, Chen et al., 2012, Kraning et al., 2014], but Chapman
and Verbic [2015] is the only other work to consider the impact of agents
manipulating the receding horizon mechanism. They use clock auctions
[Ausubel et al., 2006] for allocating loads to agents within horizons. The
prices are discounted between horizons to give some flexibility for uncertain
agents. This discount factor provides a trade off between allowing agents to
recover from uncertain events and preventing manipulation.
Our approach avoids this trade off in the cases where an identifier can be
developed to distinguish uncertain actions. We found that this is possible
with the anticipated cost error identifier, at least when agents have simple
forms of uncertainty. These identifiers can also be applied to more general
settings, such as those where agents are both producers and consumers. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to formalise and focus on
manipulation of receding horizon power balancing, and to provide a practical
solution for the identification of this form of manipulation.
5.13 Conclusion and Future work
We formally introduced the notion of receding horizon manipulation in a
power systems setting. By developing a strategic agent, we empirically iden-
tified in the worst-case setting how much advantage an agent can gain by
manipulating the power balancing mechanism. We also showed how this
harms the overall social outcome.
We then developed an inconsistency identifier and an anticipated cost
error identifier which can be used to monitor the interactions of agents in
a non-invasive manner. We successfully used these identifiers to distinguish
between an uncertain agent and one that is intentionally manipulating the
receding horizon mechanism. Such privacy-preserving identifiers can be used
to deter such actions by initiating further auditing or applying fines.
Future work will expand these results to the full network algorithm de-
veloped in chapter 4. This requires the consideration of multiple flow vari-
ables per time step (real and reactive power) and the deployment of identi-
fiers at each bus in the network.
This is expected to be a simple extension of the existing identifiers. For
example, the agent power vectors P used in this chapter can be doubled
in length to account for the reactive power and most results should follow
with minor modification. The calculations for an agent will be done with the
prices for the bus that they connect to. This could enable the development of
more powerful identifiers which uses spatial information about the location
of inconsistent agents and the changing power flows on the network.
Experiments with more diverse agents and diverse forms of uncertainty
will also be valuable, and with them the development of additional identifiers
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if the anticipated cost error identifier is insufficient. Experiments with a
greedy agent that has varying amounts of information about other agents
will also help to further narrow down the bounds on how much advantage
manipulation can offer.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The objective of this thesis was to develop techniques for operating and co-
ordinating prosumer-owned DETs, so as to maximise the benefits to both
prosumers and the network. Three key parts of the problem were investig-
ated in chapters 3, 4 and 5, with the techniques developed in these chapters
combining to form an overall solution to the problem. This solution in-
creases the value of DETs for both prosumers and networks, and facilitates
cooperation between the two.
The results can be viewed as the development of an electricity market
that extends down to the distribution level, along with automated methods
for prosumer participation and market clearing. The method has a large
number of advantages, as discussed throughout this thesis, the most signi-
ficant of which are:
• A distributed architecture that relies on the computational resources of
prosumers, enabling the problem to scale to thousands of participants.
• Prosumer privacy preservation by only requiring expected power pro-
file responses to be exchanged with the mechanism.
• The ability to model and effectively account for the uncertainty that
prosumers are exposed to.
• Full automation, with only high-level preferences to be communicated
by people.
• Accurate power flow models to ensure network losses and constraints
are accounted for.
If deployed on scale, this approach will help the electricity systems to trans-
ition to one that is supplied by high penetrations of distributed renewables,
and for the further electrification of our societies.
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Key Learnings
The three parts of the problem that were investigated in this thesis produced
their own key learnings.
Chapter 3 developed a residential EMS to automate the operation of
prosumers DETs, and investigated several approaches to managing uncer-
tainty in weather, occupant behaviour and prices. Online receding horizon
optimisation using stochastic models of external sources of uncertainty was
found to provide clear benefits over reactive control. The technique was
found to have short solve times, and to produce solutions with quality close
to a clairvoyant solution.
Chapter 4 investigated the use of distributed optimisation for coordin-
ating EMSs over a network. Distributed optimisation based on ADMM
was found to be an efficient, privacy-preserving technique for coordinating
prosumers in a microgrid or on conventional distribution networks. The
ADMM algorithm can work directly with the non-convex AC power flow
equations, producing comparable results and performance to convex relax-
ations. Common sources of prosumer discrete decisions, smart appliance
shiftable loads, can be efficiently handled by this distributed algorithm with
little degradation to performance.
Chapter 5 formalised receding horizon manipulation, explored the harm
it can cause, and developed identifiers for it. It was found that prosumers can
manipulate the receding horizon mechanism, but the circumstances where
they can gain a significant benefit will be rare. For these rare cases, privacy-
preserving identifiers can successfully identify receding horizon manipulation
by differentiating between the actions of manipulative and uncertain agents.
Future Research
This thesis has raised a number of important questions that can form the
basis of future research.
In chapter 3 we utilised semi-Markov models to generate human-like be-
haviour, but it remains an open question whether it is possible to fit such
models in an online environment. Other stochastic models might provide
a better match to human behaviour, which would need to be investigated.
The level of abstraction at which the models are developed is an import-
ant consideration, as this will impact accuracy and the ability to learn the
model. For example, instead of modelling individual occupants, which will
be difficult to learn automatically, it might be sufficient to just model the
resulting DET interactions.
There are three areas worth pursuing for the distributed algorithms used
in chapter 4. The first is whether convergence guarantees can be established
for the non-convex power flow equations. It might be possible to obtain a
theoretical result that explains why the ADMM algorithm converged in all
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our experiments, or if not ADMM then another algorithm.
The second area relates to the rate of convergence. More sophisticated
optimisation algorithms can speed up convergence, but distributing such
algorithms tends to be more challenging. Future research could develop
distributed algorithms specific to power flows that strike the right balance
between rate of convergence, subproblem complexity and communications
overhead.
The third area relates to the development of anytime distributed al-
gorithms. The ADMM algorithm works on a dual decomposition of the
problem, which becomes feasible at the point of convergence. An anytime al-
gorithm keeps the problem feasible as it searches for better solutions, which
could be beneficial in a power systems context where a feasible solution
might be required at short notice. Future work would develop and investig-
ate the performance of distributed anytime algorithms in this power systems
setting.
The approach developed in this thesis improves the efficiency of the elec-
tricity system, but it also makes it more complicated. While automation
prevents people from being directly exposed to much of this increased com-
plexity, dynamic prices also apply to household loads that are not directly
controlled by the EMS. This might be unacceptable for some prosumers,
even if their costs average out to something less than what is offered by
current fixed electricity tariffs.
This might be just a problem of perception that can be overcome with
education, information and framing. But if not, then more consistent and
predictable electricity tariffs can be used to charge prosumers, with the
dynamic prices just working behind the scenes as an EMS control signal.
Future research would investigate such tariffs, and whether or not they can
be designed to encourage the right behaviour without exposing prosumers
to volatility.
Industry Application
Further developments and testing of the approach in this thesis will be
pursued in the upcoming CONSORT project. CONSORT is a collabora-
tion between universities, industry and a network utility, with the goal of
demonstrating the use of consumer-owned batteries for solving distribution
network problems.
The project will deploy PV-battery systems in homes in order to solve
an existing network congestion problem. This will provide a testbed for
demonstrating and improving the distributed coordination algorithms in
this thesis. The project will also experiment with different prosumer reward
structures and analyse the response of residents to these new technologies.
For the distributed algorithms, this project will focus on further optim-
isations and making them robust enough for deployment, including:
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• Reducing the communication burden by developing smart communic-
ation strategies and improving convergence.
• Improving the responsiveness of the EMS solvers.
• Handling rare cases where discrete loads cause a problem, or the al-
gorithm fails to converge in time.
• Identification of faults, lost or intermittent communications and the
development of robust oﬄine behaviour.
• Development of efficient methods for dealing with unbalanced 3-phase
settings.
• Enabling seamless integration into a network with non-participants.
• Developing tariffs and rewards that buffer agents from the dynamic
prices.
Summary
To summarise, this thesis has addressed the question of how to utilise and
coordinate prosumer-owned DETs for balancing and supporting the net-
work. It has expanded the knowledge in the areas of optimisation under
uncertainty, distributed optimisation and mechanism manipulation, as they
relate to this topic. It has discovered a range of interesting future research
topics, and will continue to be developed and demonstrated in a research
collaboration with industry.
Transitioning away from fossil fuels still presents a formidable challenge,
but one that is becoming ever more achievable due to advances such as
those presented in this thesis. This challenge, along with the rapid pace
of technological developments, makes it an exciting time to work in power
systems.
Appendix A
AC Power
When dealing with power flows on the network, this thesis makes a quasi-
steady-state approximation. That is, we discretise time and assume a steady
state in each discrete time step. We do not look at what happens between
time steps but just assume there is a stable way of transitioning between
steady states. In practice what we produce is target set points for controllers.
A.1 Steady-State AC
In steady-state AC, the voltages and currents in an electrical circuit are as-
sumed to be sinusoidal, with time-independent amplitudes and phase angles,
and sharing a common time-independent frequency. An example steady-
state voltage is:
V (t) = Vp cos(ωt+ θ) (A.1)
where the angular frequency ω, peak amplitude Vp and phase angle θ are
all time independent. These sinudoidal voltages and currents are commonly
transformed into a complex number representation, as it makes it easier to
apply Ohm’s and Kirchhoff’s Laws. Representing powers in the complex
domain is also useful, but care needs to be taken in calculations and their
interpretation, as these tend to be less intuitive. The complex representation
of the above voltage in polar and rectangular coordinates is:
V(t) = Vpe
i(ωt+θ) = Vp cos(ωt+ θ) + iVp sin(ωt+ θ) (A.2)
The actual voltage is just the real part of this complex number (the same
for currents):
V (t) = <(V(t)) (A.3)
This complex representation is often further simplified by treating the
time dependence implicitly for voltages and currents. The resulting quant-
ity is called a phasor. In phasors the root mean square (RMS) amplitude
V is typically used in place of the peak amplitude, where V =
Vp√
2
for a
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sinusoid. As we will, see this makes the power calculations simpler. The
phasor representation for the voltage in polar coordinates, polar using angle
notation and rectangular coordinates is:
V = V eiθ = V ∠θ = U + iW (A.4)
Operations such as the sum of two phasors and the multiplication of a phasor
with a complex constant produces another phasor; however, the multiplic-
ation of two phasors in general does not produce another phasor with the
same frequency.
Passive two-terminal components (e.g., resistors, capacitors, inductors or
any circuit combination of these with two terminals exposed to the outside
world) can be represented by a complex constant (not a phasor) called the
impedance:
Z = R+ iX (A.5)
where R is the resistance and X is the reactance. The inverse of the im-
pedance is the admittance Y, which has components of conductance G and
susceptance B:
1
Z
= Y = G+ iB (A.6)
Ohm’s law for impedances in the complex/phasor representation is in-
tuitive. A voltage Vab = Va −Vb across a passive two-terminal component
(see figure A.1) with impedance Z produces a current Iab = −Iba where:
Vab = ZIab (A.7)
ZVaIab IbaVb
Figure A.1: Passive two-terminal component with impedance Z.
Kirchhoff’s current law (KCL) is also intuitive. If T represents the set of
terminals connected to a node (bus) and Ij is the current entering (negative
if leaving) the node from terminal j, then the sum for currents must be zero:∑
j∈T
Ij = 0 (A.8)
Going back to the time domain for a moment, the instantaneous power
is given by the multiplication of voltage and current. Assuming a voltage of
Vp cos(ωt+ θ) and current of Ip cos(ωt+ φ) the instantaneous power is:
P (t) = VpIp cos(ωt+ θ) cos(ωt+ φ) (A.9)
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The instantaneous power can be reformulated as the sum of 90◦-out-of-phase
sinusoids, one with a DC offset applied to it:
P (t) =
VpIp
2
cos(θ − φ)(1 + cos(2ωt+ 2φ))− VpIp
2
sin(θ − φ) sin(2ωt+ 2φ)
(A.10)
The first term is known as the instantaneous real/active power and the
second term the instantaneous reactive power. The constants real/active
power P and reactive power Q characterise these sinusoidal terms:
P =
VpIp
2
cos(θ − φ) = V I cos(θ − φ) (A.11)
Q =
VpIp
2
sin(θ − φ) = V I sin(θ − φ) (A.12)
Physically, real power P represents the average power consumed/produced.
It also represents the peak amplitude of the element of power that does
work. Reactive power Q is the peak amplitude of the element of power that
oscillates back and forth without doing any net work. It is the result of
energy being periodically stored and released in reactive components like
capacitors and inductors. The sign of reactive power modifies the phase of
the element it represents by 180◦.
Together real and reactive power characterise instantaneous power, and
they form a complex constant called the complex power S:
S = P + iQ (A.13)
The magnitude of the complex power S = |S| is called the apparent power.
The complex power consumed/produced by a two-terminal component can
be calculated in phasor notation by multiplying the complex conjugate of
the current by the voltage across the component:
S = IabVab (A.14)
Intuitively, one might expect this operation to produce a complex form of
the instantaneous power, but this is not the case. The time dependence of
the phasors cancel out when multiplied in this way, producing a complex
constant. Note that if peak amplitudes for the current and voltage are used
instead of RMS values, then a factor of 12 would need to be applied to the
RHS of this equation.
A.1.1 Balanced 3-Phase
A balanced 3-phase system is one where the load and line impedances in
each phase are identical. The voltages (currents) are the same in each phase,
apart from being 120◦ out of phase from each other. If the phases are labelled
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a, b and c, and the neutral labelled n, the relations between the different
line-to-neutral voltages (same for line currents) is given by:
Van = Vbn∠120◦ = Vcn∠240◦ (A.15)
The same relation holds for the line-to-line voltages:
Vab = Vbc∠120◦ = Vca∠240◦ (A.16)
which are related to the line-to-neutral voltages by:
Vab =
√
3Van∠30◦ (A.17)
The total complex power is the sum of power on each phase or just three
times the power on one of those phases in a balanced system:
S = 3Sa = 3IaVan (A.18)
where Van is the phase a to neutral voltage and Ia is the phase a current.
The balanced 3-phase system can be treated as a single phase system by
converting ∆ connected loads to their Y equivalent:
ZY =
Z∆
3
(A.19)
There are a few options when it comes to dealing with the factor of three
that appears in the total complex power equation. Either it can be used
in all calculations, the power in just one phase can be used instead, or the
factor of three can be absorbed by other terms. It does not really matter
what approach is taken as long as it is applied consistently and the physical
significance as it ties back to the 3-phase system is remembered. We adopt
the latter approach, and have the voltage and current terms soak up the
factor:
Z = ZY (A.20)
V =
√
3Van = Vab∠− 30◦ (A.21)
I =
√
3Ia (A.22)
After applying this transformation, Ohm’s law, Kirchhoff’s laws and com-
plex power are calculated as for any single phase system, and the calculated
powers are the total powers for the full 3-phase system.
Appendix B
Proofs
Lemma 1. Given the convex functions f : RM 7→ R and gj : RM 7→
R, if (∇f(x) − ∇f(y))T(x − y) = ∑Nj=1(bj∇gj(y) − aj∇gj(x))T(x − y),
ajgj(x) = bjgj(y) = 0 and gj(x), gj(y) ≤ 0 for some x, y ∈ RM , aj , bj ≥ 0
and subgradients ∇f(·) ∈ ∂f(·), ∇gj(·) ∈ ∂gj(·), then bjgj(x) = ajgj(y) = 0,
(∇f(x)−∇f(y))T(x− y) = 0 and (aj∇gj(x)− bj∇gj(y))T(x− y) = 0.
Proof. We define Γ to be equal to the LHS of the first equation:
Γ := (∇f(x)−∇f(y))T(x− y) =
N∑
j=1
(bj∇gj(y)− aj∇gj(x))T(x− y)
(B.1)
Using the convexity of f and gj we get the following bounds on Γ:
Γ ≥ (f(x)− f(y)) + (f(y)− f(x)) = 0 (B.2)
Γ ≤
N∑
j=1
bj(gj(x)− gj(y)) + aj(gj(y)− gj(x)) (B.3)
The condition ajgj(x) = bjgj(y) = 0 simplifies the second inequality to:
Γ ≤
N∑
j=1
bjgj(x) + ajgj(y) (B.4)
The conditions gj(x), gj(y) ≤ 0 and aj , bj ≥ 0 imply that bjgj(x) ≤ 0 and
ajgj(y) ≤ 0, but (B.2) and (B.4) requires that they sum to a non-negative
value. This is only possible if the first result holds:
bjgj(x) = ajgj(y) = 0 (B.5)
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This means that Γ ≤ 0, which combined with (B.2) implies Γ = 0, which is
the second result. Using the convexity of gj and applying the first result we
get:
(bj∇gj(y)− aj∇gj(x))T(x− y)
≤ bj(gj(x)− gj(y)) + aj(gj(y)− gj(x)) = 0 (B.6)
The definition of Γ and the result Γ = 0 requires that these non-positive
terms sum to zero, which is only possible if the final result holds:
(bj∇gj(y)− aj∇gj(x))T(x− y) = 0 (B.7)
Lemma 2 (No Violation). If all agents satisfy the RPAR, then for each
agent i: ∆λT∆Pi = 0.
Proof. The power conservation rule requires:
A∑
i=1
Pi = 0
A∑
i=1
P ∗i = 0 (B.8)
Taking the difference and multiplying through by ∆λ:
A∑
i=1
∆λT∆Pi = 0 (B.9)
This is a sum of non-positive values because all agents satisfy the RPAR:
∆λT∆Pi ≤ 0. Therefore for each agent i:
∆λT∆Pi = 0 (B.10)
Lemma 3 (Feasible Powers Adversary). Assume a convex agent i with fixed
power Pˆi ∈ RT that has non-zero power requirements in the first time step
of the horizon Pˆi,1 6= 0. For any untruthful pure strategy that changes the
feasible set of powers for the agent at a future time step t ∈ {2, . . . , T} (i.e.
from Pi,t ∈ {Pˆi,t} to Pi,t ∈ [
¯
Pi, P¯i] for some
¯
Pi ≤ P¯i), there exists a convex
adversary which will increase the costs for the agent relative to their truthful
strategy.
Proof. We build an environment where there is only one other agent j, the
adversary, with power Pj ∈ RT and convex cost function:
fj(Pj) = (Pj,1 + aPj,t + b)
2 (B.11)
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for some constants a and b. Because there are only two agents, the power
conservation constraint requires Pj = −Pi. We set the power bounds on the
adversary so that they are looser than those for the fixed power agent (i.e.
they are never active). The KKT conditions for the adversary at the two
time steps of interest 1 and t are (the rest are trivially satisfied):
∇1fj(Pj) + λ1 = 0 (B.12)
∇tfj(Pj) + λt = 0 (B.13)
Evaluating and substituting −Pi for Pj :
2(−Pˆi,1 − aPi,t + b) + λ1 = 0 (B.14)
2a(−Pˆi,1 − aPi,t + b) + λt = 0 (B.15)
The value of Pi,t can take on one of three values. First assume λt = 0
(bounds from fixed power agent not active). This gives the value P ′i,t:
2a(−Pˆi,1 − aP ′i,t + b) = 0 (B.16)
=⇒ P ′i,t = (−Pˆi,1 + b)/a (B.17)
Note that for any Pˆi,1 and a 6= 0 we can choose a b such that P ′i,t ∈ R. Since
fj is convex, the value of Pi,t is:
Pi,t = min(max(P
′
i,t, ¯
Pi), P¯i) (B.18)
The cost for the agent in the first time step is:
ci,1 = λ1Pˆ1 (B.19)
Eliminating λ1 and Pi,t:
ci,1 = 2Pˆi,1(Pˆi,1 + amin(max(P
′
i,t, ¯
Pi), P¯i)− b) (B.20)
For the case that the agent tells the truth P¯i =
¯
Pi = Pˆi,t:
cˆi,1 = 2Pˆi,1(Pˆi,1 + aPˆi,t − b) (B.21)
The cost change relative to this truthful case is:
ci,1 − cˆi,1 = 2aPˆi,1(min(max(P ′i,t, ¯Pi), P¯i)− Pˆi,t) (B.22)
For given
¯
Pi ≤ P¯i and Pˆi,1 we can always select an a and P ′i,t where this
change is greater than zero, unless Pˆi,1 = 0 (which the lemma prohibits) or
¯
Pi = P¯i = Pˆi,t (the agent is truthful).
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Nomenclature
Acronyms
AC Alternating current
AC Exact AC (line model)
ACT Australian Capital Territory
ADMM Alternating direction method of multipliers
AEMO Australian energy market operator
AM Additive model
BOM Bureau of meteorology
DC Direct current
DC Linear DC (line model)
DET Distributed energy technology
DF Dist-flow (line model)
DLC Direct load control
DLMP Dynamic locational marginal prices
DR Demand response
DSM Demand-side management
EV Electric vehicle
EMS Energy management system
FIT Feed-in tariff
GAM Generalised additive model
GLM Generalised linear model
129
130 NOMENCLATURE
HVAC Heating, ventilation and air conditioning
K Quadratic approximation (line model)
KCL Kirchhoff’s current law
KKT Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
LDC Linear DC (line model)
MDP Markov decision process
MILP Mixed-integer linear programming
MIP Mixed-integer programming
MIQP Mixed-integer quadratic programming
MPC Model predictive control
NEM National energy market
NSW New South Wales
OPF Optimal power flow
PV Photovoltaics
QA Quadratic approximation (line model)
QC Quadratic constraint (line model)
QP Quadratic programming
SH Single horizon (problem)
RD Relax and decide (method)
RH Receding horizon
RP Relax and price (method)
RTP Real-time pricing
TOU Time-of-use (pricing)
TRH Terminating receding horizon (problem)
UR Unrelaxed (method)
VPP Virtual power plant
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Symbols
A Number of agents
A Area
A Connection constraint matrix
A Anticipated cost error set
α Anticipated cost error
α Relax and price penalty parameter
B Susceptance
c Cost
d Device
d Component
D Device set
D Component set
E Energy
E Connection set
η Efficiency
f Cost function
g Constraint function
G Conductance
γ KKT multiplier
h Power function
h Connection constraint function
h Horizon
I Global irradiance
I Current
k Iteration
k Random parameter index
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K Known random parameter index set
κ Specific heat capacity
L Number of parameters
L Lagrangian
λ KKT multiplier
λ Dynamic price
Λ Relax and price penalty matrix
m Number of sampled scenarios
m Mass
M Number of variables
µ KKT multiplier
n Bus/node
n Number of inter-phase terminal constraints
N Number of constraints
ν Big-M style values
ω Angular frequency
p Probability
P Real power
φ Current phase angle
ψ Price/cost coefficient
Ψ Price/cost coefficient
q Stochastic programming subproblem function
Q Reactive power
r Device parameters
r Residual
R Thermal resistance
R Electrical resistance
133
ρ Step/penalty parameter
s Scenario
s Scale parameter
S Scenario set
S Complex power
t Time step
T Number of time steps
T Horizon length
T Temperature
T Terminal set
τ Time
θ Voltage phase angle
V Voltage
w Random parameter value
W Random parameter
X Reactance
Y Admittance
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